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ABSTRACTS

Democracy and Economic Crisis:
THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
By KAREN L. REMMER

The debt crisis has raised serious concerns about the future of democratic governance in Latin America. The prevailing assumption is not merely that economic decline undercuts prospects for democratic consolidation; because of their vulnerability to popular political pressures, democracies—particularly new democracies—have been seen as incapable of mounting effective policy responses to critical economic challenges. A comparative study of policy outcomes in Latin America since the outbreak of the debt crisis challenges this assumption. If we control for the magnitude of the debt burden at the outbreak of the crisis, no statistically significant differences emerge between democratic and authoritarian regimes, or between new democracies and more established regimes. The findings suggest that the conventional wisdom about democracy and economic crisis exaggerates the relationship between political regime characteristics and policy choice, and fundamentally misconstrues the strengths and weaknesses of liberal democratic forms of governance.

Deterrence:
THE ELUSIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
By RICHARD NED LEBOW and JANICE GROSS STEIN

Empirical analyses of deterrence have paid insufficient attention to the validity and reliability of the data used to test the central propositions of theories of deterrence. This article examines two prominent studies of immediate extended deterrence that do not deal adequately with the problems inherent in constructing a valid data set for quantitative analysis. The problems are particularly acute in the testing of theories of deterrence because of the difficulties in identifying cases of deterrence success and of inferring the intentions of would-be challengers. Our analysis explores these problems and suggests ways of testing theories of deterrence that can reduce the threats to valid inference.

U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection
By MIROSLAV NINCIC

The author examines the hypothesis that U.S. Soviet policy is largely driven by electoral considerations rather than by the shifting nature of the Soviet challenge. He combines historical and quantitative analysis to probe the forces that shape these electoral calculations as well as the manner in which they manifest themselves at various stages of the electoral cycle. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the domestic determinants of America's Soviet policy for the USSR's own foreign policy behavior.

World Economic Cycles and Central American Political Instability
By MARC LINDENBERG

This article explores the parameters of choice available to small developing countries within the constraints imposed by the international economic system. Its thesis is that, since the 1930s, world economic recessions have helped accelerate waves of social discontent, political instability, and repression within the Central American nations. It concludes that international economic crisis was a necessary but not sufficient condition to exacerbate political instability in all countries. The thesis was supported in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama (which entered the 1930s with traditional authoritarian regimes) and rejected for Costa Rica (which began with a democratic regime). The article also discusses the dynamics of leadership transfer in the region and makes policy recommendations about how to minimize the negative impact of world economic cycles on small countries.

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Rethinking State and Regime:
southern europe's transition to democracy

By ROBERT M. FISHMAN

The historical clustering of the transitions to democracy of Spain, Portugal, and Greece—all having taken place in the mid-1970s—encourages scholars to search for common causes, patterns, and paths of development. But important differences remain between the cases. Analytical distinctions include the difference between state and regime, and the contrast between regime crises of failure and crises of historical obsolescence. These distinctions make it possible to delineate divergent causes, actors, trajectories, and outcomes for the three cases of redemocratization.

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DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC CRISIS:
The Latin American Experience

By KAREN L. REMMER

SINCE 1979, the politics of Latin America have been transformed by the longest and deepest wave of democratization in the region's history. At the same time, the continent has been confronting its most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression. The confluence of these two trends has raised serious concerns about the future of democratic governance in the region.[1] The prevailing assumption is not merely that economic decline undercuts prospects for democratic consolidation. Because of their vulnerability to popular political pressures, democracies—particularly new democracies—are also seen as incapable of mounting effective policy responses to critical economic challenges.

In this essay, the relationship between democracy and economic crisis is examined with specific reference to the question of policy response. Are democracies less likely than other regimes to address economic crises with appropriate policies? Do they tend to intensify rather than ameliorate economic challenges to their survival? How important are political regime characteristics for explaining varying policy responses to common economic difficulties? A comparative study of policy outcomes in Latin America after the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982 suggests that the conventional wisdom about democracy and economic crisis not only exaggerates the relationship between political regime characteristics and policy choice; it also fundamentally misconstrues the strengths and weaknesses of democratic forms of governance.

[1] Jimmy Carter and Howard Baker, "Latin America's Debt and U.S. Interests," in Robert A. Pastor, ed., *Latin America's Debt Crisis: Adjusting to the Past or Planning for the Future?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987), 2; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Global Debt Crisis*, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 1986, pp. 57, 59, 76; Inter-American Dialogue, *The Americas in 1989: Consensus for Action* (Aspen, CO: The Aspen Institute, 1989), 1-2; Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, *Latin American Debt* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 146; Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller, "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica, 1978-1983," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (September 1987), 323; "Bush Aides Are Likely to Offer a Plan Soon on Third World Debt," *Wall Street Journal*, March 9, 1989, p. 1; "Third World Debt Won't Wait," *New York Times*, October 1, 1988, p. 4; "Latin Debt Crisis Seen as Threat to Continent's New Democracies," *New York Times*, January 17, 1989, p. 3.

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Regime Characteristics and Public Policy

For nearly three decades, comparativists have been arguing over the determinants of policy choice. The debate is far from closed, but a growing body of research has generated considerable skepticism about the importance of regime variations for understanding policy performance.[2] Not only are policy choices constrained by socioeconomic realities, but the political similarities and differences among nations appear to be far too complex and multifaceted to be captured by simple distinctions among types of regimes. As a result, knowing that a regime is civilian rather than military, democratic rather than authoritarian, or even inclusionary rather than exclusionary establishes only a limited basis for making predictions about policy outcomes. The reasons are obvious. What counts in the formation of policy is not merely the rules of the political game, but the composition of governing coalitions, the ideological orientations of government leaders, and the structure of decision making. Recent literature on policy formation in Latin America and Western Europe has accordingly stressed such issues as the ideology of the dominant party, differences between presidential and parliamentary rule, national policy commitments, the belief systems of policy makers, the role of technocrats, union organization, relationships between the state and business groups, and corporatist forms of interest representation.[3]

[2] For a summary and review of this literature as it pertains specifically to Latin America, see Karen L. Remmer, "Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 13, No. 2 (1978), 39-54.

[3] David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Francis G. Castles, *The Social Democratic Image of Society: A Study of the Achievements and Origins of Scandinavian Social Democracy in Comparative Perspective* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); William Coleman and Wyn Grant, "The Organizational Cohesion and Political Access of Business: A Study of Comprehensive Associations," *European Journal of Political Research* 16 (September 1988), 467-87; Catherine M. Conaghan, *Restructuring Domination: Industrialists and the State in Ecuador* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Merilee S. Grindle, *State and Countryside: Development Policy and Agrarian Politics in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, "The Politics of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment," in Jeffrey D. Sachs, ed., *Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance*, Vol. 1: *The International Financial System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 209-54; Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," *American Political Science Review* 71 (December 1977): 1467-87; Robert R. Kaufman, *The Politics of Debt in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Stephen McBride, "The Comparative Politics of Unemployment: Swedish and British Responses to Economic Crisis," *Comparative Politics* 20 (April 1988), 303-23; Ronan Raddison, *The Fragmented State* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Philippe C. Schmitter, "Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone," in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making* (London: Sage Publications, 1982).

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Policies designed to cope with acute economic crises stand out as a key exception to these generalizations about research trends. Beginning with Thomas E. Skidmore's seminal study of economic stabilization,[4] scholars have repeatedly stressed the significance of regime characteristics for understanding the capacity of governments to manage serious economic disequilibria.[5] Either because economic austerity is seen as posing different kinds of risks for democratic and authoritarian governments or because the capacity to impose unpopular adjustment programs is assumed to vary with regime type, authoritarianism has been repeatedly linked with the successful management of economic crises, and democracy with failure. The first line of theoretical argument is represented by a recent work on the debt crisis, which asserts that "a democracy which is not accompanied by social and economic betterments for the population at large is putting its survival at risk."[6] A quotation from another recent work on Latin America illustrates the complementary argument—namely, that democracies are unable to administer the economic medicine required by crisis conditions. "Present economic policy . . . demands decision-making centers able to impose policies resisted by almost all segments of society. This is a task that prior cycles show is beyond the capacity of open democratic regimes in Latin America."[7] Authoritarian rule, which implies less dependence on popular support and more capac-

[4] Skidmore, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization in Postwar Latin America," in James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 149-90.

[5] Christian Anglade and Carlos Fortín, eds., *The State and Capital Accumulation in Latin America*, Vol. 1 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 8; Alejandro Foxley, *Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Robert Frenkel and Guillermo O'Donnell, "The 'Stabilization Programs' of the International Monetary Fund and Their Internal Impacts," in Richard R. Fagen, ed., *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979), 171-216; Robert R. Kaufman, "Democratic and Authoritarian Responses to the Debt Issue: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico," *International Organization* 39 (Summer 1985), 473-503; Riordan Roett, "The Foreign Debt Crisis and the Process of Redemocratization in Latin America," in William N. Eskridge, Jr., ed., *A Dance along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the International Debt Problem* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), 207-30; John Sheahan, "Market-oriented Economic Policies and Political Repression in Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 28 (January 1980), 267-91; Barbara Stallings, "Peru and the U.S. Banks: Privatization of Financial Relations," in Fagen, pp. 217-53; Rosemary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead, "Introduction," in Thorp and Whitehead, eds., *Inflation and Stabilisation in Latin America* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 11, 18; Jorge Dominguez, "Political Change: Central America, South America, and the Caribbean," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Understanding Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 83.

[6] Institute of Latin American Studies, *The Debt Crisis in Latin America*, Monograph No. 13 (Stockholm: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1986), 11.

[7] James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin America," in James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1987), 249.

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ity to override political dissent, is consequently seen as more compatible with economic crisis than democracy.

To date, comparative research has provided only limited support for this line of analysis, and most of that support has been drawn from the historical experience of the three largest Latin American states. To the extent that researchers have considered a broader variety of cases, evidence of any strong linkage between regime characteristics and policy performance in the area of economic stabilization has remained distinctly elusive. A 1986 study, which presented both diachronic and cross-sectional analyses of IMF standby programs in Latin America over a thirty-year period, concluded that democratic regimes have been no less likely to introduce stabilization programs than authoritarian ones, no more likely to break down in response to their political costs, and no less rigorous in their implementation of austerity measures. If anything, the evidence suggested that the edge with respect to program implementation was with the democracies.[8]

Studies encompassing other areas of the third world have arrived at similar findings. According to Stephan Haggard's study of IMF Extended Fund Facility programs between 1975 and 1984, the capacity to adjust to economic crisis depends less on regime characteristics than on other variables, including the economic ideologies of governing elites, the importance of political clientelism, and the existence of a cohesive group of economic technocrats.[9] Joan M. Nelson's analysis of third-world stabilization programs reached similar conclusions.[10]

Despite this evidence, the economic policies and performance of Latin American states continue to be analyzed in terms of regime characteristics. The reason is twofold. First, either implicitly or explicitly, regional specialists have dismissed the relevance of prior research on the grounds that the current economic crisis is qualitatively different from any in the past. Thus, in their recent book on the debt crisis, Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman argue that "political regime type has been an important determinant of policy choice in the 1980s, even if it was not necessarily crucial in the more affluent 1960s and 1970s." In their view, "regime type weighs more heavily in conditions of crisis, when there are sharply contrasting views about how to allocate costs."[11] The argument parallels that of Peter Gourevitch, whose comparative analysis of responses to eco-

[8] Karen L. Remmer, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954-1984," *Comparative Politics* 18 (October 1986), 1-24.

[9] Haggard, "The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility," in Miles Kahler, ed., *The Politics of International Debt* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 157-86.

[10] Nelson, "The Politics of Stabilization," in Richard E. Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *Adjustment Crisis in the Third World* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984).

[11] Stallings and Kaufman, "Debt and Democracy in the 1980s: The Latin American Ex-

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nomic crises stressed that "the moments of greatest freedom are crisis points."[12]

The recent origin of most Latin American regimes has provided a second reason for dismissing the results of past research. Questions about the capacity of the region's democracies to manage the current crisis have been articulated specifically with respect to "newly emerging," "fledgling," "nascent," "struggling," or "incipient" democracies,[13] and not necessarily with reference to the generic properties of democracy as a system of governance. New democracies are singled out because of their supposed fragility or lack of legitimacy; indeed, the adjectives "new" and "fragile" have been used almost interchangeably to describe democratic governments in such countries as Argentina and Brazil.[14] The operative theoretical assumption is that, "in postauthoritarian situations, political legitimacy is very fragile and strongly contingent on material payoffs."[15] In a similar vein, Seligson and Muller have argued, "Demands of labor unions, middle-class groups, and peasants must all be at least partially satisfied if these regimes [the new democracies] hope to build their legitimacy."[16] Fragility, however, is not merely seen as a reflection of the contingent nature of popular support. New democracies also harbor strong antidemocratic forces, which may take advantage of widespread political unrest.[17] As a result, political leaders in recently established democracies are portrayed as facing unusually intense pressures to resist economic orthodoxy and to pursue policies that are likely to push their economies in the direction of total financial collapse.

Economic Constraints and Political Instability

Neither the depth of the post-1982 crisis in Latin America nor the recent origin of the majority of the continent's democratic regimes estab-

perience," in Stallings and Kaufman, eds., *Debt and Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 203, 220.

[12] Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 240.

[13] Seligson and Muller (fn. 1), 322, 323; House Committee on Foreign Affairs (fn. 1), 76; "Third World Debt Won't Wait," *New York Times*, October 1, 1988, p. 14; William C. Smith, "Heterodox Shocks and the Political Economy of Democratic Transition in Argentina and Brazil," in William L. Canak, ed., *Lost Promises: Debt, Austerity, and Development in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 156.

[14] See, for example, "Brazil's Democracy in the Balance," *COHA's Washington Report on the Hemisphere* 9 (December 7, 1988), 4; see also the statement of James A. Baker, III, the secretary of state-designate, at his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 17, 1989, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Current Policy*, No. 1146 (January 1989), 1.

[15] Smith (fn. 13), 156.

[16] Seligson and Muller (fn. 1), 322.

[17] Institute of Latin American Studies (fn. 6), 11.

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lishes an altogether compelling basis for dismissing prior research findings. First, the magnitude of the recent crisis has limited the choices open to Latin American countries far more severely than in the past. Regardless of their ideology or institutional base of support, leaders have been forced to choose between losing access to international financial markets or making concessions to the IMF and the international banking community in the form of orthodox policy measures and market-oriented programs of economic restructuring. Under such conditions, it seems plausible to assume that regime characteristics have become less rather than more important than in the past. What has counted is international bargaining position, not domestic politics.

Second, the assumption that new democracies will succumb more readily to economic challenges, or will handle them differently from old democracies, is also questionable. New democracies are not necessarily more fragile than old ones, nor do they necessarily enjoy less legitimacy or support. To assert otherwise is to argue by tautology. Myron Weiner errs in this direction when he states, "when countries have remained democratic for a generation, they appear more likely to remain democratic."[18] To the extent that this and similar statements take us beyond the conclusion that stable (or "institutionalized") democracies are stable (or institutionalized), they hardly comport with the Latin American experience.

Up until the recent wave of democratization, the peak year for democracy in the region was 1960. The correlation between democratic age in 1960 and subsequent durability is statistically insignificant ($r = .0181$). Table 1 illustrates the point. In 1970, there were seven liberal democracies in Latin America, three of which (Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica) had been established for a generation or more. Two of these three had collapsed by 1973. The breakdown rate for the "new" democracies was actually lower. Only one of the four (Ecuador) was overthrown by the wave of militarism that swept over the continent in the 1970s. The results are similar if 1960 or 1965 is chosen as a base year. If anything, past Latin American experience thus suggests that old democracies are more unstable and fragile than new ones.

The experience of Latin America since the outbreak of the debt crisis also raises questions about the supposed fragility of new democracies. Despite repeated prognoses of collapse, every Latin American democracy, whether old or new, weathered the first eight years of the debt

[18] Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 18.

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TABLE 1
BREAKDOWN RATES OF LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	1960	*1965*	*1970*
"New" democracies[a]	66.7 (9)	40.0 (5)	25.0 (4)
"Old" democracies	100.0 (2)	66.7 (3)	66.7 (3)

[a] "New" democracies are defined as those under a generation old at the relevant date.

crisis. The fate of authoritarian regimes was different: of the six authoritarian governments that existed in South America in 1982, five had been overthrown by mid-1989. The sixth (Chile) was defeated in a national plebiscite in 1988, paving the way for a democratic transition. In Central America and the Caribbean, the situation was similar. There were no instances of democratic regime breakdown, but the twenty-eight-year Duvalier dictatorship was displaced in Haiti, and Guatemala underwent a partial transition from military to civilian rule. Based on this record, it might be more appropriate to emphasize the fragility of "old" authoritarianism rather than the weakness of "new" democracy.

The assumption that new democracies lack the support or legitimacy to see them through a protracted crisis also appears unwarranted. Albert O. Hirschman has pointed out that democratic governments that displace highly repressive or widely discredited authoritarian regimes can count upon a special reserve of political support and trust that may carry them through economic crises.[19] As a result, new democracies may be at a distinct advantage. The transition from authoritarianism to democracy, which allows "political goods" to compensate for declining per capita incomes, provides new democracies with a breathing space not enjoyed by older regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian.[20]

POLICY PERFORMANCE IN LATIN AMERICA

The policy performance of Latin American countries between 1982 and 1988 provides a basis for evaluating the conventional wisdom concerning the linkage between regime and policy. During this seven-year period, the region existed in a condition of continuous economic crisis characterized by net outflows of capital, lowered standards of living,

[19] Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Seven Exercises in Retrospection," *Latin American Research Review* 22, No. 3 (1987), 28.

[20] The concept of "political goods" in this connection is drawn from Kuczynski (fn. 1), 147.

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high unemployment, and depressed levels of investment. At issue is the relevance of regime characteristics for understanding varying responses to these common economic difficulties.

Three principal hypotheses are examined:

1. Under conditions of economic crisis, regime is an important determinant of policy choice.
2. Democracies respond to economic crises less effectively than authoritarian regimes.
3. New democracies respond to economic crises even less effectively than old democracies.

For the purpose of this analysis, regime differences have been defined in relatively conventional terms. Governments selected on the basis of popular and competitive elections have been classified as democracies. Governments based upon military power or noncompetitive elections have been classified as authoritarian.[21] To address the theoretical issues posed by the relatively recent origin of many Latin democracies, a distinction has also been drawn between "new" and "old" democracies. All of the democratic regimes that emerged after 1979 have been assigned to the former category.

Policy performance has been assessed on the basis of six indicators, which were selected to minimize problems of data availability as well as to circumvent a variety of theoretical controversies. Three of the indicators represent fairly conventional measures of economic performance: the annual GDP growth rate, the annual percentage change in the rate of inflation (logged to achieve distributional normality), and the annual percentage shift in the ratio between total external indebtedness and export earnings. A fourth indicator was designed to provide a direct measure of policy choice as distinct from policy outcomes—namely, the annual percentage change in the ratio between the central government's deficit and GDP. Taken together, these four indicators establish a relatively uncontroversial basis for assessing policy success and failure. Whether inspired by orthodox or unorthodox thinking, efforts to cope

[21] These criteria are utilized solely because they pose few classificatory problems for the time period and the set of countries in question. The only ambiguous case is that of Brazil, which made less than a complete transition to democracy during the period under consideration. For other purposes, a more complex set of operational indicators might be preferable in order to separate inclusionary and exclusionary forms of competitive rule and to differentiate between limited and open competition. For recent efforts along these lines, see John A. Booth, "Elections and Democracy in Central America: A Framework for Evaluation," paper prepared for the Southwestern Political Science Association meeting, Little Rock, AR, March 30-April 1, 1989; Karen L. Remmer, "Exclusionary Democracy," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 20 (Winter 1985-1986), 64-85; Evelyne Huber Stephens, "Capitalist Development and Democracy in South America," paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1988.

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with the debt crisis have consistently placed a high priority upon limiting deficit spending, controlling inflation, restoring economic growth, and reducing the burden of debt servicing.

The two remaining indicators of policy performance reported in the subsequent tables pertain to labor conditions and are more ambiguous with respect to the question of policy success. These are the indicators of changes in real wages and unemployment, which were included in the analysis primarily to assess the supposed vulnerability of democracies to popular pressures. Much of the existing literature on the relationship between democracy and economic crisis assumes that democracies will attempt to protect real wages and employment levels, even at the risk of courting economic disaster. Hence, to the extent that regime type affects economic performance in line with the hypotheses derived from the literature on the debt crisis, the evidence should indicate that authoritarian regimes outperform democratic regimes, and that "old" democracies outperform "new" democracies, except with respect to the indicators of wages and employment, which should exhibit the opposite pattern.

Because the subsequent analysis is designed to explore variable responses to a common set of crisis conditions, the case base is limited to the ten Latin countries of South America, plus Mexico. The study thus encompasses all of the region's principal debtor nations, but excludes Central America and the Caribbean, which are conventionally considered part of the Latin American region. The reason for this exclusion is that the causes and dynamics of economic crisis in the Caribbean Basin have differed fundamentally from those of the rest of the region. The key problem has not been international indebtedness, but the regional political crisis originating with the struggle to oust the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Likewise, the capacity of political actors to manage economic difficulties has been shaped more heavily by military conflict and outside intervention than by pressures from the international banking community and associated outflows of capital. Heavy U.S. aid flows to countries such as Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica, for example, have compensated (and in some cases more than compensated) for the cost of servicing the foreign debt; while the performance of economies such as the Nicaraguan has reflected guerrilla warfare and external intervention. The magnitude of the economic problems posed by the onset of the debt crisis also differed significantly in Central and South America. In 1982, debt-service ratios in countries such as El Salvador, Haiti, and Guatemala were less than one-third of the regional average.[22]

[22] World Bank, *World Debt Tables, 1984-85* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1985), 158-227.

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Data on the policy performance of the eleven states have been drawn from official sources as reported to the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) and the Inter-American Development Bank.[23] To augment the case base and to avoid classification problems posed by regime transitions, the statistical analysis has been conducted in terms of pooled data rather than on a country-by-country basis. The data on Argentina for 1982 and 1983, when the military still governed the country, have thus been treated as cases of authoritarian program administration, while those of the five subsequent years have been coded as instances of democratic performance. The same procedure has been followed in the cases of Brazil and Uruguay, which also shifted regime categories in the middle of the period under consideration. The "new" democratic administrations thus include Argentina (1984-1988), Bolivia (1982-1988), Brazil (1985-1988), Ecuador (1982-1988), Peru (1982-1988), and Uruguay (1985-1988). Authoritarian program administrations include Chile (1982-1988), Mexico (1985-1988), and Paraguay (1982-1988), in addition to Uruguay (1982-1984), Argentina (1982-1983), and Brazil (1982-1984). Colombia and Venezuela have been coded as "old democratic." The resulting breakdown yields fourteen years of "old" democratic policy administration, thirty-four years of "new" democratic program administration, and twenty-nine years of authoritarian program administration.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the effects of regime differences on policy performance. The evidence in Table 2 demonstrates that no major differences separate democratic and authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Not one of the indicators listed in the table points to a contrast that is remotely significant in statistical terms. What is more, the indicators are inconsistent with the hypotheses drawn from the literature inasmuch as they point in the direction of more effective democratic rather than authoritarian crisis management.

A similar picture emerges from Table 3, which analyzes the differences between new and old democracies as well as the contrasts between these regimes and authoritarian ones. These differences are statistically significant with reference to only one of the six indicators of economic performance—the rate of unemployment; and even that indicator fails to conform to the literature on the management of economic crisis. New democracies in Latin America have turned in the best record in the area of employment, but old democracies have not evinced greater sensitivity

[23] CEPAL, "Balance preliminar de la economía latinoamericana, 1988" [Preliminary balance of the Latin American economy, 1988], *Notas sobre la economía y el desarrollo*, No. 470 (December 1988); *ibid.*, No. 387 (December 1983); Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America* (Washington, DC: IADB, 1982-1988).

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TABLE 2
DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIME PERFORMANCE[a]

	Democratic (N = 48) %	*Authoritarian (N = 29)* %	*F*	*Significance*
GDP growth	1.6	0.3	1.3994	.2406
Rate of change govt. deficit/GDP[b]	3.6	9.9	.0231	.8796
Log % change inflation rate[c]	4.8	4.7	.1938	.6611
Rate of change debt/exports[d]	6.5	10.4	.5088	.4779
Real wages (annual % change)[e]	−0.5	−2.4	.2950	.5888
Unemployment rate[f]	8.9	9.0	.0138	.9067

[a] Calculated on the basis of preliminary data for 1988.
[b] Based on the ratio between the central government deficit and GDP. Because some data were missing for 1988, calculations are based on 63 observations.
[c] Based on consumer price index.
[d] Calculated on the basis of the total disbursed debt divided by total exports of goods and services.
[e] Based on average manufacturing wage. Brazilian data represent averages for Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.
[f] Urban unemployment only. Data for Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela represent national urban averages; data for other countries are based on one or more major cities.

to unemployment levels than authoritarian regimes. Contrary to the expectation that authoritarian regimes and new democracies represent the two ends of the policy spectrum, with the performance of old democracies falling somewhere in between, the best and worst performances in the area of employment belonged, respectively, to the new and old democracies. What is more, no statistically significant differences separate the average annual unemployment rates of new democracies from those of authoritarian regimes ($p = .7889$).

A similar pattern emerges with respect to the other indicators. Not one points in a direction consistent with the literature on economic crisis. In terms of economic growth, real wages, and the rate of change in government deficits relative to GDP, the two extremes of the spectrum correspond to the old democracies and the authoritarian regimes rather than to the new democracies and authoritarian regimes. In terms of the indicator of inflation, new democracies have turned in the worst average record, but no differences separate the other two regime types. The average figures for changes in the debt-to-export ratio also run counter to prediction inasmuch as new democracies have outperformed the other

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TABLE 3
REGIME AND POLICY PERFORMANCE[a]

	"Old" Democracies (N = 14) %	*"New" Democracies (N = 34)* %	*Authoritarian Regimes (N = 29)* %	*F*	*Significance*
GDP growth	2.4	1.3	0.3	.9690	.3842
Rate of change govt. deficit/GDP	−3.7	7.2	9.9	.0296	.9708
Log % change inflation rate	4.7	4.9	4.7	.5649	.5709
Rate of change debt/exports	7.0	6.3	10.4	.2546	.7759
Real wages (annual % change)	0.2	−0.7	−2.4	.1625	.8503
Unemployment rate	11.6	7.8	9.0	5.1583	.0081
Debt/exports	251.2	411.4	340.3	13.9313	.0000
Interest payments/ exports	24.3	35.3	32.6	4.7000	.0120
Annual % change purchasing power of exports	3.6	1.1	10.2	1.6238	.2041
1982 debt/export ratio	216.0	322.1	321.7	10.6656	.0001

[a] Calculated as indicated in notes to Table 2.

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regime types, with authoritarian governments turning in the worst average records. As a result, not only are none of the differences between the newly established democracies and authoritarian regimes statistically significant, but newly established democracies have outperformed authoritarian regimes in promoting growth, containing the growth of fiscal deficits, and limiting the growth of the debt burden. Overall, the old democracies appear to have adhered to the most orthodox line of policy and compiled the strongest records of economic performance.

The last set of indicators in the table, which measures the severity of the economic constraints confronting policy makers, provides some basis for understanding these patterns. Old democracies outperformed other regimes in managing the debt crisis because they faced the fewest economic constraints. As suggested by Table 3, the old democracies—Colombia and Venezuela—entered the crisis in 1982 with debt-to-export ratios that were significantly lower than those of the new democracies and authoritarian regimes, while the authoritarian regimes began at a slight advantage relative to new democracies. Indeed, in terms of linear measures of association, the only indicator presented in Table 3 that is significantly correlated with regime is the 1982 debt-to-export ratio ($r = .3681$), which is also significantly correlated with the post-1982 debt-to-export ratio ($r = .7081$) and the ratio between interest payments and exports ($r = .8017$). When controls are introduced for the debt burden at the outset of the crisis, any relationship between regime and policy performance disappears.[24] In short, the fundamental problem confronted by competitive regimes in such countries as Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s has not been caused by the pressures or constraints of democratic governance, but by the sheer magnitude of the debt burden bequeathed to them by their authoritarian predecessors.

The Impact of Regime Change

In view of the unusually high level of indebtedness of the new South American democracies, is there any basis for arguing that new democracies have actually coped with crisis conditions more effectively than

[24] It may be noted that the results are virtually identical if the analysis is limited to the nine larger and more modern economies of the Latin American region, upon which Stallings and Kaufman focus their discussion of the link between regime and policy (fn. 11, chap. 12). The only difference with the findings reported here is that the relationship between rates of unemployment and regime remains significant at the .04 level after controlling for the 1982 debt burden. Again, however, that relationship does not conform to the hypotheses presented in the literature inasmuch as (a) the highest rates of unemployment are found in the old democracies rather than in the authoritarian regimes, and (b) the unemployment rates of new democracies and authoritarian regimes are not significantly different.

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other regimes? The cross-national data establish no support for such an argument; however, because three South American countries shifted regime categories after the outbreak of the debt crisis, it is possible to compare the policy performance of democratic and authoritarian regimes within national units.

Although the results of these comparisons are mixed, they do provide some basis for arguing that a shift to democracy can actually strengthen, rather than weaken, the capacity to cope with economic challenges. Particularly striking in this regard is the case of Uruguay, where a new democratic regime managed not only to increase real wages and reduce unemployment, but also to accelerate growth, limit the expansion of the debt burden, cut the government deficit as a percentage of GDP, and put the brakes on an inflationary spiral. In the other two cases, the economic impact of the transition to democracy was less positive. As indicated in Table 4, short-term improvements in several key economic indicators followed the regime transition, but these improvements appear to reflect the policy ineffectiveness of disintegrating authoritarian governments rather than the policy effectiveness of democracy. The diachronic comparisons thus reinforce the results of the cross-sectional analysis, concretely underlining the diversity of performance patterns encompassed by broad regime categories and the resulting lack of clear contrasts among them.

Even in terms of policy choice (as distinct from performance), major contrasts do not emerge between authoritarian and democratic governance in the three countries that changed regime categories after 1982. As suggested by the figures on changes in deficit spending, in Brazil a lack of strict policy orthodoxy characterized the management of the economy both before and after the election of a civilian president. In neither period did policy makers impose strict fiscal and monetary constraints or pursue a program of restructuring through privatization and liberalization—all of which constitute basic elements of an orthodox program in the 1980s. Probably the closest Brazil came to orthodoxy was in 1982, when its net international reserves dropped by U.S. $5.3 billion, forcing the military's economic team to introduce a series of austerity measures and to open negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. Far from heralding a major shift in the direction of orthodoxy, however, the letter of intent that was signed with the Fund in January 1983 was never fulfilled. Within six months, IMF support had been suspended. As indicated in Table 4, part of the problem was the fiscal deficit, which was allowed to increase from 2.5 to 4.0 percent of GDP; but the rate of growth of domestic credit, which rose by more than 50 percent

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in 1983, also points to a lack of concern with orthodoxy.[25] Between 1983 and 1985, five more letters of intent were signed with the IMF—and all of them were suspended for noncompliance. Thus, the program of the military in the face of economic crisis can at best be characterized as halfhearted orthodoxy—an approach not clearly distinguishable from the halfhearted heterodoxy of its civilian successor.

Under the leadership of Minister of Finance Francisco Neves Dornelles, the civilian government of José Sarney began with an orthodox economic orientation. It subsequently embraced heterodoxy in the form of the Plan Cruzado, which was announced in early 1986. The failure of that plan, in turn, paved the way for the restoration of a more orthodox approach under the leadership of Finance Minister Mailson Ferreira da Nóbrega. Policies arguably varied within the 1985-1988 period as much as they did between the periods of military and civilian rule, emphasizing the weakness of the link between regime and policy choice. In any case, the evolution of international conditions dilutes the significance of any contrasts that might be drawn between the wavering orthodoxy of the military and the wavering heterodoxy of Sarney's civilian government. Through time, perceptions of the debt crisis changed significantly, as did Brazil's economic position, thus increasing incentives and opportunities for departures from policy orthodoxy. In 1982, Brazilian policy makers had been worried about short-term liquidity problems rather than long-term constraints on growth. Moreover, dramatic improvements in the level of international reserves created possibilities for experimentation between 1985 and 1988 that did not exist at the outset of the crisis.[26]

Uruguay represents the opposite end of the political spectrum: it pursued a relatively orthodox set of policies both before and after the transition to democracy. Indeed, among the countries of Latin America, only Chile—long identified as a paragon of economic orthodoxy—could be described as adhering more consistently to orthodox precepts. A key difference between the two countries is that in Uruguay the military response to the crisis of 1982 was ineffective and vacillating. During the last three years of military rule, the fiscal deficit averaged 6.0 percent of GDP, while the average annual rate of growth of domestic credit exceeded 60 percent. Nevertheless, basic elements of the orthodox approach that had dominated the management of the economy between 1973 and

[25] Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1987 Report* (Washington, DC: IADB, 1987), 246.

[26] Johanna Sharp, "Regime Type and Economic Policy Formation: The Case of Brazil, 1982-1989," unpub. (Albuquerque, NM: 1989).

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TABLE 4
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND POLICY PERFORMANCE[a]
(PERCENTAGES)

	GDP Growth	*Govt. Def./GDP*	*Change Govt. Def./GDP*	*Inflation*	*Change Rate of Inflation*	*Change Debt/ Exports*	*Change Real Wages*[b]	*Unemployment Rate*[c]
Argentina								
1982	−5.8	−3.9	−26.3	209.7	59.8	44.4	−10.4	5.3
1983	2.6	−14.9	261.5	433.7	106.8	2.1	25.4	4.7
1984[d]	2.2	−7.2	−48.9	688.0	58.6	0.6	26.4	4.6
1985	−4.5	−4.5	−37.5	385.4	−44.0	−1.4	15.2	6.1
1986	5.8	−3.1	−31.1	81.9	−78.7	26.8	1.6	5.2
1987	1.6	−8.0	158.1	174.8	113.4	10.3	−5.9	5.9
1988	0.5	n.a.	n.a.	372.0	112.8	−19.6	−5.0	6.5
Brazil								
1982	0.9	−2.5	0.0	97.9	−2.7	33.2	7.3	6.3
1983	−2.4	−4.6	60.0	179.2	83.0	−0.2	−9.8	6.7
1984	5.7	−5.8	26.1	203.3	98.7	−12.5	−1.3	7.1
1985[d]	8.4	−11.8	103.4	228.0	12.1	5.8	15.1	5.3
1986	8.1	n.a.	n.a.	58.4	−74.4	18.7	16.7	3.6
1987	2.9	n.a.	n.a.	365.9	526.5	−5.9	−10.5	3.7
1988	0.0	n.a.	n.a.	816.1	123.0	−25.3	−4.1	4.0

Uruguay								
1982	−10.1	−8.6	85.0	20.5	−30.3	50.8	−0.3	11.9
1983	−6.0	−3.7	−57.0	51.5	151.2	17.4	−20.7	15.5
1984	−1.3	−5.0	35.1	66.1	28.3	11.7	−9.2	14.0
1985[d]	0.2	−1.9	−62.0	83.0	25.6	8.0	14.1	13.1
1986	7.0	−1.4	−26.3	76.4	−8.0	−10.7	6.7	10.7
1987	5.3	−1.3	−7.1	57.3	−25.0	8.6	4.8	9.3
1988	0.0	n.a.	n.a.	68.5	19.5	−6.6	2.3	9.2

[a] Calculated as indicated in notes to Table 2.

[b] Average manufacturing wage; Brazilian figures represent averages for Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.

[c] Data for Argentina are for all urban areas. Data for Brazil are calculated on the basis of the metropolitan regions of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador, and Recife. Data for Uruguay are based on unemployment rates in Montevideo.

[d] First year of democratic administration.

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1982, such as international opening and economic liberalization, were retained and carried forward into the late 1980s under civilian leadership. In Uruguay, regime transition entailed more effective policy implementation rather than major changes in policy orientation.

The case of Argentina resembles that of Uruguay in that authoritarianism proved incapable of mounting a coherent response to the outbreak of the 1982 crisis. In Argentina, however, the lack of policy coherence under authoritarianism was more pronounced. Confronted with a rapidly deteriorating international position in 1982 and 1983, the Argentine armed forces wavered between state interventionism and more orthodox approaches, but they were too divided and discredited to implement any effective policy response. The agreement reached with the IMF in January 1983, for example, committed the military government to limiting its fiscal deficit to 2.1 percent of GDP, but the actual figure for the year reached a level of 16.8 percent.[27] The democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín consequently inherited an extremely difficult situation. Its initial response was one of policy drift, but in mid-1985 it announced a bold economic plan, known as the Plan Austral, which combined conventional orthodox measures with a heterodox wage and price freeze. After a brief period of success, however, the economy began to deteriorate again, leading to a progressive drift away from orthodoxy. Hence, as in Uruguay, regime change initially enhanced rather than diluted policy orthodoxy, but the policy shift in the Argentine case was less decisive and less durable.

Analysis of the impact of regime change thus casts further doubt upon the conventional wisdom regarding democracy and economic crisis. The performance of the new democracies in the three countries that changed regime categories during the debt crisis was not markedly worse than that of their authoritarian predecessors. In one of the three cases, democracy was linked with improved rather than diminished policy effectiveness; in the other two, it brought a temporary respite from deepening crisis. The longitudinal evidence also indicates that the way in which governments responded to economic crisis was not a function of regime characteristics. Contrary to the literature crediting authoritarianism with the capacity to administer the harsh medicine of orthodoxy, no sharp differences can be delineated between the approaches of democratic and authoritarian governments in the three countries.

Overall, the evidence points less in the direction of domestic determinants of policy choice than to the relevance of international conditions. Of the three countries that shifted regime categories, Brazil had the

[27] Inter-American Development Bank (fn. 25), 214; *1983 Report*, 148.

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strongest international bargaining position and evidenced the least propensity to adhere to orthodox precepts or IMF recommendations either before or after the transition to democracy. Moreover, such shifts as occurred in its policies through time can be linked to the changing international situation. Uruguay, the country with the weakest international bargaining position, adopted a relatively orthodox set of policies both before and after regime transition. Argentina occupied the middle ground, both in terms of its bargaining position and its level of policy orthodoxy.

Conclusion

The experience of Latin American countries since the outbreak of the debt crisis establishes no basis for asserting that authoritarian regimes outperform democracies in the management of economic crisis. When we control for the magnitude of the debt burden at the outbreak of the crisis, no statistically significant differences emerge between democratic and authoritarian regimes or between new democracies and more established regimes. The importance of regime characteristics for explaining differing responses to economic crisis has been exaggerated, as have the inadequacies of new democratic regimes. Despite debt burdens that were significantly higher than those of more established regimes, the supposedly fragile new Latin democracies performed just as effectively as their authoritarian counterparts in managing the debt crisis. Longitudinal data support the same point. The experience of countries that shifted regime categories after 1982 suggests that the inauguration of a democratic regime does not necessarily undermine, and may actually enhance, the capacity of political actors to cope with economic challenges.

The weakness of the link between regime and policy performance can be related to external constraints on policy choice. As suggested by the longitudinal analysis, large countries—particularly those with dynamic export sectors—have enjoyed a much broader array of policy options than smaller ones. In countries that shifted regime categories, the continuities in policy performance over time also point to the possible relevance of factors such as economic structure or national policy commitments, which may not change with regime transitions.

More fundamentally, however, the paucity of evidence linking regime and policy speaks to the wide array of ideologies, political coalitions, and decision-making structures that are encompassed by broad regime categories such as "democracy" or even "new democracy." In countries such as Ecuador, the right dominated the recent process of democratic transition, giving rise to decision-making structures that protected business

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interests and shielded economic policy making from electoral pressures.[28] In neighboring Peru, however, democracy unleashed populist forces, threatening the access of business to the decision-making process and pushing policy in more nationalistic and less orthodox directions. Because of important variations in orientation, base of social support, and regime structure, the policy performance of authoritarian regimes has also differed considerably from one case to another.

The problem is that prevailing conceptualizations of regime characteristics do not leave room for such variations. As a result, the potential fragilities and policy costs of authoritarianism have been understated, whereas those of democracy have been exaggerated. Particularly intriguing in this regard are the sharp contrasts that emerge between the debt burdens of the new democracies and authoritarian regimes on the one hand, and of old democracies on the other. In the 1980s, Latin American democracies not only handled economic crises as effectively as authoritarian regimes; they achieved a far better record at avoiding acute crises in the first place.

The findings thus address questions about democracy that transcend the issue of crisis management. Like scholars of other third-world regions, Latin Americanists have spent most of the past two decades explaining the instability and rarity of democratic rule. While virtually every aspect of Latin society—from international structures of dependence to cultural values—has been seen as an obstacle to democracy, the dominant theoretical frameworks have emphasized the role of economic performance. In Guillermo O'Donnell's influential formulation, socioeconomic modernization failed to enhance the probability of democracy in the Latin American context because popular-sector pressures came increasingly into conflict with socioeconomic constraints on policy choice.[29] James Malloy, while taking a more cyclical view of political change in the region, has similarly linked the fragility of democracy with public policy, arguing that "since the 1930s the problem has been to found a government capable of solving key economic problems." He views the root of the problem as a tension between the need to accumulate capital for economic development and the need to build political legitimacy by meeting demands for increased consumption.[30] Similar arguments con-

[28] See Conaghan (fn. 3), 120-44.

[29] Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973). See also O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review* 13, No. 1 (1978), 3-38; O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 285-318.

[30] Malloy (fn. 7), 239.

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cerning the role of policy failure have been applied to Southeast Asia as well as to areas of the world characterized by comparatively low levels of modernization and popular-sector mobilization.[31] A recent volume on Africa, for example, attributes democratic decay and delegitimation to "the poor, often disastrous, economic performance of democratic regimes."[32]

Although the political face of Latin America has been dramatically transformed since 1979, the process of theoretical reorientation has hardly begun. Emphasis continues to be placed on the link between democratic fragility and policy failure. The puzzle of the 1980s, however, has not been the fragility of democracy, but its surprising vitality in the face of overwhelming economic constraints. To understand this vitality, it is necessary to set aside the assumptions that have been made about the operation of democracy in Latin America. At issue is not merely the question of pseudo-democracy, in which democratic institutions mask authoritarian realities, or even of exclusionary democracy, in which a restricted suffrage undergirds oligarchical control, but also the broader debate about the ways in which capitalism has accommodated democracy. In emphasizing the fragility of democracy in Latin America, scholars have conjured up systems in which the "privileged position of business," the "iron law of oligarchy," "private government," and other related constraints on popular control disappear, leaving policy responsive to the unmediated demands of peasants and workers.[33] Such systems have no empirical counterpart in the North Atlantic, much less in the highly inegalitarian societies of Latin America.

The strengths and weaknesses of Latin American democracy have been further distorted with respect to the political calculus of democratic political leaders. Contrary to the assumption that elected officials will attempt to enhance their legitimacy by delivering material payoffs to the bulk of the population, even at the cost of financial disaster, the lessons of the past have induced considerable political caution. Political leaders are aware that the rise and the fall of democracy in Latin America have corresponded less to the whims of the voting majority than to the concerted opposition of business and military elites.

[31] See, in particular, William Crowther, "Philippine Authoritarianism and the International Economy," *Comparative Politics* 18 (April 1986), 339-56, and Hyug Baeg Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea," *World Politics* 39 (January 1987), 231-57.

[32] Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, Vol. 2: *Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 15.

[33] Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Collier Books, 1962); and Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966), chap. 5.

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DETERRENCE: The Elusive Dependent Variable

By RICHARD NED LEBOW and JANICE GROSS STEIN*

THE testing of theory in international relations requires clearly articulated assumptions, the specification of scope conditions, rigorously formulated propositions, appropriate tests, and a valid and reliable data set against which to test the propositions. This last requirement has generally been the most neglected dimension of research. In this article, we examine two prominent studies of immediate extended deterrence by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett that do not deal adequately with the problems intrinsic to constructing a valid data set for quantitative analysis.† The problems are particularly acute in the testing of theories of deterrence because of the difficulties inherent in identifying deterrence successes, which leave few if any behavioral traces, and of inferring the intentions of would-be challengers.[1] Our analysis explores these problems and suggests ways of testing theories of deterrence that can reduce the threats to valid inference.[2]

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†A further article on this subject, by Huth and Russett, will appear in a forthcoming issue.—ED.

[1] Deterrence seeks to prevent undesired behavior by convincing those who might contemplate such action that its costs would exceed its gains. In the area of security, deterrence usually attempts to prevent a military challenge; but it also can and has been used to try to prevent unacceptable military deployments (such as the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba) or nonmilitary actions that defenders perceive as threatening to their national security. Deterrence requires that the "defender" define the behavior that is unacceptable, publicize the commitment to punish or restrain transgressors, demonstrate the resolve to do so, and possess the capabilities to implement the threat.

General deterrence is based on the existing power relationship between adversaries; it attempts to prevent an adversary from seriously considering a military challenge of any kind because of the obviously adverse consequences. Immediate deterrence is specific: it is designed to forestall a challenge to a well-defined and publicized commitment. This distinction is analyzed by Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Library of Social Science, 1977). Extended deterrence refers to the attempt to prevent an attack against a third party; direct deterrence is the attempt to prevent an attack against home territory.

[2] The pioneering study is Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in Ameri-*

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Huth and Russett have compiled the largest collection of cases of immediate extended deterrence. The fifty-four cases between 1900 and 1980 that they have identified form the basis of their frequently cited test of deterrence theory published in *World Politics* in 1984.[3] The primary canon of scientific research is the capacity to replicate the data of other scientists through similar procedures. We were unable to do so, however, with respect to either the selection or the coding of their cases.[4]

In our case-by-case analysis of the data set used by Huth and Russett in their 1984 study, we find that only nine of the fifty-four cases qualify as immediate extended deterrence. (See Table 1 for a summary.) In thirty-seven cases, we find no evidence that the alleged attacker intended to use force or that the putative defender practiced deterrence; both are necessary to identify valid cases of deterrence. Four cases are reclassified as compellence, and the remaining four cases are ambiguous; either they are open to multiple historical interpretations, or insufficient evidence is currently available to permit confident classification and coding.[5]

In many of the fifty-four cases, we find that attacker and defender are improperly designated, third parties are incorrectly identified as either targets of attack or of deterrence, direct deterrence is coded as extended deterrence, or deterrence is conflated with compellence. In four of the cases, for example, the threats made by countries identified as defenders were designed to stop an adversary from doing something it was already doing or to compel it to do something it would not otherwise have done; such cases are properly considered compellence, not deterrence.

In a subsequent article, published in 1988, Huth and Russett reclas-

can Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). For a recent review of the controversies associated with the testing of theories of deterrence, see the following articles in *World Politics* 41 (January 1989): Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," pp. 143-69; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," pp. 170-82; Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," pp. 183-207; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," pp. 208-24; and George W. Downs, "The Rational Deterrence Debate," pp. 225-37.

[3] Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984), 496-526. Huth and Russett presented a revised data set in "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (March 1988), 29-46; see also Paul Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), and Huth's article-length version, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *American Political Science Review* 82 (June 1988), 423-44.

[4] We researched and coded all the cases ourselves, but also asked our students to do so independently. We met periodically with them to compare analyses and resolve any discrepancies. We would like to thank John Garafano, Karsten Geier, Robert Herman, Aaron Karnell, Havina Dashwood-Smith, Christopher Cushing, Nabil Mekhael, and Mark Busch for their assistance.

[5] We coded three compound cases twice, thus generating a total of fifty-seven cases in this collection; they are cases 25, 32, and 49, described in Table 1.

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Table 1
Immediate Extended Deterrence, 1984 Data Set[a]

Case	Year(s)	Attacker	Protégé	Defender	Outcome	
					Huth/Russett	Lebow/Stein
1	1902/03	Germany	Venezuela	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
2	1904	Russia	Korea	Japan	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
		Recoded in the 1988 data set:				
	1903/04	Japan	Korea	Russia	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
3	1905/06	Germany	Morocco	France	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
		Recoded in the 1988 data set:				
		France	Morocco	Germany	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
4	1905/06	Germany	France	Britain	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
5[b]	1908	Turkey	Persia	Russia	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
6	1908/09	Russia/Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
7[b]	1908/09	Austria-Hungary/Germany	Serbia	Russia	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
8	1911	Italy	Tripoli	Turkey	Failure	Direct deterrence failure
9	1911	Germany	Morocco	France	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
		Recoded in the 1988 data set:				
		France	Morocco	Germany	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
10	1911	Germany	France	Britain	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
11[b]	1912	Serbia	Albania	Austria-Hungary	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
12[b]	1912	Austria-Hungary	Serbia	Russia	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
13	1912/13	Russia/Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
14	1913	Rumania	Bulgaria	Russia	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
15	1913	Bulgaria	Greece	Serbia	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
16	1913	Serbia	Albania	Austria-Hungary	Success	Compellence success
17	1914	Austria-Hungary/Germany	Serbia	Russia	Failure	Deterrence failure
18	1914	Russia/Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
19	1914	Germany/Austria-Hungary	Russia	France	Failure	Deterrence failure, improperly described
		Recoded in the 1988 data set:				
		Germany	France	Britain/Russia	Failure	Deterrence failure, improperly described
20	1914	Germany	Belgium	Britain	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
21[b]	1920	Soviet Union	Iran	Britain	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter

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22[b]	1927	Yugoslavia	Albania	Italy	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
23	1935	Italy	Ethiopia	Britain	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
24	1935/36	Japan	Outer Mongolia	Soviet Union	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
25	1938	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Britain/France	Failure	Deterrence success, Deterrence failure
26	1938/39	Italy	Tunisia	France/Britain	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
27[b]	1939	Japan	Outer Mongolia	Soviet Union	Failure	Deterrence failure
28	1939	Germany	Poland	Britain/France	Failure	Deterrence failure
29	1940/41	Soviet Union	Finland	Germany	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
30	1946	Soviet Union	Iran	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
31	1947	Soviet Union	Turkey	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
32	1948	Soviet Union	W. Berlin	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter, Ambiguous (two phases)
33	1950	United States	North Korea	China	Failure	Deterrence failure
34	1954/55	China	Taiwan/Islands	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
35	1957	Turkey/United States	Syria	Soviet Union/Egypt	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
36[b]	1957	Egypt/Syria/Soviet Union	Turkey	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
37[b]	1958	China	Taiwan/Islands	United States	Success	Ambiguous
38	1961	Iraq	Kuwait	Britain	Success	Ambiguous
39	1961	India	Goa	Portugal	Failure	Direct deterrence failure
40[b]	1961	Soviet Union	W. Berlin/W. Germany	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
41[b]	1962	India	Nepal	China	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
42[b]	1962	North Vietnam	Thailand	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
43	1964/65	Indonesia	Malaysia	Britain	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
44[b]	1964	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	Failure	Deterrence success, improperly identified
45	1964/65	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	United States	Failure	Failed compellence
46[b]	1965	India	Pakistan	China	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
47	1967	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
48	1967	Israel	Syria	Egypt	Failure	Deterrence success, improperly identified
49	1970	Syria	Jordan	Israel	Success	Deterrence failure, Compellence success
50[b]	1973	Soviet Union	Israel	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
51	1974	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
52	1975	Morocco	Western Sahara	Spain	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
		Recoded in the 1988 data set:				
		Morocco	Western Sahara	Spain	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
53	1977	Guatemala	Belize	Britain	Success	Ambiguous
54[b]	1978/79	Tanzania	Uganda	Libya	Failure	Failed compellence

[a] In the 1988 data set, the dates were changed in seven cases: numbers 13, 24, 29, 32, 43, 47, and 53. We have used the new dates in Table 1.
[b] Eliminated in the 1988 data set.

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sified and recoded many of their cases. The second collection, which extends from 1885 to 1983, includes only fifty-one cases of immediate extended deterrence between 1900 and 1980. Without offering an explanation for the changes in classification or coding of any particular case, Huth and Russett eliminated sixteen of their original cases from the second collection, added thirteen new ones, and recoded five of the thirty-eight they retained. In the absence of a case-by-case explanation of the changes, it is difficult to understand the reasons for the low cross-study reliability between the two collections, both of which were assembled by the same team of investigators with the same rules of classification and coding. At a minimum, these discrepancies raise serious questions about the validity and reliability of the original data set and its use to test theories of deterrence.

The second data set does not correct the problems we identified in our detailed examination of the 1984 cases. We classify only one of the thirteen new cases in the 1900-1980 period as a deterrence encounter. We find that the revised collection includes only ten cases of deterrence out of a total of fifty-one. (See Table 2 for a summary.) It also excludes what we regard to be the three legitimate cases of extended deterrence that were included in the first data set.[6]

These discrepancies reveal alarmingly low levels of cross-study reliability, not only between two teams of investigators classifying and coding precisely the same set of cases, but also between two data sets coded by the same team of investigators using the same rules four years apart. A broader issue of fundamental concern arises. Analysts of deterrence concur that a widely agreed-upon data base is a critical prerequisite for testing competing theories of deterrence and conflict management. Without a data base of cases of deterrence that is regarded as valid and replicable by the community of scholars it is impossible to test competing theories, much less resolve their differing predictions.

Our examination of the cases also challenges the coding of their outcomes. In their 1984 data set, Huth and Russett classified thirty-one of their cases as deterrence successes and twenty-three as deterrence failures. Of their nine cases that we designate as meeting the criteria of extended deterrence, we code three as successes and seven as failures (one compound case qualifies both as a success and as a failure). None of the three successes was so designated by Huth and Russett.

The most important question raised by our reclassification and recoding of the cases assembled by Huth and Russett is why and how two

[6] These are cases 24, 44, and 48. Cases 25 and 44 are discussed in the appendix.

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TABLE 2
IMMEDIATE EXTENDED DETERRENCE, 1988 DATA SET:
ADDITIONAL CASES

Case	*Year(s)*	*Attacker*	*Protégé*	*Defender*	*Outcome*	
					Huth/Russett	*Lebow/Stein*
1	1903/04	Colombia	Panama	United States	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
2	1906	Turkey	Egypt	Britain	Success	Direct compellence success
3	1921	Panama	Costa Rica	United States	Success	Direct compellence success
4	1922	Turkey	Greece	Britain	Success	Compellence failure
5	1937	Soviet Union	Manchukuo	Japan	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
6	1938	Soviet Union	Manchukuo	Japan	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
7	1950	China	Taiwan	United States	Success	Ambiguous
8	1961	North Vietnam	Laos	United States	Success	Compellence success
9	1961/62	Indonesia	West Irian	Netherlands	Failure	Not a deterrence encounter
10	1964/65	United States	North Vietnam	China	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
11	1971	India	Pakistani Kashmir	China	Success	Not a deterrence encounter
12	1975	Guatemala	Belize	Britain	Success	Ambiguous
13	1979	China	Vietnam	Soviet Union	Failure	Deterrence failure

teams of researchers can evaluate the same historical cases so differently. Are decisions of this kind inherently subjective in the face of historical evidence, or do other factors account for the differences? We do not deny the element of subjectivity that is intrinsic to all historical analysis, but we also do not believe that it is a critical factor in explaining the low levels of cross-study reliability.

Different definitions of an immediate deterrence encounter would be the obvious explanation for the discrepancy between our classification of cases and that of Huth and Russett. However, we concur with their definition of deterrence; our dissent is with their application of that definition to the cases. We agree that immediate extended deterrence occurs only when an attacker contemplates military action against another country and a third party commits itself to the defense of the country threatened with attack. That is not an arbitrary definition; it is derived directly from the fundamental axioms of deterrence theory.

Using this common definition, we still eliminated forty-one of the fifty-four cases from the 1984 collection and ten of the thirteen cases added to the 1988 collection. Six others from both collections should properly be set aside because of ambiguities of evidence and interpretation. We first reclassified cases of direct deterrence and then cases where the designated defender was attempting to compel rather than to deter. We then eliminated thirty-seven cases from the 1984 collection and six additional cases from the 1988 collection because they did not meet the requirements of a deterrence encounter. Among the thirty-seven cases eliminated from the 1984 collection, we find no persuasive evidence of intention to attack by the designated challenger in twenty-nine cases; the identified defender did not practice immediate deterrence in twenty-seven. In nineteen of the cases, neither of the two necessary conditions was present. Among the six cases eliminated from the 1988 collection, we find no convincing evidence of intention to attack by the designated challenger in five cases; the identified defender did not practice immediate deterrence in five. In five of the six cases, neither of the two necessary conditions was present.

Intention to attack is never easy to establish, but can more validly be inferred from multiple streams of evidence interpreted in context. Huth and Russett use the movement or redeployment of military forces as one of their principal indicators of the intention to attack. Military deployments, however, can be used for a wide range of purposes. We find that only a few of the deployments identified by Huth and Russett in their cases are associated with the intention to attack. That intention can only be established by reference to other kinds of historical evidence.

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A second important explanation of the variance in the identification of cases is the difference in assessments of threats to attack. Huth and Russett rely heavily on a threat to attack as an indicator of intention to attack. But threats do not always equate to intention: leaders may bluff and threaten war in circumstances in which they are not prepared to use force, in the hope that in this way, they will achieve the goals they seek. We require independent evidence of a would-be challenger's intentions. To identify a case as one of deterrence, there must be evidence to indicate that the challenger considered an attack, as well as evidence that a defender attempted to deter. When this kind of evidence is not available, we refrain from making a judgment.

We recognize that these are strict criteria to validate cases of deterrence. We chose to work with them because they are derived directly from deterrence theory. They are also the criteria employed by Huth and Russett. Researchers confront two kinds of ambiguity in seeking to apply these criteria.[7] In some cases, definitive information about the intentions of would-be challengers is inaccessible. Documents are unavailable or are still classified. In Tables 1 and 2, we have coded these cases as "ambiguous." In other cases, policy makers themselves may have been uncertain about how they would behave if the situation escalated to the point where they had to make a decision whether or not to use force. It is not obvious, for example, whether President Soekarno of Indonesia would have carried out his threat to use force against the Netherlands in 1962 if the dispute about the status of West Irian had not been resolved; Indonesian sources suggest that he was uncertain about his intentions.[8] An examination of the forty-one cases we have excluded from the 1984 collection and the ten in the revised collection which, in our view, did not meet the requirements of the definition of deterrence, shows, however, that this is the only case of this kind.

[7] A third kind of ambiguity arises from the attempt to establish what would have happened if deterrence had not been practiced vigorously. This is a counterfactual argument that lies beyond the scope of this analysis.

[8] Even as Soekarno threatened the use of military force, the chief of the general staff of the Indonesian armed forces, General Nasution, warned that an invasion of West Irian could not take place earlier than the middle of 1962 because of logistical preparations, the need for thorough military preparations, and the necessity to absorb new military equipment. A political settlement of the status of West Irian was reached before Indonesian military leaders estimated that Djakarta had the military capability to mount a successful invasion. See Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); Robert C. Bone, Jr., *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962); Bruce Grant, ed., *Indonesia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964); William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and Its Settlement* (New York: Seton Hall University Press, 1973); Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983); and Guy J. Pauker, "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow," *Asian Survey* 1 (March 1961), 15-17.

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The second necessary condition of a deterrence encounter is the defender's practice of deterrence. A defender must define the unacceptable behavior, make public the commitment to punish or restrain transgressors, demonstrate the resolve to do so, and possess at least rudimentary capabilities to implement the threat. We use the most permissive interpretation of these criteria in examining the cases in the two collections. In thirty-two of the forty-three cases we eliminated from the two collections, we find that the defender made no deterrent commitment or did not tacitly try to deter. If there is no attempt to practice deterrence, a case cannot validly be included.

We also dissent strongly from the coding of outcomes by Huth and Russett. The most obvious explanation for these differences would be different criteria of success and failure. As the following discussion indicates, we do differ in our operational definitions of success and failure; but these differences do not account for much of the variation in our respective coding.

Using a variant of the definition developed by Russett in 1963, Huth and Russett define a deterrence failure as a military attack: "a government-sanctioned engagement of its regular armed forces in combat with the regular armed forces of the protégé and/or its defender, resulting in more than 250 fatalities."[9] In his book, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, Paul Huth amends this definition by lowering the number of casualties to 200 and also coding as a deterrence failure any case in which the defender is forced to accede to the challenger's demands under the threat of war.[10] The operationalization of deterrence failure by an arbitrary number of battle deaths is not derived from any theory of deterrence.

We consider deterrence to have failed when a challenger commits the action proscribed by the defender, or the defender backs away from a commitment in the face of a challenger's threats and demands. Yet, differences between the two definitions of failure account for hardly any of the variance in the coding. If we had used Huth and Russett's operational definition of failure and scored as failures only those cases with more than 200 battle deaths, we would have coded only one of their cases differently.[11]

In order to code a case of deterrence as successful, we require evidence

[9] Huth and Russett (fn. 3, 1984), 505. Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7 (June 1963), 97-109, at 98, defined success as the repulse of a challenge to a client without a violent military confrontation.

[10] Huth, *Extended Deterrence* (fn. 3), 27.

[11] This is case 49 in the 1984 data set and involves an attempt by Israel in 1970 to deter Syria from attacking Jordan.

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that a challenger considered an attack or a proscribed action, but decided against proceeding because the defender persuaded the challenger that there would be serious and unacceptable consequences. This definition of success is derived directly from the postulates of theories of deterrence. When reliable evidence of a challenger's calculations is lacking, no decision can be made about the coding of the outcome of a deterrence encounter.

An important factor in the explanation of the variance in coding outcomes is Huth and Russett's tendency to measure the acceptability of the outcome of a crisis or conflict to the defender rather than the success and failure of deterrence. The Cuban missile crisis, not included by Huth and Russett because it is a case of direct deterrence from the American perspective, offers an illustration of the difference.[12] President Kennedy drew a line in Cuba—no offensive weapons were to be deployed on the island—and communicated this commitment to the Soviet Union through public and private channels. Khrushchev challenged Kennedy's commitment by attempting to deploy medium and intermediate missiles in Cuba. Their discovery by the United States provoked an acute crisis because deterrence had failed. The outcome of the crisis was analytically distinct. Through a partial blockade of Cuba and the threat of an air strike, Kennedy persuaded Khrushchev to remove the Soviet missiles. The outcome was a partial compellence success. Huth and Russett, by conflating the outcome of deterrence with the outcome of the crisis or conflict, code as successes some cases that other investigators have classified as failures.[13]

Also important in the explanation of the variance in coding is Huth and Russett's tendency to confirm the success of deterrence tautologically. A planned attack is inferred—often without direct evidence of a would-be challenger's intentions—and deterrence is then judged to have been successful because the attack did not occur.[14] Here, explanation of the variance does not lie in definitional differences, but in the use of different standards of evidence both in the designation and the coding of cases.

The coding of outcomes in the 1984 and 1988 studies reflects political bias in the designation of challenger and defender in cases involving the

[12] From the Soviet perspective, Cuba was a case of extended immediate deterrence, as one Soviet objective of putting missiles into Cuba was to deter an expected American invasion.

[13] George and Smoke (fn. 2), 517n., cite the Berlin blockade, Suez, and the second Taiwan Straits crisis as cases in point. They score the Berlin blockade in 1948, for example, as a failure of American deterrence; Huth and Russett code it as a success.

[14] Clinton Fink, "More Calculations About Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 9 (March 1965), 54-65, makes a similar argument about tautological reasoning.

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United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies. Perhaps the most obvious instance is the depiction of U.S. policy in 1964 and 1965 as an unsuccessful attempt to deter North Vietnam from invading South Vietnam. At the time, American policy makers conceived their strategy as an attempt at compellence: Washington tried unsuccessfully to pressure North Vietnam to restrain the Viet Cong.[15] Other examples include allegedly successful attempts by the United States to deter Soviet attacks on Iran in 1946 and on Turkey in 1947, and North Vietnamese attacks on Laos and Thailand in 1961 and 1962. All of these interpretations are contradicted by respected scholarly treatments of these cases.

We doubt that Huth and Russett are consciously biased. Rather, they relied heavily on data sets assembled by others, which were based on now-outdated Western secondary sources about the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China. Most of these analyses were done in the 1950s and 1960s, many at the height of the cold war. With a few notable exceptions, they took the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as established fact. Their authors were not predisposed to consider the possibility that Soviet or Chinese leaders might have been motivated by defensive considerations, or that they did not have as their immediate objective an attack on Berlin or Taiwan; they could interpret restraint only as the result of successful deterrence.[16]

A final explanation of the differences is the nature of the evidence consulted by the two teams of investigators. In their 1984 study, Huth and Russett cite four existing data sets (none of which were constructed explicitly for the analysis of deterrence), two general reference works, and three secondary sources.[17] Their 1988 study relies on additional secondary as well as some primary sources.[18] A broader reading of the important primary and secondary sources is necessary to uncover the complexities, ambiguities, and interpretative problems associated with many of the cases included in the collection assembled by Huth and Russett.

In reclassifying and recoding the cases, we examine primary as well as secondary sources for the fifty-four cases in the original data collection

[15] This case is discussed in greater detail as a representative example in the appendix.

[16] An early and influential example of this kind of thinking was Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). For a critique of current thinking of this kind and its application to Soviet policy in Afghanistan, see Richard Herrmann, "The Soviet Decision to Withdraw from Afghanistan: Changing Strategic and Regional Images," paper presented at the Twelfth Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Tel Aviv, June 18-23, 1989.

[17] Huth and Russett (fn. 3, 1984), 504, n. 15.

[18] Huth, *Extended Deterrence* (fn. 3), 26, note 20, cites one data collection, seven secondary sources, three encyclopedias and general reference works, and five studies of crises by international relations scholars. Huth has assured us, however, that many other works were consulted, and that citations represent only those he found to be most helpful.

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and for the thirteen cases added in the revised collection; our bibliography includes the relevant competitive sources for each. In the case descriptions, we provide an explanation for our decision to accept or reject each case as a deterrence encounter. When a case is classified as one of deterrence, we make our reasons for coding it as a success or failure explicit.

We consider the case summaries to be critical intellectually: there is no better way to appreciate the difficulties inherent in operationalizing theories of deterrence. Limitations of space preclude the presentation of all the cases included in Huth and Russett's collections. All the summaries will be published in a forthcoming volume; in the interim, they are available from the authors on request.[19] As an appendix to this article, we provide some representative summaries that illustrate the principal differences in the designation and coding of cases.

Rethinking the Analysis of Deterrence

Our examination of the data sets constructed by Huth and Russett raises several broader issues about the testing of theories of deterrence. The testing of theories of deterrence confronts especially difficult data requirements that derive from the focus of the theory on the intentions of actors. This focus creates empirical and conceptual problems that threaten valid inference. Two kinds of bias are especially important. The first type, a bias in selection, affects the identification of the cases that are subjected to analysis. Immediate deterrence is relevant only to those cases where would-be challengers seriously consider a challenge and where deterrence is practiced by defenders. It is often difficult to establish an intention to challenge after a would-be challenger has decided to refrain from action. Such a decision usually leaves few behavioral traces. Because of the difficulty of inferring intentions in the absence of behavior, case selection is inherently biased in favor of deterrence failure.

A second type of bias affects the operationalization of the central theoretical concepts of "challenger" and "defender," which also depends on the inference of the intentions of the participants. Designation of the participants in a conflict as the challenger or defender sets the structure for the testing of theories of deterrence. Analysts have generally tended to rely on secondary sources to identify cases, designate roles, and code outcomes. These sources, however, often contain implicit biases that flow from a broader political orientation. Often, a challenger is designated

[19] Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Specifying and Testing Theories of Deterrence* (forthcoming).

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with reference to a status quo that is legitimate only to a defender. The success of deterrence is frequently inferred in the absence of evidence that a would-be challenger was actually planning to attack. Use of this kind of data seriously compromises the validity and the reliability of the results of the testing.

Although the recoded cases are suggestive of interesting propositions about the dynamics of deterrence and compellence, we have chosen to limit our analysis to the dependent variable. Even when properly coded, the data set is incomplete, and consequently inappropriate for the testing of hypotheses. We are in the process of constructing a broader data set and will use it to test alternative theories of deterrence and compellence.

Among the most important findings with respect to the dependent variable is the seemingly elusive and fragile nature of the success of immediate deterrence. We coded only three cases in the two collections as successful; two of the three were partial or short-lived. They could be classified as successes only by the most liberal application of our coding criteria. We double-coded the case of Munich as a failure and as a limited success: a failure because the Western powers acceded to Hitler's territorial demands, and a success because French and British resolve late in the crisis was partially responsible for Hitler's decision to postpone his plans for an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia. Only five months later, however, Hitler's armies occupied the remainder of the rump Czechoslovak state. The success of Egypt's deterrence, in May 1967, of an Israeli attack on Syria was even more short-lived. Within weeks, Israel was at war with Egypt and Syria, and in the course of that war, Israel carried out a more far-reaching offensive against Syria than the punitive operation its leaders had originally planned.

The most impressive of the three deterrence successes is the effort by the United States to deter Turkey from attacking Cyprus in 1964. The case is unambiguous in that Turkey intended to invade Cyprus; deterrence was successful to the degree that it gained a reprieve of ten years. However, renewed crises in 1967 and 1974 led to a Turkish invasion and division of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish spheres of influence.[20]

Examination of these cases suggests that immediate extended deterrence successes tend to be uncommon, partial, and tenuous. A more extensive search of the historical record may identify a larger number of successes. Only then can it be established whether additional cases will replicate the pattern we have observed, or whether deterrence success will prove to be more robust and enduring.

[20] Munich and Turkey are discussed in the appendix as representative cases.

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The second issue is methodological. It concerns the feasibility of aggregate data analysis to test theories of deterrence. Generally speaking, investigators have relied on two methods to test deterrence: detailed comparative analysis of a number of "critical" cases to assess the impact of structural and process variables, and analysis by aggregating data across a large number of cases to permit the quantitative testing of causal models that incorporate the principal structural explanations. Although these methods are often treated as mutually exclusive, they are more appropriately conceived of as complementary.[21] Each method has different data requirements and permits different kinds of inference.

Aggregate data analysis across cases places a heavy burden on investigators. They must examine large numbers of cases in sufficient historical detail to establish the intentions of putative challengers and to document the behavior of the defenders, to determine, in the first instance, whether a case qualifies as a deterrence encounter. Examination of cases must go well beyond existing data collections to a wide range of primary and secondary sources, since the intentions of alleged challengers as well as the deterrent commitments of defenders are critical to the identification of relevant cases. Investigators must also make explicit their criteria for coding outcomes in each case they include in their collection. This kind of documentation is essential because of the multiple interpretations that are characteristic of many of the cases. It is misleading, then, to assume that, in the evidence it requires, the analysis of data aggregated across large numbers of cases is less labor-intensive or less demanding than the case-study approach.

A further requirement of aggregate data analysis is a large enough number of cases to test even the small number of explanatory variables identified by deterrence theory as critical. At a minimum, if valid influences are to be drawn, the number of deterrence successes as well as of failures must be significantly larger than the number of independent variables in the model. Our review of cases of immediate extended deterrence in this century suggests that this essential requirement has not been met. Thus far, the tiny number of cases of immediate extended deterrence successes identified effectively precludes this kind of analysis as a valid method of theory testing.

If a sufficiently large number of cases of deterrence successes can be documented, the development of longitudinal models that can be tested statistically is one promising path of analysis. Our admittedly preliminary search of the evidence of cases of immediate extended deterrence in

[21] For the most recent debate on this subject, see the articles by Achen and Snidal, George and Smoke, Jervis, Lebow and Stein, and Downs (fn. 2).

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this century is not encouraging. If only a small number of cases of deterrence success can be identified, then the design of causal models to be subjected to quantitative testing is precluded. The data simply would not justify this kind of analysis. Under these conditions, we have no choice but to rely on a carefully controlled comparison of cases as the primary methodology of testing deterrence theory and establishing the conditions under which deterrence succeeds or fails. This kind of testing has its strengths and weaknesses. It is, of course, more difficult to generalize from an analysis of a small number of critical cases. There may be no alternative, however, if sustained effort results in only a small number of cases of immediate deterrence successes that can be validly and reliably identified.

We have argued in detail elsewhere that it is impossible to identify the universe of cases of either immediate extended or direct deterrence, even in a limited time period where relatively good data are available.[22] Deterrence successes may leave so few behavioral traces that they will elude even the most careful and thorough search of the evidence. Because the universe of cases cannot be identified with a reasonable degree of confidence, it is impossible to draw a sample for purposes of analysis.

The collective task we face, then, as analysts of deterrence is to identify the largest possible number of cases of both immediate direct and extended deterrence. In our review of the collections assembled by Huth and Russett, we have found only eleven cases of immediate extended deterrence in this century. The small number of cases currently precludes valid quantitative testing of theories of deterrence. Our preliminary research has also identified several cases of immediate extended deterrence in this century that Huth and Russett omitted from their collection.[23] We hope to identify sufficiently important or "critical" cases of both success and failure so that we can compare, through detailed historical analysis, the processes characteristic of each outcome. Detailed analyses of critical cases narrow the gap between essential concepts in the theory of deterrence and their measurement. They are also better able to discriminate among competing theoretical explanations insofar as they reconstruct leaders' processes of decision.

The first priority is to broaden the temporal and historical base of the collection through exhaustive search of the best available primary and secondary evidence. Scholars from different disciplines and with differ-

[22] Lebow and Stein (fn. 2), and Lebow and Stein, *When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, forthcoming, 1990).

[23] These include the U.S. success in deterring a successful Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1954 and Egypt's success in deterring an Israeli attack on Syria in May 1967.

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ent kinds of expertise must cooperate in the identification and coding of as many cases of immediate direct and extended deterrence as available data permit. We must share historical evidence and seek the judgments of experts where the data are open to multiple interpretation, as they so often are. We must also make differences of interpretation explicit, and specify the reasons for the classification and coding of each case.

In this spirit, we propose a broadly-based collaborative effort among analysts of deterrence, historians, and area experts. We are currently circulating the cases that we have identified among historians with special expertise in each case, and among scholars who specialize in the history and politics of the relevant region. Still, we do not expect that multidisciplinary collaboration will resolve all questions of historical interpretation. On the contrary, in view of the data available, we anticipate that widespread consultations among scholars will generate three kinds of cases: those that command a strong consensus in their interpretation, those that cannot be included in a collection because of the poor quality of information that is currently available, and those that remain controversial because they are open to multiple and competing interpretations. If a valid and reliable data base is to be built, however, it is important to make these differences explicit. We invite scholars across disciplines to propose cases that might qualify for inclusion in our collection and to dispute our interpretation of any given case. Only through intensive multidisciplinary collaboration can the validity and reliability of the data base for the analysis of deterrence be improved. Theories of deterrence can then be tested against competing interpretations of cases to see how sensitive the results of the analysis are to these kinds of differences in coding.

The third issue that emerges from the case studies is substantive: it concerns the relationship between deterrence and compellence. Deterrence theorists have always maintained that, other things being equal, compellence is the more difficult of the two strategies to implement in practice.[24] In contrast to deterrence, which requires the target merely to refrain from some action (often an invisible concession), compellence requires the target to act in ways that are highly visible and, therefore, more likely to involve major costs that affect important domestic constituencies and foreign allies. Our data include eight cases of compellence

[24] See, for example, Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). By contrast, Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), assert that whether compellence succeeds depends on how strongly motivated the challenger is, on the nature of the demand, and on the mixture of inducements and threats.

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practiced by the defender—six of them extended, and two direct.[25] Five of the eight were successful, indicating a surprisingly high rate of success. Moreover, in a large number of the cases that we exclude from the collection of immediate extended deterrence encounters, the challenger practiced compellence successfully. The nature of the data collection precludes any comparison with the rate of deterrence success; but these preliminary results challenge the validity of the conventional wisdom, which asserts that compellence is the more difficult strategy. Additional studies of compellence and analysis of the causes of its success and failure are needed.

Deterrence theorists have treated compellence as conceptually distinct from deterrence. Our cases indicate that the two strategies are often practiced in tandem and in ways that effectively blur the distinctions between them. Deterrence may be used to reinforce compellence, and compellence to deter. The American intervention in Panama in 1903 is an example of the former. The Roosevelt administration sought to foment rebellion in the Colombian province of Panama in order to establish an independent Panama, led by American-backed and -financed leaders who would promptly grant the U.S. rights to build a canal across the isthmus. American warships were on hand to discourage local Colombian forces from opposing the rebellion and to prevent Bogotá from sending reinforcements to Panama by land or sea. If the narrow military mission of the American forces was to deter, their broader political mission was to compel Colombian leaders to recognize Panama's independence.

The crisis in the Middle East in 1973 illustrates how compellence can be used in order to deter. After Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and threatened to cut off and surround the Third Egyptian Army, the Soviet Union sought to protect Egypt by negotiating a cease-fire. When Israel ignored the cease-fire and continued its offensive, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev threatened to send Soviet forces to Egypt—a threat

[25] We have restricted the designation of cases of compellence to those encounters where compellence is attempted by the "defender." Extended compellence succeeded in 1913, when Austria-Hungary compelled Serbia to end its occupation of northern Albania (case 16: 1984); in 1970, when the United States and Israel compelled Syria to halt its attack against Jordan (case 49: 1984); and in 1961, when the United States compelled the Soviet Union to restrain its local allies in Laos (case 8: 1988). Direct rather than extended compellence succeeded in 1906, when Britain compelled a Turkish withdrawal from Taba (case 2: 1988), and in 1921, when the United States compelled Panama to surrender territory to Costa Rica (case 3: 1988). Extended compellence failed in 1964-1965, when the United States failed to compel North Vietnam to cease its support of the Viet Cong (case 45: 1984); in 1979, when Libya failed to compel Tanzania to withdraw its forces from Uganda (case 54: 1984); and in 1922, when Britain failed to compel Turkey to withdraw its forces from Chanak (case 4: 1988).

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that provoked an immediate crisis with the United States. The Soviet Union practiced immediate extended compellence to press the United States to restrain Israel. It did so, however, for an avowedly deterrent goal.

The Elusive Dependent Variable

The difficulty of distinguishing deterrence from compellence points to a broader conceptual problem. Existing theories of deterrence rely on technical, context-free definitions of deterrence, but deterrence—and any other strategy of conflict management—takes on meaning only within the broader political context in which it is situated. That context defines the strategy: it informs the purposes for which it is used. The attempt to interpret strategies of conflict management within their political contexts, however, introduces a significant element of subjectivity in the selection and coding of deterrence cases.

Even if we make the generally unwarranted assumption that a state speaks with only one voice, any deterrence encounter involves two parties, and any extended deterrence encounter involves at least three. Each of these parties is likely to have its own perspective. When those perspectives differ significantly, it may be impossible to assign the roles of challenger or defender with reference to objective criteria. The three Taiwan Straits crises provide a cogent illustration of this problem.

Huth and Russett classified all three cases as deterrence encounters in which the People's Republic of China was the challenger, Nationalist China the protégé, and the United States the defender. Their classification reflects the traditional cold-war view of Sino-American relations, which is not supported by the available evidence. These cases cannot be designated as cases of deterrence because the evidence suggests that the People's Republic of China was not planning to attack Taiwan.

The bias introduced by the cold-war interpretation is reinforced through the use of purely technical criteria to assign roles in deterrence encounters. Huth and Russett assigned the role of attacker to the state challenging the status quo, and that of defender to the state that attempts to use threats to prevent change. In keeping with this formulation, the People's Republic was the challenger because its long-term objective—as well as its short-term objective, in the judgment of those who consider these cases as immediate extended deterrence encounters—was to replace the *guomindang* government in Taiwan with a communist government. The United States was the defender because in the 1950s it consis-

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tently sought to maintain the independence of Nationalist China by providing arms and training its military forces, and by committing its own forces, conventional and nuclear, to its defense.

An opposing view—consistent with recent historical scholarship—is that the Taiwan controversy was not a deterrence encounter at all, but an attempt at compellence on the part of the United States.[26] Washington had intervened in China's civil war and then sought to protect its defeated client on its island redoubt of Taiwan. It practiced compellence in the hope of forcing Beijing to accept an otherwise unnatural division of its country. These scholars see Beijing's military and political efforts to weaken the *guomindang* as a legitimate effort by the mainland government to reunify China in the face of foreign interference.

From the perspective of the People's Republic of China, its strategy was deterrent. New evidence from Chinese sources indicates that Mao Zedong was convinced that the Truman administration was preparing to intervene with force in China's civil war from its base in Taiwan in an attempt to overthrow the government in Beijing. The buildup of the People's Liberation Army opposite Taiwan and the deployment of Soviet anti-aircraft and air-defense units, including pilots and fighter planes, was not a prelude to an invasion of Taiwan, but designed to deter an American attack.[27]

From Washington's perspective, U.S. policy toward Taiwan appeared entirely defensive and deterrent in character. President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to contain the Korean War. The fleet's mission was not only to deter Beijing from invading Taiwan, but also to prevent the *guomindang* from launching attacks against the mainland that could have dragged the United States into an unwanted war with China. In the Taiwan Straits crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, the Eisenhower administration saw itself as defending a commitment of great symbolic importance. Administration officials feared that lack of resolve on their part would weaken the *guomindang*. Its collapse in turn, would undercut the faith of other Asian allies in the resolve of the United States, and would encourage aggression.

The parties to a deterrence encounter of this kind are like the char-

[26] Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China: 1941-50*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., *The Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[27] To protect Chinese scholars in difficult political conditions, we are currently withholding the identity of the sources.

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acters in Lawrence Durrell's *The Alexandria Quartet*. Each has a different, sometimes clashing, but equally valid view of the social reality they all collectively create. To interpret this reality only through the prism of any one of the protagonists is to adopt, by definition, a partisan point of view. This also applies to the analysis of deterrence. To classify the Taiwan Straits crises as deterrence encounters is to adopt Washington's perspective on the world; to categorize American policy as compellence is to accept the Chinese diagnosis. In practice, it is essential for analysts to consider both points of view as well as that of the *guomindang* if they are to understand the motives of the protagonists, the genesis of their policies, and their response to threats.

Despite its obvious theoretical and conceptual advantages, the use of context-free criteria imposes severe costs on the analysis of deterrence. As currently formulated, deterrence theories do not allow analysts to examine a confrontation from diverse and competing perspectives. On the contrary, analysts are forced to adopt one perspective in the misguided belief that a context-free definition taps an objective, "scientific" reality. But the designation of challenger and defender often reflects the partisan outlook of one of the protagonists at the expense of the other.

Context-free criteria are also conceptually inadequate because much of the behavior they seek to classify does not fit neatly into the conceptual categories of deterrence theories. All deterrence theories are based on a fundamental distinction between challenger and defender: these role characterizations are critical to the identification of deterrence encounters and the coding of their outcomes. Analysis of the cases demonstrates that frequently both parties to any conflictual relationship see themselves as defenders—a self-perception that has profound consequences for behavior. If the mutually exclusive designation of defender and challenger does not fit the data, the explanatory and predictive capacity of theories of deterrence are seriously compromised.

Deterrence encounters are embedded in two kinds of contexts. The first, treated above, concerns the specific situation in which a deterrence encounter arises. The second is historical; it consists of the expectations that the adversaries have of each other, themselves, and third parties. In part, those expectations derive from the lessons adversaries have drawn from the past.[28] Theories of deterrence have traditionally focused on the

[28] Comparative analyses of cases of immediate deterrence have examined the impact of the previous encounter on the outcome of deterrence. This is an inappropriately time-bound treatment of relationships that stretch into the past as well as the future. There is no theoretical reason to assume that leaders define their roles in a relationship largely in response to their last encounter.

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past through the strong emphasis on credibility and reputation, frequently by looking only at the last encounter between the parties. They have paid far less attention to the impact of the past on the way participants define their roles, the legitimacy of their purposes, and their strategies.[29]

A research strategy that can cope with these conceptual and methodological dilemmas is essential, but it is not easy to design. We must start by recognizing the need to make important conceptual and methodological trade-offs. At best, as George and Smoke have argued, we can hope for context-dependent generalizations.[30] In identifying cases of deterrence, analysts must examine the purposes of all the parties in the context of the relationship over time. Approaching deterrence from multiple perspectives may lead to multiple classifications of the same encounter, but it will simultaneously improve the validity of the identification of cases and the assessments of their outcomes.

The analysis of the importance of context raises a more fundamental problem. The conceptual language of theories of deterrence may provide too narrow a prism to capture the fundamentals of conflict management within an adversarial relationship. Compellence and deterrence are at times intertwined in complex and messy ways; the parties to an adversarial relationship can and sometimes do practice both strategies simultaneously, and both may see themselves as the defender in the same encounter. For purposes of analysis, it may be far more useful to ask when and why threats are made, in what contexts and in what kinds of relationships, and when and why they succeed or fail in accomplishing their purposes. Answers to these questions require attention to the role conceptions and objectives of all parties to a conflict and to the broader context in which these conceptions and purposes are embedded.

Appendix: Representative Cases

The eight representative cases we discuss are classified under six headings which represent all the outcomes that we code differently from Huth and Russett. They are: (1) not a deterrence encounter; (2) not extended deterrence; (3) missed success; (4) compellence; (5) defies simple classification; and (6) ambiguous encounters. Where Huth and Russett made changes in their identification of attacker or defender, their coding of outcomes, or the dates, we have noted these changes. In fairness to Huth and Russett, we

[29] Paul Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, and Roy Radnor examine the impact of perceptions of legitimacy on the outcome of deterrence in their "Conclusions," in *Perspectives on Deterrence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 294-321.

[30] George and Smoke (fn. 2), 512-15.

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have chosen to discuss, with one exception, only cases that appear in both their 1984 and 1988 studies. The exception is the 1964 Cyprus crisis, which they deleted from the 1988 study. We examine it because it is the strongest case of immediate extended deterrence success in their two data collections.

Not a Deterrence Encounter

The category "not a deterrence encounter" is by far our most common recoding. Thirty-seven of Huth and Russett's original fifty-four cases and six of the thirteen new cases included in their 1988 study are reclassified this way. Among the forty-three cases so recoded from both collections, we found no persuasive evidence of intention to attack by the designated challenger in thirty-four, and no practice of deterrence by the identified defender in thirty-two. In twenty-four of the forty-four cases, neither of the two necessary conditions was present. The two cases described below illustrate the two reasons for our judgment that a case does not qualify as a deterrence encounter: the absence of any convincing evidence that the "challenger" was planning to attack the "protégé," and/or the failure of the "defender" to practice deterrence on behalf of its protégé.

Soviet Union (attacker) vs. Turkey (protégé) and United States (defender), 1947 (case 31)[31]

Huth and Russett: deterrence success

Lebow and Stein: not a deterrence encounter

This incident occurred in 1946, not 1947. On March 18 of that year, Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson cabled Washington that new Soviet deployments indicated possible intent to attack Turkey. Bruce Kuniholm, the author of the principal secondary source used by Huth and Russett in their interpretation of this case, accepts Wilson's appraisal of Soviet intentions. Other analysts have been highly critical of this interpretation.

Soviet forces in southeastern Europe were actually reduced in the course of 1945-1946. There were a few Soviet troop movements in the region that were initially misperceived or misunderstood. For example, Ambassador Wilson cabled Washington about Soviet tank deployments in the Soviet Caucasus, only to report four days later that the tanks were actually snowplows. During the so-called crisis of August 1946, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg informed President Truman that there were no unusual Soviet troop concentrations, movements, or supply buildups.

The White House was also advised that Turkish officials were not particularly alarmed and did not expect a Soviet attack. Turkey had anticipated more dramatic Soviet action and regarded the second Soviet note, of September, as "milder and more restrained." For the most part, the Truman administration viewed the Soviet demands as cautiously phrased and defensively motivated. It was nevertheless decided to exploit them as a means, in Secretary of State Dean Acheson's words, "of conditioning the public mind" for a more active anti-Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean.[32]

[31] Case numbers refer to the 1984 collection as listed in Table 1.

[32] Cited by Kenneth C. Royall to Robert P. Patterson, n.d. [mid-August 1946], box 9, gen-

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This case does not properly qualify as a deterrence encounter because there is no evidence that the Soviet Union was planning an attack; in fact, neither the Turkish government nor the Truman administration thought so. Washington also made no unequivocal commitment to Turkey's defense. Instead, the U.S. sought to strengthen Turkey's hand in what it correctly perceived to be essentially a diplomatic effort by Moscow to expand its influence in the region.

Italy (attacker) vs. Ethiopia (protégé) and Britain (defender), 1935 (case 23)
Huth and Russett: deterrence failure
Lebow and Stein: not a deterrence encounter

The coding of this case as a deterrence failure is erroneous in two respects: Ethiopia was not a protégé of Britain, and Britain did not make a serious attempt to deter Italy from attacking Ethiopia.[33] At the very beginning of the crisis, in January 1935, London reversed its policy of trying to establish closer relations with Ethiopia; it advised Emperor Haile Selassie that no assurances of even the most general and personal nature could be given. With respect to Italy, London pursued an uneven policy; it opposed the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, but did not do so forcefully for fear of encouraging an alliance between Mussolini and Hitler.

Italy's conquest of Ethiopia (Abyssinia) was an expression of long-standing Italian interest in creating an African empire that would rival those of France and Britain. Benito Mussolini, who also wanted a successful military adventure to reinforce his domestic political standing, correctly judged that France and Britain had neither the interest nor the will to oppose him.

France and Italy had drawn closer together in response to the threat

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eral decimal file, Robert P. Patterson Papers, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, RG 107 (National Archives); *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. VII; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), Vol. II; Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). For a devastating review of Kuniholm, see Melvyn P. Leffler, "From Cold War to Cold War in the Middle East," *Reviews in American History* 9 (March 1981), 124-30, and "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," *Journal of American History* 71 (March 1985), 807-25. Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 210-80, and Anthony R. De Luca, "Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits," *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Fall 1977), 503-24, make no mention of an impending Soviet attack. They view Soviet pressure on Turkey as exclusively diplomatic, and provide evidence that this is how Turkey understood Soviet strategy. De Luca argues that previous accounts have underrated the Soviet Union's concern for securing its territory against attack.

[33] Anthony Eden, *Facing the Dictators: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1962); George W. Baer, *The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Frank Hardie, *The Abyssinian Crisis* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1974); Cedric J. Lowe and Frank Marzari, *Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975); Esmonde M. Robertson, *Mussolini as Empire-Builder: Europe and Africa, 1932-36* (New York: Macmillan, 1977); Renato Mori, *Mussolini e la conquista dell 'Etiopia* [Mussolini and the conquest of Ethiopia] (Florence: F. Le Monnier, 1978); Denis Mack Smith, *Mussolini's Roman Empire* (New York: Viking, 1976), and *Mussolini* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1982); Geoffrey Warner, *Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France* (New York: Macmillan, 1969); Franklin D. Laurens, *France and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-1936* (The Hague: Mouton, 1967); Nicholas Rostow, *Anglo-French Relations, 1934-36* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

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posed by a resurgent Germany. Pierre Laval, who became French foreign minister in October 1934, sought and achieved a comprehensive understanding with Italy that included French acquiescence in Italian economic penetration and, if necessary, political domination of Ethiopia. On January 29, 1935, Dino Grandi, the Italian under secretary for foreign affairs, advised London about Italy's agreement with France, and offered to negotiate a similar understanding.

The British government was deeply divided in its approach to Italy. Anthony Eden, the minister of League affairs, wanted to oppose Mussolini and strengthen the League of Nations. Foreign Secretary John Simon was loath to do anything that would adversely affect Anglo-Italian relations. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald was prepared to ignore Italian encroachments on Ethiopia in the hope of securing Mussolini's participation in an anti-German coalition. The first test of British policy came on March 17, 1935, when the Ethiopian government brought its dispute with Italy to the League. To Mussolini's delight, Britain and France turned a deaf ear to Ethiopia's appeals and supported Italy's contention that the problem should not be considered while arbitration was pending. At the Stresa Conference the following month, the question of Ethiopia was studiously ignored. Mussolini interpreted British and French silence as consent, or at least acquiescence, to Italy's plans, now well known to both powers, for the subjugation of Ethiopia.

Samuel Hoare replaced Simon as foreign minister in June, and the British cabinet reconsidered its approach to Italy. A firm stand against Mussolini was ultimately ruled out because Britain was unable to persuade France to risk war with Italy. Laval explained to Eden that as long as Mussolini kept troops on the Brenner Pass and Britain refused to commit itself to France's defense on the continent, Paris could not afford to alienate the one major power that might help to restrain Hitler. France did join Britain in proposing a diplomatic solution that would have given Italy economic suzerainty over Ethiopia, but Mussolini rejected the proposal outright.

By July, Italian military preparations were well advanced; almost 250,000 troops were in Africa, along with the necessary supplies for the impending offensive. The Italian chiefs of staff were nevertheless increasingly apprehensive of the possibility of British naval intervention. Their fear was intensified by the British naval buildup in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. By the end of September, a total of 144 British warships were deployed around Gibraltar, Alexandria, and Aden. These forces were not intended to intimidate Mussolini. According to George Baer, author of the most comprehensive study of the origins of the Ethiopian war, "the British did not send their fleet to the inland sea to support the League, to deter Mussolini from invading Ethiopia, or to punish him if he did. The fleet was sent as a unilateral action unrelated to collective security, with the purpose of protecting British military and imperial interests. . . ."[34] Hoare had already reached an agreement with Laval ruling out military action against Italy. He had also negated whatever unintended deterrent value the naval buildup

[34] Baer (fn. 33), 351.

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might have had by advising Mussolini that it was purely precautionary and that Britain had no intention of closing the Suez Canal to Italian traffic or of imposing military sanctions. On October 3, convinced that Britain would not intervene, Mussolini gave the order to attack Ethiopia.

Because Britain had made no commitment to Ethiopia, and had advised Mussolini of its unwillingness to go to war in Ethiopia's defense, the case does not qualify as a deterrence encounter.

Not an Extended Deterrence Encounter

The case described below is one of two that we reclassified because they constituted direct as opposed to extended deterrence.

India (attacker) vs. Goa (protégé) and Portugal (defender), 1961 (case 39)
Huth and Russett: deterrence failure
Lebow and Stein: not an extended deterrence encounter (direct deterrence failure)

This case must be considered as one of failed direct deterrence. Goa was not a client, ally, or protégé of Portugal, but a province of Portugal, subject to Lisbon's authority, and ruled by a Portuguese governor. By 1961, this status had endured for over four hundred years. When Indian military preparations and Nehru's statements indicated that India was preparing an assault on Goa, Portugal warned that it would resist, and subsequently reinforced its garrison in Goa with additional weapons supplied by the United States.

If any third party sought to dissuade India from attacking Goa, it was the United States, Portugal's ally and principal supplier of weapons. General B. M. Kaul, then chief of the Indian army's general staff, testified that Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith's intercession with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on the night of December 17 led him to order a postponement of the invasion, scheduled for midnight. But Defense Minister Krishna Menon persuaded Nehru that it was too late on the grounds (which were untrue) that the advance on Goa had already begun. The American intercession cannot be considered deterrence, however, because Galbraith made no threats. He merely expressed sympathy for India's objective and pleaded for time to work out a diplomatic solution; he also advised Nehru that an invasion of Goa would have a disastrous effect on American public opinion, damage Nehru's reputation, and encourage a chain reaction of violence in Asia. Nevertheless, the invasion took place as scheduled.[35]

Missed Success

There are three extended deterrence successes in the 1984 data set: Munich in 1938 (a failure and a short-lived success), Cyprus in 1964, and Israel

[35] John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 270-95; Brij Mohan Kaul, *The Untold Story* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967); Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972), 236-42; R. P. Rao, *Portuguese Rule in Goa, 1510-1961* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963).

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versus Syria and Egypt in 1967 (another short-lived success). Huth and Russett fail to identify the successful components of all three crises. We treat the case of Cyprus below, and shall discuss that of Munich later as a case that defies simple classification.

Turkey (attacker) vs. Cyprus (protégé) and Greece (defender), 1964 (case 44; eliminated in the 1988 data set)
Huth and Russett: deterrence failure
Lebow and Stein: extended deterrence success by the United States

Communal conflict on Cyprus in 1963-1964 triggered a series of extended compellence and deterrence encounters. In none of them was Cyprus the protégé and Greece the defender.

In November 1963, Archbishop Makarios III, president of the Cypriot Republic, proposed a series of constitutional revisions that would have significantly reduced the political power of the Turkish community. The Turkish members of the government rejected the changes and resigned. The political crisis touched off communal violence and rioting, which only abated in late March 1964, with the arrival of a United Nations peacekeeping force on the island. Earlier that month, the parties concerned had agreed to a Security Council resolution calling on them to refrain from doing anything to aggravate the situation in Cyprus.

In May, Makarios—in violation of the Security Council resolution—announced military conscription and allowed General George Grivas to return from Greece to train the National Guard. Greece and Turkey both began to supply arms to their respective communities on Cyprus. In July, the Greek Cypriots took the offensive and sought to reduce and isolate Turkish enclaves on the island. Approximately 20,000 Turks fled from their homes; their refugee camps were subjected to a virtual economic blockade by the National Guard. In August, Greek Cypriot forces attacked the Kokkina-Mansoura region, one of the last Turkish-held coastal areas, and vital to the resupply of the Turkish community. The United Nations forces, caught in the cross fire, withdrew; on August 7-8, the Turkish air force intervened in the fighting and attacked Greek positions in the area. The Greek Cypriots halted their offensive.

Turkey—not Greece, as Huth and Russett allege—practiced deterrence and then compellence to protect the lives and political rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. On Christmas Day 1963, Turkish fighter planes buzzed the island to lend weight to Turkish protests against Makarios's announced intention to revise the constitution. On January 28, 1964, Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu told the American ambassador in Ankara that Turkey would invade Cyprus unless some kind of supervised cease-fire went into effect. This attempt at compellence failed; Under Secretary of State George Ball was unable to secure Greek or Greek Cypriot compliance.

On March 13, 1964, Turkey (which was militarily superior to Greece and the Greek Cypriots) announced that it would intervene immediately unless all attacks against the Turkish community ceased within twenty-four hours. The Turkish threat galvanized the Security Council into action; Ankara agreed not to intervene and the Greeks were persuaded to accept a United

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Nations peacekeeping force. Turkish compellence succeeded, but only in the short term.

In April, the Greek Cypriots renewed their offensive, and Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou announced a campaign of "self-determination" for Cyprus. On June 2, Washington was informed that the Turkish Security Council had decided on an invasion to protect the Turkish community in Cyprus. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent Under Secretary Ball back to Ankara with "the most brutal note," Ball wrote, "that I have ever seen." The letter, signed by President Johnson, threatened to suspend military aid to Turkey and to let the country fend for itself if the Soviet Union decided to intervene. Inonu canceled the planned invasion; extended deterrence had succeeded.[36]

The fighting flared up again; on August 7, Turkey sent jet fighters to strafe the most threatening Greek positions on the north coast. This intervention, combined with the growing diplomatic isolation of the Makarios government and continuing pressure by the United States, prompted the Greek Cypriots to accept a cease-fire. Huth and Russett ignore the important role played by the United States in twice deterring a Turkish attack and in prodding the Greek and Cypriot governments into accepting arrangements that made a Turkish invasion unnecessary.

Compellence

We recoded as compellence four of the fifty-four cases in the 1984 collection and four of the thirteen new cases in the 1988 study. In all of these, the threats made by those identified as defenders were designed to stop an adversary from doing something it was already doing or to compel it to do something it would not otherwise have done. One such case, involving compellence by the defender, is discussed below. In other cases, compellence was practiced by the country identified as the challenger. When there was no evidence that the so-called attacker was prepared to implement its threats, we coded these cases as "not extended deterrence encounters."

North Vietnam (attacker) vs. South Vietnam (protégé) and United States (defender), 1964/1965 (case 45)
Huth and Russett: deterrence failure
Lebow and Stein: failed compellence

There is no evidence that U.S. policy makers believed that North Vietnam intended to invade South Vietnam. On the contrary, they were convinced that Hanoi intended to limit its military involvement to guerrilla

[36] Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970); Rauf R. Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982); George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), 350; Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus, 1958-1967: International Crises and the Role of Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Sharon Wiener, *Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making on the Cyprus Issue: A Comparative Analysis of Three Crises* (Ph.D. diss., Duke University; Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1980).

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resupply operations. Washington's political and military pressure against Hanoi was not intended to deter an attack against the South, but to compel North Vietnam to cease training the Viet Cong, stop supplying it with equipment, and restrain its insurgency.[37]

In the course of 1964, the Johnson administration made numerous public and private statements about its objectives. In March, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told the Committee on Foreign Relations, meeting in executive session, that for some time the administration had threatened "the other side" with the prospect of escalation in the belief that their fear of a wider war would induce them to "have some influence on the situation there."[38]

These signals—and the thinking behind them—dominated the American approach to Vietnam in the aftermath of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. FLAMING DART, which consisted of limited air strikes against the North in response to specific Viet Cong actions in the South, and ROLLING THUNDER, the policy of gradually intensified air attack against the North, were both designed to compel Hanoi to restrain the Viet Cong. These warnings had no observable effect on Hanoi. Its military involvement in the South escalated rapidly in 1964. The North Vietnamese leadership sought to foster the revolutionary process in the South and at the same time discourage major involvement of American combat forces.

This is a case of failed compellence. The United States failed to compel the North to cease its support of the Viet Cong. But it is also important to recognize that U.S. policy in this period was aimed as much at South Vietnam as it was at the North: the Johnson administration attempted to stem the movement within South Vietnam for negotiations with Hanoi and to reinforce the cohesion and determination of the South Vietnamese government.

Cases that Defy Simple Classification

Some of the cases identified by Huth and Russett are compound cases that encompass more than one deterrence encounter or include both compellence and deterrence. Two such compound cases are discussed below. They illustrate the difficulty of imposing abstract and context-free formulations on the complex and protean reality of international relations.

[37] Senator Mike Gravel, ed., *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking in Vietnam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Vols. 2-4; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive Roles and Relationships, 1961-64* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1984), 235-36, 243-44, 255-59; *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Historical Series), Vol. 16 (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1988), 168-70, 177-80; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, *United States Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1971) Books 3, 4, 5; Leslie H. Gelb with Richard Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1979); George Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986); George McT. Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York: Knopf, 1986).

[38] U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Historical Series), vol. 16 (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1988), 118-19.

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Germany (attacker) vs. Czechoslovakia (protégé) and Britain and France (defenders), 1938 (case 25)

Huth and Russett: deterrence failure

Lebow and Stein: deterrence failure and short-lived deterrence success

The Munich crisis was provoked by Hitler's threats of war against Czechoslovakia in the spring and summer of 1938; it ended on September 28 with Hitler's agreement to settle for major territorial concessions. Britain and France practiced immediate deterrence, with mixed results.

Twice during the crisis, France and Britain seemed on the verge of war with Germany. The first war scare, known as the May crisis, was triggered on May 19 by false rumors of major German troop movements that appeared to presage an imminent invasion of Czechoslovakia. France and Britain gave credence to the rumors because Konrad Henlein, head of the Sudeten Nazis, had just broken off negotiations with the Czechoslovak government. On May 21, Britain warned Germany of the dangers of war inherent in any German attack. Three days later, France delivered an even stiffer warning, advising Berlin that it would honor its treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia. The Czech government called up a class of reservists and reinforced its border with Germany. The May crisis cannot be considered a successful deterrence encounter because Hitler had no intention of attacking Czechoslovakia until the fall, when his defensive preparations in the West were further advanced.

The British and French were convinced that their threats had temporarily averted war, but realized that they had done nothing to resolve the crisis. Accordingly, they stepped up their pressure on President Edvard Beneš to make generous territorial concessions. Meanwhile, German military preparations continued unabated and Hitler's demands became more extreme; by September, Britain and France again believed they were at the brink of war. The British cabinet considered and rejected a formal warning to Hitler for fear that it would provoke an attack, but quietly prepared the navy, air force, and army for war. In France, Prime Minister Edouard Daladier and his cabinet hoped to restrain Hitler by appearing resolute; but they were desperately anxious to avoid a war the generals thought they were unlikely to win.

With French approval, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden on September 15 to confer with Hitler. The Führer was intent on war and looking for a pretext that would make Czechoslovakia appear responsible for its outbreak, yet allow Britain and France to remain neutral. He told Chamberlain that war could be averted only if Czechoslovakia agreed to implement the principle of national self-determination. Chamberlain returned home, and with French support, prevailed upon Benes to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. On September 22, Chamberlain flew to Germany again, and to Hitler's probably genuine astonishment conveyed Czech acceptance of his demand. Concerned that he was to be deprived of the opportunity to initiate war, Hitler made new demands. Chamberlain refused to make further concessions and returned to London in a deeply pessimistic mood.

The British and French conferred and agreed that they would not put

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pressure on the Czechoslovakian government to accept Hitler's new terms. Sir Horace Wilson, the British ambassador in Berlin, was instructed to inform Hitler that France would honor its treaty commitment to Czechoslovakia if he attacked, and that Britain would fight at its side. Both governments made earnest preparations for war; France mobilized its army and Britain its fleet. On September 28, Hitler changed his mind. He called off the invasion of Czechoslovakia which had been scheduled for the 30th, and agreed to an international conference in Munich to oversee the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany.

Overall, Munich must be considered a deterrence failure. France backed away from its formal treaty obligation to defend Czechoslovakia against German attack. In the course of the confrontation, the French bought peace with Germany at Czechoslovakia's expense. Britain, whom Huth and Russett incorrectly described as a defender, had never made a commitment to defend Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity: Chamberlain had urged territorial concessions almost from the beginning of the crisis.

There are also grounds for considering Munich a minor deterrence success. The evidence is overwhelming and unambiguous that Hitler wanted war with Czechoslovakia in 1938 and was sorely disappointed by the Munich agreement. Gerhard Weinberg, author of the most authoritative treatment of German foreign policy during this period, argues that several reinforcing considerations brought about Hitler's reluctant decision on September 28 to forgo war and settle instead for a diplomatic triumph. Chief among these was the news that Britain had mobilized its fleet (which convinced the generals and Göring and Goebbels that an attack on Czechoslovakia would unleash a world war), and a message from Mussolini appealing to Hitler to postpone German mobilization and accept Chamberlain's proposal of an international conference. Hitler now recognized that an isolated war with Czechoslovakia was impossible and was reluctant to fight a general war without Italy on his side. He decided to retreat, at least temporarily. Munich can accordingly be considered a tactical deterrence success: Hitler did not change his strategy, but temporarily postponed a planned attack.

British and French military preparations and resolve to go to war if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia were instrumental—but by no means entirely responsible for—Hitler's about-face on September 28. This deterrence success was short-lived; in March 1939, Hitler's armies entered and occupied most of those parts of Czechoslovakia that had not been ceded to Germany at Munich.[39]

[39] *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1948 ff.), ser. D., 2 *Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1937-1938; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, 8 vols. (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1946); Norman H. Baynes, ed., *The Speeches of Adolph Hitler, April 1922-August 1939*, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1942); *Documents diplomatiques françaises, 1932-39*, 1st ser. (1932-1935), 6 vols., 2nd ser. (1936-1939), 8 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1964 ff.); *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 3rd series (1938-1939), 10 vols. (London: H.M.S.O., 1949-52), vols. 2, 7; John Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy* (New York: Viking, 1948); Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, *The Appeasers* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963); Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Hel-

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North Vietnam (attacker) vs. Laos (protégé) and United States (defender), 1961 (case 8, 1988)[40]

Huth and Russett: deterrence success

Lebow and Stein: extended compellence success

American policy in Laos is an instance of coercive diplomacy. The case of Laos indicates just how inadequate and misleading the concepts of deterrence and compellence can be to describe the dynamics of an acute confrontation.

Serious American involvement in Laos began in 1954, following the Geneva Accords, and went through a series of twists and turns. Most of the time, the United States supported anticommunist forces in Laos who opposed sharing power with the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX), the political arm of the Pathet Lao, and were against a neutral foreign policy for their country. Washington was particularly antagonistic toward Prince Souvanna Phouma, who signed an agreement with the Pathet Lao in November 1957 recognizing the NLHX as a legitimate political party and integrating the Pathet Lao into the Royal Laotian Army.

The Eisenhower administration supported the December 1959 military coup of General Phoumi Nosavan, who pursued a vigorous anti-Pathet Lao policy. Later, the U.S. supplied Phoumi with military aid to assist his bid to return to power after he was overthrown by Captain Kong Le, the pro-neutralist commander of the Second Paratroop Battalion. In December 1960, Phoumi's forces advanced north on the capital of Vientiane. Souvanna Phouma, spurned by the United States, turned to the Soviet Union for support, and Moscow began to airlift supplies to Vientiane to assist the newly allied forces of Kong Le and the Pathet Lao. Soviet aid did not save the capital; on December 16, it fell to General Phoumi's forces, and Souvanna Phouma fled to Cambodia.

Phoumi was extraordinarily slow in his pursuit of Kong Le's forces. The latter, after regrouping on the Plain of Jars, became the recipient of massive Soviet military aid. North Vietnamese military advisers also entered the country and attached themselves to Kong Le's forces. In March 1961, Kong Le and the Pathet Lao launched a counteroffensive and sent the American-backed Royal Laotian Army reeling in retreat. On March 9, neutralist Pathet Lao forces captured the road junction that linked Luang Prabang and Vientiane, the two largest cities.

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muth K. G. Ronnefarth, *Die Sudetenkrise in der internationalen Politik: Enstehung-Verlauf-Auswirkung* [The Sudeten crisis in international politics: Origin–course–result], 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1961); Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979); Gerhard Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970-1980); Edouard Bonnefous, *Histoire de la Troisième République* [History of the Third Republic], vol. 6: *Vers la guerre: du Front Populaire à la Conference de Munich (1936-1938)* [Toward the war: From the Popular Front to the Munich Conference], vol. 7: *La course vers l'abîme: la fin de la IIIe République 1938-1940* [The race toward the abyss: The end of the Third Republic] (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1965, 1967); Keith Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972); Larry William Fuchser, *Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement* (New York: Norton, 1982).

[40] This case is found in the 1988 collection only and is listed in Table II.

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President Kennedy was convinced that the "loss" of Laos to communist-dominated forces would be an unacceptable blow to U.S. prestige throughout Southeast Asia. His administration attempted, without success, to get the other side to agree to a cease-fire in return for talks leading to neutralization. The diplomacy that followed was complex and is impossible to describe adequately in a short narrative. In brief, Kennedy tried to convince the Soviet Union that he was serious about accepting neutralization and was committed to defending Vientiane, with American troops if necessary. U.S. air and ground forces were dispatched to Thailand and naval forces were sent into the Gulf to lend credibility to the American threat.

Khrushchev at first rebuffed Kennedy's plea for a cease-fire and talks. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Soviet Union was caught in the middle of a dispute that was not of its making. It had no desire to become engaged in a conflict in Laos that it could not control and that threatened to involve the United States as a direct participant. But, embroiled in an intensifying conflict with the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union did not wish to appear weak or vacillating in the eyes of the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. Peking objected strongly to any cease-fire and was anxious to expose Moscow's lack of revolutionary ardor, but Khrushchev decided to risk China's condemnation and appealed to Hanoi to accept a cease-fire. The North Vietnamese, who may have been concerned about the impact of American military involvement on their efforts to reunify Vietnam, agreed to the Soviet request. On May 3, representatives of the Pathet Lao and the Laotian government concluded an agreement for a cease-fire.

On the most superficial level, this case might be coded as successful deterrence; Washington's threat may have been an important consideration in the decision by the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces not to attack Vientiane. The U.S. threat to intervene, however, could not have prevented a North Vietnamese invasion of Laos, as Huth and Russett assert. The majority of the combatants who threatened Vientiane were Laotian and had sought Vietnamese assistance to compensate for U.S. support of General Phoumi and the Boun Oun regime. The United States, moreover, was only trying to deter these forces from occupying the capital. There is no evidence that North Vietnam planned an invasion of Laos.

We feel more comfortable characterizing the case as an attempt at extended compellence. In trying to restore a neutral government in Laos, the Kennedy administration deemed it necessary to prevent a takeover of Vientiane and the Mekong river basin by North Vietnamese-backed forces. It sought to do so by working through a third party, the Soviet Union. Kennedy and his advisers reasoned that Khrushchev had a strong interest in forestalling American military intervention in Laos and might pressure the Laotian forces the USSR was supporting to accept a cease-fire in return for a neutral government in which they would participate. This is indeed what happened.

It seems equally valid to consider the Kong Le/Pathet Lao counteroffensive as another exercise in extended compellence directed against the United States. Washington and its Laotian clients had upset the fragile political stability of Laos and attempted to impose a pro-Western, anticommunist

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regime on the country. Kong Le, a prominent drug lord, had formed an alliance with the Pathet Lao, and had accepted increasing support from North Vietnam and the Soviet Union as a counterweight to American backing for General Phoumi. Many Southeast Asian specialists consider the advance of these forces into the Mekong Valley an attempt to compel the Americans and their client to accept the restoration of a neutral regime. Some of them doubt that the Kong Le/Pathet Lao offensive sought to capture Vientiane or to install a communist government.[41]

Considered in its broader political context, the American threat takes on an altogether different meaning. The conflict within Laos is best viewed as an internal one with each of five outside powers—the United States, Thailand, North Vietnam, China, and the USSR—trying to foster or exploit developments within the country to its own advantage. President Kennedy's threat to intervene was a last attempt to preserve American influence, which was fast disappearing because of a series of disastrous miscalculations made by the prior administration.

Ambiguous Cases

In our final category we place those cases that cannot be definitively identified or coded at this time because of inadequate information or unresolved controversy about a would-be challenger's intentions. This latter kind of ambiguity can refer to conflicting interpretations of a would-be challenger's intentions or to evidence that leaders were uncertain about what they would have done if they had had to confront a decision whether or not to use force.

Soviet Union (attacker) vs. West Berlin and West Germany (protégés) and United States (defender), 1948-1949 (case 32)

Huth and Russett: deterrence success (The 1988 article correctly drops West Germany as a protégé because in 1948 it did not exist in its present form.)

Lebow and Stein: not a deterrence encounter (first phase); insufficient evidence to code (second phase)

[41] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Security Arrangements and Commitments Abroad*, 91st Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1970); Roger Hilsman, *To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Charles A. Stevenson, *The End of Nowhere: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); David Hall, "The Laotian War of 1961 and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971," in Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, ed., *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1978), 135-221; Arthur J. Dommen, *Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965); R. Sean Randolph, *The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); James Basche, *Thailand: Land of the Free* (New York: Taplinger, 1971); Marek Thee, *Notes of a Witness: Laos and the Second Indochina War* (New York: Random House, 1973); Adulyasak Soonthornrojana, "The Rise of United States-Thai Relations, 1945-1975" (Ph.D. diss., University of Akron, Akron, Ohio, 1986); D. Gareth Porter, "After Geneva: Subverting Laotian Neutrality," in Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., *Laos: War and Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1970), 179-212; G. M. Chittenden, "Laos and the Powers: 1954-1962" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1969).

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The Soviet challenge to Berlin should probably be analyzed in two phases: the first, the Soviet mini- and full blockades of the Western sectors, and the second, the Soviet decision not to interfere with the successful Anglo-American effort to resupply the city by air.[42]

The first phase of the crisis cannot be classified as a deterrence encounter because, in the words of George and Smoke, "the Soviet move cannot be viewed as a simple effort by an aggressor to change the local territorial status quo."[43] The consensus among Western scholars is that the blockade was the Soviet Union's response to Western efforts to integrate, politically and economically, the Western zones of occupation. By squeezing Berlin without using force, Stalin sought to coerce the Western powers into giving up their attempt to create a separate West Germany. If so, the Soviet move against Berlin must be considered an attempt at compellence.

It has been argued that the crisis can be regarded as an example of successful deterrence; the Soviet Union was obliged to settle for the blockade because they were deterred from using stronger options against West Berlin. George and Smoke call this a "dubious assumption" and argue, as do most Western scholars, that the blockade was probably Stalin's preferred option for obtaining his complex and fundamentally political goals.[44]

Another reason for questioning the use of the concept of deterrence to characterize this phase of the crisis is the absence of any prior formal commitment by the U.S. and Britain to defend West Berlin. The so-called "baby blockade" of April 1948 provided the Western powers with the opportunity to make an explicit commitment to Berlin, but they did little to establish or reinforce deterrence.

The second phase of the crisis is more open to multiple interpretations. The argument has been made that, once the airlift frustrated the blockade, the Western powers deterred the Soviet Union from more extreme measures against Berlin, perhaps including military occupation. But there is no evidence indicating that the Soviets planned to attack. An alternative and more widely accepted view holds that Stalin was only interested in the city as an instrument of political leverage, and never seriously considered military escalation. It can even be argued that the airlift constituted successful compellence by the Western powers as it convinced the Soviet Union to discontinue the blockade. Cautious investigators like George and Smoke, and Richard Betts, recognize the impossibility of any definitive judgment in the absence of the relevant Soviet documents.

[42] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, Vol. II: *Germany and Austria*; Vol. III: *Western Europe*; Vol. IV: *Eastern Europe: The Soviet Union* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1973, 1974); U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1959); Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969); Frank Howley, *Berlin Command* (New York: Putnam's, 1950); Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York: Doubleday, 1950); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Truman (fn. 32); W. Phillips Davison, *The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958); George and Smoke (fn. 2), 107-39; Avi Shlaim, *The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1987), 23-31.

[43] George and Smoke (fn. 2), 117; see also 109.

[44] George and Smoke (fn. 2), 135.

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U.S. SOVIET POLICY AND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION

By MIROSLAV NINCIC

IN this article, I examine the possibility that United States attitudes toward the Soviet Union are not only (perhaps not even principally) determined by that country's capacities and behavior, but that they are substantially shaped by domestic political rhythms within the United States and, in particular, by the electoral cycle that dominates so much of the nation's political life. This is a level of causality that contemporary thinking on international relations—whose dominant disposition is to assume that foreign policy reflects the structure of the international system—has relegated to the sidelines of its concerns.[1]

To the extent that political leaders bend foreign policy to their own electoral goals, they will separate it from the objective nature of external challenges, thereby impairing the nation's ability to deal with its international environment in a sensible and effective manner. Because of the place the Soviet Union occupies in U.S. foreign relations, and because of the consequences of a misconceived policy toward the USSR, the implications may be substantial. It is therefore necessary to examine the pattern of motivations, and the associated rules of behavior, that connect electoral politics to foreign policy.

The Bearing of Foreign Policy on Presidential Elections

The injection of electoral calculations into the conduct of external affairs is generally deemed undesirable and avoidable. It is undesirable because the national interest's close association with foreign policy dictates that the latter should follow a more elevated set of incentives. A disinterested pursuit of the national weal should guide the government's dealings with the outside world, no matter what is necessary in domestic affairs. In theory, at least, the politicization of foreign policy is often

[1] Two volumes that do seek to address the domestic sources of America's Soviet policy are Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979), and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). The latter provides a very fragmented picture, however, and the principal thesis contained in the former is not, in this author's opinion, truly convincing. On the domestic sources of the superpower hostility, and of the ups and downs in their relations, see also Miroslav Nincic, *Anatomy of Hostility: The US-Soviet Rivalry in Perspective* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989).

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thought unnecessary because national elections do not seem to be determined by international affairs.[2] A significant body of evidence suggests that a candidate's personality (defined in terms of leadership ability, competence, or even likability) may be as important as the substance of the issues around which elections appear to be fought.[3] Moreover, to the extent that issues do matter, the average voter is assumed to be principally concerned with domestic affairs that are recognized as having an impact on his own existence—especially those that have a direct bearing on his economic fortunes.[4] International policy is considered too remote from the daily concerns of the average citizen to have much of an impact on voting decisions. Accordingly, U.S. politicians appear to have no incentive to shape their foreign policy around public moods.

This reasoning may be intuitively compelling, but it is not entirely correct; though it may be advisable to remove foreign affairs from the normal play of domestic politics, it is often difficult for politicians to act on what is desirable in principle. Although a candidate's personal image plays an important role in shaping electoral preferences, and pocketbook issues are the dominant concern of many voters, foreign policy should not be considered irrelevant, especially at the level of presidential elections.

The tendency of presidential candidates to stress foreign policy issues in their campaigns is one reason for supposing that the conduct of external affairs has an impact on voter preferences. If it is true that the average voter cares little about such issues, it remains to be explained why they claim so much of the candidates' efforts. Evidence of a more direct sort

[2] An early statement of the probable irrelevance of the public's foreign policy opinions to elections is provided in Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950). More recent examples of studies that dismiss or play down the relevance of foreign affairs are Walter Dean Burnham, "The 1984 Election and the Future of American Politics," in Ellis Sandoz and Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., eds., *Election 1984: Landslide without a Mandate* (New York: New American Library, 1985); Everett C. Ladd, "On Mandates, Realignments and the 1984 Presidential Election," *Political Studies Quarterly* 100 (Fall 1985), 1-25; and Michael Kagay and Greg Caldeira, "I Like the Looks of His Face," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1975.

[3] An early treatment of this theme is found in Donald E. Stokes's seminal article, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review* 60 (March 1966), 19-28. For more recent studies, see Arthur H. Miller and Warren Miller, "Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality?" *American Political Science Review* 70 (September 1976), pp. 832-49; Arthur H. Miller, Martin P. Wattenberg, and Oksana Malenchuk, "Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates," *American Political Science Review* 80 (June 1986), 521-40.

[4] For example, see Paul C. Light and Celinda Lake, "The Election: Candidates, Strategies, and Decision," in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Election of 1984* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985). More generally, see Ray C. Fair, "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for the President," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 60 (May 1978), 159-73.

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also points to the electoral relevance of foreign policy. It has been demonstrated that a president's approval ratings are a major determinant of his electoral prospects or, if he is not running, of those of his party's candidate.[5] At the same time, survey data indicate that approval of an incumbent's foreign policy significantly influences his popularity—establishing a causal link that neither incumbent nor challenger can easily ignore.[6] The course of Jimmy Carter's and Ronald Reagan's popularity ratings illustrates the point. In surveys assessing how well the public felt each president was doing his job, respondents were frequently asked whether they approved of how each was handling the economy and foreign policy. The answers enable us to compare the impact of these two types of issues on the popularity of two recent presidents. Consider the following simple model:

$$P_t = \alpha + \beta_1 E_t + \beta_2 S_t + u_t$$

where

P_t is the incumbent president's approval rating at time t;[7]
E_t is public approval of the president's economic policies, as measured at time t;[8]
S_t is public approval of the president's Soviet policies at time t;[9] and
u_t is a stochastic error term.

The model was estimated for a period spanning the two presidencies; the results are displayed in Table 1.

The equation, though encompassing the effect of only two issue areas, accounts for over 90 percent of the variance in presidential popularity. As expected, approval of economic performance produced the greater impact, but public feelings regarding Carter's and Reagan's foreign pol-

[5] Lee Sigelman, "Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 43 (Winter 1979), 532-34; Michael Lewis Beck and Tom W. Rice, "Presidential Popularity and Presidential Vote," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46 (Winter 1982), 534-37; Richard Brody and Lee Sigelman, "Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections: An Update and Extension," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47 (Fall 1983), 325-28.

[6] This argument is developed in Miroslav Nincic and Barbara Hinckley, "Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections" (forthcoming).

[7] For President Reagan, approval was measured by responses to the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?" as reported in *The Gallup Report* No. 264, September 1987. Approval for President Carter was assessed in terms of positive responses to the question: "How would you rate the job President Carter is doing as President?" *The Harris Survey* (various issues).

[8] For Reagan, the question was: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling the economy?" For Carter, the wording was: "How would you rate him on handling the economy?" (Sources as in footnote 7.)

[9] For Reagan, the wording was: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling foreign affairs?" For Carter, it was: "How would you rate him on handling of foreign policy matters?" (Sources as in footnote 7.)

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TABLE 1
POLICY TOWARD THE USSR, ECONOMICS, AND PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY[a]

Variable	*Estimated Coefficient*	*t*
	$\alpha = 10.36$	3.2
E_t	$\beta_1 = 0.58$	8.73
S_t	$\beta_2 = 0.36$	4.47

$R_2 = 0.91$ $N = 47$

[a] Due to first-order serial correlation, the equation is estimated by generalized least squares.

icy mattered as well. The fact that $\beta_1 = 0.58$ indicates that an increase of 10 percentage points in the public's approval of presidential economic performance yielded an expected increase of nearly 6 percentage points in overall popularity. In the case of foreign policy ($\beta_2 = 0.36$), a similar ten-point increase would have yielded between three and four additional points of popularity—not a trivial political benefit, and one that no rational politician would easily abandon.

The conclusion is that, although a president must be most attentive to his economic performance, he cannot afford to neglect public reactions to his foreign policy. By the same token, it is in the challenger's interest to discredit the incumbent's conduct of external affairs. Consequently, both are tempted to tailor their foreign policy around its anticipated electoral impact. Because of the centrality of relations with the Soviet Union to any administration's foreign policy and presumably to the public's appraisal of that policy, this area is especially likely to be one upon which electoral politics would intrude.

Acquiring and maintaining political power is not the only objective that drives political leaders. Although tradeoffs between personal political goals and the national interest are not always resolved to the advantage of the former,[10] it may be fruitful to interpret U.S. foreign policy choices vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in terms of electoral calculations. To gain a firmer grasp on the structure of incentives undergirding this policy, we must address the pattern of political rewards and punishments surrounding it.

[10] For example, President Carter's decision to cede control of the Panama Canal to the Republic of Panama was, by all indications, based on principle alone, and was taken despite the expectation that the decision would not be popular domestically. Similarly, President Truman's decision to dismiss General Douglas MacArthur, despite the public adulation for the World War II hero, was politically risky and rooted mainly in a judgment of what the national interest demanded.

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Electoral Timetables and U.S. Soviet Policy

The Hypothesized Model

The salience of the Soviet Union to American society implies that, in their dealings with Moscow, foreign-policy decision makers will seek to avoid errors that the electorate deems particularly grievous.[11] Mistakes are always possible, however; these leaders must therefore devise, explicitly or implicitly, a set of rules to guide them in a context where uncertainty permeates most foreign policy decisions.

Because stances toward the USSR are typically based on imperfect information regarding its leaders' intentions and the country's capabilities, U.S. Soviet policy carries the risk of two sorts of errors. On the one hand, leaders or presidential candidates may wrongly underestimate the Soviet threat, and consequently advocate a response that is insufficiently assertive (too mild a denunciation of Soviet provocations, a failure to undertake needed military buildups, and so forth). On the other hand, they could mistakenly overstate Moscow's capabilities and predatory intent, choosing a policy that is more confrontational than is objectively called for (overly denunciatory postures, unneccessary military programs, etc.). Knowing that mistakes of either sort are possible, they are likely to opt for the policy that stands to evoke the lesser political punishment if it should prove to have been misguided.

There is little doubt that the penalties facing the leader found guilty of mistakenly underreacting to a Soviet threat are far more severe than those inflicted on one whose error consists of wrongly overreacting to that threat.[12] There is nothing surprising about this: the national security values that are jeopardized by an underreaction appear more salient than those that are undermined by unnecessary belligerence, and the organized interests that have developed around the East-West confrontation are more powerful than those that have rallied against it.[13] Accordingly, when uncertainty surrounds the USSR's intentions and capabilities (as is typically the case), the political reward structure facing the national leader disposes U.S. Soviet policy toward hostile assertiveness.

[11] This necessity is buttressed by a realization that much voting is "retrospective," i.e., based on an estimate of a candidate's past performance rather than his program for the future. See Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), and Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, "Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1980," *American Political Science Review* 79 (June 1985), 359-72.

[12] If we were to assume that the leader or candidate were not concerned with minimizing errors but with maximizing successes, the conclusion would be the same. The reasons for the bias are identical in both cases.

[13] I develop these arguments in much greater detail in Nincic (fn. 1), chap. 4.

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The bias does not always operate with uniform force, however, and it is interesting to speculate on the conditions that may impart a periodicity to its effect. The reasoning pursued here suggests that, ceteris paribus, the inclination should be especially pronounced at election time, when the political system's principal rewards and punishments are meted out. Thus, within the typical four-year electoral cycle, one would expect a pronounced surge of anti-Soviet assertiveness in the year of the actual election—the fourth year of the cycle.[14] Grasping the bias in the political reward structure, challengers have been tempted to sharpen the tone of their anti-Soviet rhetoric, to discover ways in which their opponent has been lax with respect to security, and to call for increased vigilance and firmness toward America's premier rival. If an incumbent is running for reelection, he will seek to disprove the challenger's claims by displaying examples of his own firmness toward Moscow and his belief in a strong defense. If nonincumbent challengers are competing against each other, the tendency is to demonstrate an unassailable toughness by promises of appropriate future policies.

Since a belligerent stance acquires its own momentum, and since some campaign pledges must be honored, the election-induced hostility is likely to carry over at least into the first year of the subsequent cycle. Thus, hostility is also likely to be pronounced at the beginning of the four-year cycle. Beyond this, however, two considerations may begin to sway American Soviet policy in a more conciliatory direction. The first concerns the American public's distaste for extremes—especially sustained extremes—of policy. The second involves the other aspects of a statesman's motivational structure.

Though the political reward structure facing a U.S. leader's Soviet policy is inclined toward hostility, it also imposes bounds on permissible hawkish behavior. The American electorate prefers to err on the side of excessive firmness and distrust of Moscow, but it does not feel comfortable with unbridled hostility or extended saber rattling. In the absence of dramatic evidence of impending threat, weariness with hostility eventually sets in. For example, the promise of a more assertive policy toward the Soviet Union appears to have been one of the causes of Ronald Rea-

[14] The model assumes that the American public responds most powerfully to relatively current policies. Thus, although actions in the earlier years of the cycle may have some impact, political memory is, for most people, not very long. The notion that past policies are discounted when political evaluations of the president are made is substantially confirmed in the literature on the determinants of presidential elections and popularity. See, e.g., Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., *The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), and Barbara Hinckley and Paul Brace, "The Powers and Limits of the President: The Case of the Polls" (forthcoming).

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gan's electoral success in 1980. Yet in 1983, although public approval of the Soviet Union remained at its lowest point in fifteen years, 56 percent concurred with the statement that "while it's good to have someone as president who is firm with the Soviets, I worry that he might get us into another war." An identical percentage agreed that "he doesn't seem to realize that negotiations to make peace are more important than building up the armed might of the U.S."[15] Whatever biases may be imbedded in the political culture, the public eventually becomes impatient with policies that spill out of the boundaries defined by its conception of moderation.[16] Consequently, having established their ability to be tough, most leaders eventually find it useful to relax their belligerence on East-West matters, and to demonstrate their commitment to peace and cooperation.

This tendency may be reinforced by other layers of incentives that guide U.S. presidents. Although elections are rarely far from their thoughts, it should be assumed that politicians at most levels of the political system are generally also driven by their interpretation of the issues, an interest in problem solving, and an aspiration to statesmanship. With regard to U.S. dealings with the Soviet Union, it is probable that some conception of peace, and not only of strength, matters to the country's leaders, and that they would like to establish a stable foundation for East-West relations as part of their legacy. Given the bias of the political reward structure, however, they are most likely to act on this second tier of motivations when the potential costs of doing so recede—i.e., *between* elections.

One might expect a mellowing of attitudes toward Moscow in the second year of the typical election cycle, as the administration's structure of incentives begins to change, but major results may not be immediately apparent. Substantial new initiatives require some effort at building the appropriate domestic coalitions (e.g., an arms-control proposal might require the assent of major military leaders), and agreements with the Soviet Union are often contingent on prior negotiation. Consequently, it may not be until the third year of the cycle that major breakthroughs occur—making this the period of the greatest potential successes in U.S.-Soviet cooperation. The hypothesized consequence is that Washington's Soviet policy will trace the following movement across the four-year electoral cycle.

There is another facet to this argument. The reasoning that leads us

[15] *The Harris Survey*, May 9, 1983.

[16] See Miroslav Nincic, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites," *World Politics* 40 (July 1988), 452-75.

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

FIGURE 1
ELECTORAL CYCLE AND POLICY TOWARD USSR
(HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIP)

to expect a characteristic four-year pattern to the U.S. Soviet policy also leads us to anticipate that, in his second term, a president will be less inclined to tailor his Soviet policy around electoral considerations than he was in his first term. Free from the pressures of reelection, less concerned about the fate of his party's next nominee than he was about his own, and perhaps more interested in securing history's favorable judgment on his performance than in manipulating public opinion, he may pursue decreased tensions and a stable basis for East-West cooperation more energetically than he did during his first term in office. A four-year cycle may characterize the second term as well, but the overall level of cooperativeness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union should be higher and the bent toward belligerence less pronounced.

Thus, the assumed electoral basis of U.S. Soviet policy produces two hypotheses: the first concerns the connection between policy and electoral cycles, and the second involves a difference between the two presidential terms. There is no assumption of determinism; all we expect is a domestically fueled *bias* to foreign policy. Accordingly, there are circumstances when the anticipated effects will not normally occur. Before we follow up this shifting impact, it is necessary to see whether the initial hypotheses find support in the evidence.

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The Historical Record

The selection of a starting point may be somewhat arbitrary, but the election of 1952 seems appropriate for a number of reasons. By the late 1940s, containment had become the official Soviet policy of the United States: Henry Wallace's fate in the 1948 election established how parlous a dovish foreign policy could be, and the 1948 Berlin crisis and the Korean War had left no doubt about the clashing objectives of the two sides. In 1950, reflecting the mood of the nation, NSC 68 stated that "an indefinite period of tension and danger is foreseen for the United States and for the West—a period that should be deemed less as a short-term crisis than as a permanent and fundamental alteration in the shape of international relations."[17]

A sharpening of the tone and substance of hostility toward the USSR has been apparent in a number of presidential contests since that time. Although some elections had no obvious impact on the tone of the rivalry, it is hard to think of any (with the possible exception of 1972) that actually encouraged a more conciliatory stance toward the Soviet Union. Thus, while there is nothing inevitable about the link, there is at least evidence of a propensity toward increased assertiveness in presidential election years.

The 1952 presidential contest set a pattern that was to be replicated in several races. Though President Truman did not run for reelection, contenders for the Republican nomination chose to make his foreign policy a major campaign issue, and their accusations ranged from the specific to the very general. Republicans accused the administration of having invited the invasion of South Korea by suggesting that it lay outside the perimeter of U.S. security interests. Asserting, moreover, that Yalta and Potsdam had amounted to an abandonment of Eastern Europe, they charged that the Democrats lacked the resolve needed to stand up to the Soviet Union's expansionary designs. Pamphlets prepared by the Republican National Committee declared: "We can thank the political party in power that one-third of people in the world are now under Communist domination."[18] Eisenhower, guided largely by John Foster Dulles, maintained that the Democrats had demonstrated a readiness to "barter away freedom in order to appease the Russian rulers."[19] Containment came under attack as "defensive, negative, futile, and immoral [in abandoning]

[17] The text of NSC-68 (declassified in 1975) is reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, *Documents in American Foreign Policy and Strategy: 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 385-442.

[18] Quoted in Robert A. Divine, *Foreign Policy and US Presidential Elections: 1952-1960* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), 44.

[19] *Ibid.*, 53.

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countless people to a despotism and Godless terrorism."[20] The Republicans, Dulles asserted, would liberate Eastern Europe through a "rollback" of Soviet influence (to be achieved by unspecified means).

Adlai Stevenson, then a more orthodox cold warrior than he would subsequently become, accepted the Republicans' characterization of the USSR and the need for anti-Soviet toughness. Warning that "there should be no mistake about this," he observed that "world domination is the ultimate target of the communist rulers, and world domination includes us."[21] Still, he did not question the adequacy of containment, and the more fiery rhetoric came from the Republican camp.

Eisenhower's victory may have provided a lesson on where the greatest electoral advantage lay when it came to Soviet policy, and much of the campaign's pugnacity spilled over into the beginning of his term in office. Nevertheless, the new administration did not quite match its deeds to its tone. Although it moved toward a "new look" in military policy, involving a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and the strategy of "massive retaliation," the policy of "rolling back" Soviet power was never implemented—nor, it seems, seriously considered. Eventually, the level of tension began to recede. By 1955, the four-power summit in Geneva signaled a more conciliatory stance, leaving the years immediately preceding the meeting as the high-water mark of the cold war. The mid-fifties witnessed a plateau in East-West tension, and 1959 produced the "spirit of Camp David." By 1960, however, two new candidates were vying for the presidency; a number of parallels with 1952 could be discerned, together with another upswing of belligerence. Khrushchev's behavior in 1960 did nothing to help the situation, but electoral calculations probably also contributed to the increasingly acid U.S. attitudes toward the Kremlin.

The Republicans entered the race with what they considered a virtually unassailable position on foreign affairs. The nation had enjoyed eight years of peace, Richard Nixon's anticommunist credentials were impeccable, and—possibly as an additional precaution—Henry Cabot Lodge, who had emerged as one of the nation's leading cold-war spokesman, was nominated as his running mate. Unexpectedly, however, John F. Kennedy chose to make the Republican stewardship of foreign policy a leading theme of his presidential campaign. Exploiting the nation's feelings of vulnerability in the wake of Sputnik, he contended that the Eisenhower-Nixon administration had presided over a decline in Amer-

[20] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 128.
[21] Divine (fn. 18), 73.

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ica's military power. The resulting "missile gap," he charged, promoted a loss of America's international prestige and encouraged an increase in Soviet boldness—as attested to, for example, by Moscow's influence over Cuba. "Never before have we experienced such arrogant treatment at the hands of our enemies," Kennedy declared, and he attacked Nixon's vice presidential leadership as one of "weakness, retreat, and defeat."[22]

Vice President Nixon had no choice but to counterattack. Although he preferred to stress his background in foreign affairs and his experience at dealing with Nikita Khrushchev, he was quite prepared to sharpen his own cold-war rhetoric for the occasion. He worried about Soviet subversion in the third world, and castigated Kennedy for insufficient firmness on Quemoy and Matsu—which amounted, he argued, to a willingness to abandon the islands to the Russians.[23] Despite the Eisenhower administration's fiscal conservatism, he promised to increase military spending—even if this meant increasing taxes.[24] Just how much foreign policy issues contributed to Kennedy's slim margin of victory is a matter for debate, but his attitude on East-West matters probably bolstered the tough and dynamic image that ultimately carried him to victory.[25]

Once in office, Kennedy quickly discovered that whatever missile gap existed actually favored the United States, but he did not retreat from his campaign pledge of a major military buildup. Moreover, the administration made its resistance to Soviet influence in the third world a cornerstone of its foreign policy; extensive counterinsurgency programs were devised for this purpose. But Kennedy lacked the intellectual and policy rigidity of a John Foster Dulles. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., by the time he entered the White House, the "contrast between the God-annointed apostles of free enterprise and the regimented hordes of atheistic communism bored him. . . . The stereotypes of the fifties, he thought, were not only self-serving, but worse, they simply did not provide a useful way of thinking about international affairs."[26]

The political psychologists Douglas Stuart and Harvey Starr, reporting on their study of Kennedy's and Kissinger's attitudes toward the Soviet Union, stated that "Kennedy succeeded in amalgamating Acheson's emphasis upon strength and caution with Stevenson's perpetual

[22] "Kennedy Attacks Nixon 'Weakness,' " *New York Times*, August 25, 1960.
[23] See "Nixon and Kennedy Clash on TV over Issue of Quemoy's Defense," *New York Times*, October 8, 1960.
[24] "Nixon Gives Budget Priority," *New York Times*, August 25, 1960.
[25] See, for example, Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Bantam, 1966), 216-17.
[26] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 298.

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commitment to negotiation."[27] Nevertheless, these two components were emphasized to a differing extent over the political cycle. As his presidency got under way and the election receded behind him, he sought to set Soviet-American relations on a less volatile footing. A number of steps were taken toward this end. Cooperation between the two superpowers ensured the neutralization of Laos and removed that country from the grip of the cold war in 1962. Moreover, spurred by the Cuban missile crisis, the administration put real vigor into its efforts to secure a nuclear test ban. In the opinion of Richard Goodwin, a member of his administration, "by 1963, John Kennedy had begun to alter the direction of his leadership and was intent on a process of accommodation that might end the Cold War."[28] On June 10, 1963, the President delivered a major foreign policy speech at American University, criticizing those who "say it is useless to speak of world peace or world disarmament . . . until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude." Rather, he announced, "we must reexamine our own attitude . . . for our attitude is as essential as theirs. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counterweapons."[29] He dispatched Averell Harriman to Moscow to get the treaty talks under way, and in 1963, despite some resistance from within the Defense Department, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Kennedy's death, the Vietnam War, and the short-lived détente promoted by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger temporarily disrupted the link between electoral cycles and U.S.-Soviet relations. However, 1976 conveyed a sense of political déjà vu. This time, the assault was led by Ronald Reagan who, in his bid to deny the nomination to Gerald Ford, denounced détente and the SALT process. Charging that the administration had let itself be duped by Moscow, he declared that "there is little doubt in my mind that the Soviet Union will not stop taking advantage of détente until it sees that the American people have elected a new President and appointed a new Secretary of State."[30] President Ford responded by announcing that détente would no longer be a part of his political vocabulary, and he abandoned his efforts to secure the SALT II

[27] Stuart and Starr, "The 'Inherent Bad Faith Model' Reconsidered: Dulles, Kennedy, and Kissinger," *Political Psychology* 3 (Fall/Winter 1981-82), 8.

[28] Goodwin, *Remembering America: A Voice from the Sixties* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), 234.

[29] The text of the American University Speech is available in "Text of Kennedy's Address 'Strategy of Peace' for Easing the Cold War," *New York Times,* June 11, 1963.

[30] Reagan, quoted in Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 337.

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Treaty. As he later explained, by January 1976 he had concluded that, with an approaching election, "it would be impossible to discuss issues like SALT II in a rational way."[31] Although Jimmy Carter was inclined to take more than one stand on the issues, he avoided a politically perilous dovish position by asserting that the Ford administration had been too accommodating in its arms talks with Moscow and, in pressing for the 1975 Helsinki Agreement, insufficiently committed to individual liberties within the Soviet bloc.[32]

Even after the election, President Carter found it hard to devise a consistent Soviet policy, and his first steps were hardly designed to win Moscow's confidence. At the University of Notre Dame in May 1977, the president declared: "We are now free of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear." However, the speech is generally remembered as far more conciliatory than it really was; Carter used the same occasion to criticize the Kremlin's human rights record and, with special reference to the Soviet-sanctioned Cuban presence in Angola, he denounced its desire to "impose its own social system upon another" through direct or indirect force.[33] His needling of the Kremlin on human rights and the administration's courting of China, as well as Soviet adventurism in the third world, sharpened the rivalry through 1977 and 1978. Still, like others before him, President Carter tried to introduce a more cooperative note in East-West relations toward the middle of his term. Although these efforts never got very far, he signed SALT II in 1979, and strides were taken toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, there were comparatively few references to the USSR's human rights performance in 1979. It is by no means certain that a Carter victory in 1980 would have altered the East-West climate of subsequent years. Soviet behavior in Africa, and the invasion of Afghanistan, contributed to the demise of détente and to Washington's conviction that Moscow should only be dealt with from a position of strength. With the approaching election, even the feeblest hopes faded away that some cooperation could be salvaged. Domestic political conditions made virtually inconceivable any attempt to moderate the tone of anti-Soviet rhetoric, to search for areas of common interest between the superpowers, and to maintain effective bilateral communication.

In 1980, President Carter assumed a rather implacable stance. He

[31] *Ibid.*, 353.

[32] The 1976 election is described and analyzed in Gerald Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1976* (New York: David McKay, 1977).

[33] For the full text of the University of Notre Dame speech, see "Carter Says Failure in the Mideast Now Could Be Disastrous," *New York Times*, May 23, 1977.

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abandoned his efforts to obtain Senate ratification of the SALT II Treaty and accelerated the buildup of U.S. strategic arsenals and force projection capabilities. The United States withdrew from the Moscow Olympics, and dealings with the Kremlin assumed a far more belligerent tone than during the previous decade. Nevertheless, a challenge was again launched from the hawkish end of the political spectrum, and it was again spearheaded by Ronald Reagan, with accusations reminiscent of those leveled by Dulles and Eisenhower against the Truman administration. He charged that President Carter's policy, by "bordering on appeasement," had encouraged the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and could even be inviting another world war. "They were right," he proclaimed. "The Soviet Union has bet that Mr. Carter is too weak to respond to the invasion of Afghanistan. And they were right."[34] The Republican party's platform asserted that the Soviet threat loomed more ominously than ever before, and in a significant departure from Nixon's and Kissinger's stress on "essential equivalence," it called for a decisive margin of military superiority over the USSR.

It is difficult to disentangle the effects that the state of the economy (especially the high inflation rates) or the spectacle of U.S. hostages in Iran may have had on the voting decision of the average American, but the possibility exists that insufficient toughness toward the Soviet Union may have carried substantial electoral costs.[35]

President Reagan's first years in office were marked by a shrillness of rhetoric unparalleled since the coldest days of the cold war. The notion of establishing a modicum of economic cooperation between the superpowers was abandoned. The administration's eagerness to invest in new military systems seemed boundless, and loose talk on the need for a nuclear war-fighting ability made allies as nervous as rivals. Though Reagan's entire first term registered little movement toward a significant normalization of relations, and though a new pitch of rhetoric was reached in March 1983 with the president's "evil empire" speech, a few moderately encouraging signs did appear during the year. The administration liberalized grain sales to the USSR and ended the ban on furnishing pipeline equipment, and the START and INF talks in Geneva showed first stirrings of life.

Although the notion of a U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union that is at least partly driven by the rhythms of electoral calculation finds support in a survey of recent history, not all elections produced an increase in

[34] "Reagan Assails Carter's Foreign Policy as Weak," *Wall Street Journal*, January 28, 1980.
[35] For the impact of Carter's Soviet policy on the outcome of the 1980 election, see Nincic and Hinckley (fn. 6), 15.

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cold war assertiveness. There are certain conditions that appear to activate the link between elections and presidential pugnaciousness, but a less anecdotal and descriptive examination of the four-year cycle is necessary.

Some Quantitative Evidence

A more systematic confirmation of the hypothesized relation requires a quantitative analysis of several core indicators of American cooperativeness or hostile assertiveness toward the Soviet Union. For example, the U.S. government's firmness with regard to the USSR is partially reflected in the nation's rate of military spending, but this indicator is broader than the relationship that we intend to tap here. Bureaucratic momentum is known to be one of the forces driving defense programs;[36] these programs may also be related to a variety of economic needs.[37] Moreover, part of the nation's military forces (e.g., its counterterrorist capacity) is not specifically directed against the USSR.

In view of the variety of influences that shape overall defense outlays, it would be wise to choose a less highly aggregated indicator of military effort as a reflection of U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union. An example is the portion of overall defense outlays devoted to the development and procurement of strategic weapons. Even investments in strategic capability are determined by several factors, but they cannot be separated from the dominant U.S. posture vis-à-vis the USSR. It is difficult to justify the cost of major new programs without invoking an appropriate Soviet threat; moreover, since the acquisition of an expanded strategic arsenal generally fuels the Kremlin's fears regarding American intentions and capabilities, it is not consistent with a desire to promote enhanced cooperation. Therefore, the rate of growth of U.S. spending on strategic forces, rather than the overall military budget, provides a simple yet compelling measure of U.S. assertiveness toward the Soviet Union.

Two intuitively plausible indicators of cooperativeness suggest themselves as well. First, agreements to halt or control the arms race indicate some level of authentic commitment to cooperate in a vital area of superpower relations. Most importantly, they generally involve some willingness to forgo a military system or, at the very least, to accept a ceiling on

[36] An excellent treatment of the bureaucratic momentum that may account for the rate of growth of military budgets is to be found in Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

[37] On this point, see Miroslav Nincic, *The Arms Race: The Political Economy of Military Growth* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

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its future procurement. Though the various test bans have rarely made a significant dent in weapons development, the possibility that they might do so could not be discounted at the time they were signed. Negotiations leading to an agreement may span a number of years, but its actual signing reflects a determination by both sides to resolve the last, and generally thorniest, obstacles to an accord. Consequently, the signing of arms control agreements should denote, at both the symbolic and practical level, a heightened willingness to deal cooperatively with the Soviet Union.

Summit meetings are a second potential indicator (overlapping partially with the first) of cooperative stance, but a few reservations are called for. In contrast to arms control agreements, the level of commitment involved may not go much beyond facile symbolism. The real objective on one or both sides may even be to impress the other with firmness rather than with conciliatory intent. Nevertheless, direct meetings between the leaders of the two superpowers generally do indicate a desire for improved relations; occasionally, they involve practical steps to set them on a more cooperative course. Thus, a U.S. president's willingness to meet with Soviet leaders, as reflected in the incidence of summits, provides another useful indicator of a cooperative posture.

Most foreign policy activities have both a symbolic and a practical component. The precise mix of the two varies, but the absence of any symbolic content (a rather rare occurrence) would make an activity ill-suited to the sort of electoral calculus we are examining. Accordingly, our brief historical survey has examined policies that had at least some symbolic implications; the same applies to the quantitative measures. One of the indicators (incidence of summits) is heavily weighted toward the symbolic. Another (growth of strategic spending) has practical implications that are at least equal to the symbolic. Finally, arms control agreements present a very close balance of symbolic and practical content. Each of these three measures reflects Washington's Soviet policy from a different angle. None is a perfect indicator of the underlying construct (U.S. attitude toward the Soviet Union),[38] but, taken together, they portray it in a meaningful and fairly comprehensive manner. Not only are they objective indicators of the extent of U.S. cooperativeness or hostility, but they are likely to be perceived as such by the American public. The latter is therefore expected to reward political leaders for such policies with electoral benefits.

[38] Most importantly, summits and arms control agreements depend on Soviet cooperativeness as well as on U.S. attitudes.

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To see whether hostile assertiveness is more pronounced toward the first and fourth years of the electoral cycle while cooperative efforts are more apparent toward the second and particularly the third year, we should observe the movement of the three indicators over the cycle, during as extensive a portion of cold-war history as possible. Thus, we record the average percent rate of increase in strategic spending over each of the four (one-year) phases of the electoral cycle (Figure 2), the number of arms control agreements over each of these periods (Figure 3), and the number of superpower summits over the same cycle (Figure 4).



FIGURE 2
STRATEGIC SPENDING AND ELECTORAL CYCLE[a]

[a] Levels of strategic spending are those proposed in the annual presidential budget (*Budget of the United States Government*, various issues). Strategic spending has been reported in a separate category since 1962. The data cover the period 1961-1988. (In order to complete the cycle, a 1961 figure was estimated on the basis of overall military spending and ICBM construction figures.)

U.S. strategic spending follows the predicted pattern in every respect. The average percentage increase was highest during the fourth year of the electoral cycle (5.53 percent); the next highest (4.48 percent) occurred during the first year. It was lowest during the third year (a *negative* growth of −0.34 percent); during the second year, it was only slightly higher (0.42 percent). Thus, these figures are consistent with the hypothesis that incumbent presidents do their best to display toughness during

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election years by expanding outlays for strategic programs, and that this momentum usually carries over into strategic spending during the first year of the subsequent presidential term. Beyond the first year, the pattern shifts. Conceivably because electoral pressures are weaker during the second and third years, and because the tendency for the "politics of opposites" comes into play, strategic growth is much less pronounced toward the middle of the cycle.



FIGURE 3
ELECTORAL CYCLE AND ARMS CONTROL[a]

[a] Included are those significant arms control agreements that were, principally or exclusively, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. (The number in parentheses designates the year of the electoral cycle in which the agreement was signed.)

Hot Line Agreement, 1963 (3)
Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963 (3)
Outer Space Treaty, 1967 (3)
Seabed Treaty, 1971 (3)
Accident Measures Agreement, 1971 (3)
Hot Line Modernization Agreement, 1971 (3)
SALT I ABM Treaty, 1972 (4)
SALT I Interim Offensive Arms Agreement, 1972 (4)
Nuclear War Prevention Agreement, 1973 (1)
Vladivostok Accord, 1974 (2); as most of the relevant preparatory work was done before President Nixon's resignation, the Vladivostok Accord is attributed to the second year of his second term.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 1974 (2)
ABM Protocol, 1974 (2)
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 1976 (3)
SALT II Treaty, 1979 (3)
Intermediate-range Nuclear Weapons Treaty, 1987 (3)

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

FIGURE 4
SUMMITS AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE[a]

[a] The following are the U.S.-Soviet summits involved. (The number in parentheses designates the year of the electoral cycle in which the summit occurred.)
Eisenhower/Khrushchev, Geneva, 1955 (3)
Eisenhower/Khrushchev, Camp David, 1959 (3)
Eisenhower/Khrushchev, Paris, 1960 (4)
Kennedy/Khrushchev, Vienna, 1961 (1)
Johnson/Kosygin, Glassboro, NJ, 1967 (3)
Nixon/Brezhnev, Moscow, 1972 (4)
Nixon/Brezhnev, Washington, 1973 (1)
Nixon/Brezhnev, Moscow, 1974 (2)
Ford/Brezhnev, Vladivostok, 1974 (2); as most of the relevant preparatory work was done before President Nixon's resignation, the Vladivostok summit is attributed to the second year of his second term.
Carter/Brezhnev, Vienna, 1979 (3)
Reagan/Gorbachev, Geneva, 1985 (1)
Reagan/Gorbachev, Reykjavik, 1986 (2)
Reagan/Gorbachev, Washington, 1987 (3)
Reagan/Gorbachev, Moscow, 1988 (4)
Reagan/Gorbachev, New York, 1988 (4)

Our hypothesis about the relation between U.S. Soviet policy and electoral rhythms is further confirmed by our measures of cooperativeness. By far the greatest number of the fifteen agreements identified since the onset of the cold war were signed during the third year of the four-year cycle (nine in all). Three agreements were signed during the second year; only one (the Nuclear War Prevention Agreement) was signed during a first year; and just two (unless one chooses to regard SALT I as a single agreement) were signed during a fourth year.

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While summit meetings do not reflect the cycle quite as clearly, they do provide at least a tentative confirmation of the hypothesis. As expected, the greatest number of summits (five) took place during the third year. The first year had as many summits as the second (three), but the fourth year had more (four). Though this is not in line with the anticipated pattern, it is worth pointing out that the two least successful summits on record were first- and fourth-year summits, respectively.[39] The 1960 summit (a fourth-year event) ended as a complete fiasco: Khrushchev demanded Eisenhower's apology for the U-2 espionage incident and a promise to renounce future overflights. Eisenhower refused to provide either, and the summit was scuttled before it really got under way. The 1961 meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev is also generally regarded as a failure, characterized by sharp exchanges between the two leaders and no substantive agreements. Thus, even the pattern of summits provides some illustration of the electoral cycle's influence on foreign policy. If, by removing these two summits from the picture, we focus only on those marked by a cooperative attitude (the dotted line in Figure 4), the shape of the graph is broadly consistent with the one predicted for the four-year cycle.

The quantitative evidence supports our hypothesis about the impact of the electoral cycle on the Soviet policy of the United States. The two indicators that performed best (rate of strategic spending and arms control agreements) have significant practical as well as symbolic implications. Moreover, the quantity that is most directly under U.S. control—i.e., strategic spending—provides the most unambiguous confirmation of the model. (Summits and arms-control agreements depend on appropriate Soviet responses.) In any case, it is hard to escape the conclusion that U.S. stances toward the Soviet Union have been significantly shaped by the requirements of domestic political competition. Although deviations from the pattern have occurred, and there is no question of determinism here, evidence of an electoral bias cannot easily be dismissed.

First and Second Terms

The reasoning that led us to expect that attitudes toward the USSR would be linked to the four-year political cycle also suggests that a second-term president should be less inclined to tailor his Soviet policy around electoral considerations than one in his first term.

The empirical base for second terms is unfortunately slim, since the

[39] An overview of the first eleven superpower summits is provided in Gordon R. Weihmiller, *US-Soviet Summits: An Account of East-West Diplomacy at the Top, 1955-1985* (New York: University Press of America, 1986).

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postwar period has witnessed only two completed second terms—Dwight D. Eisenhower's and Ronald Reagan's. Even though Nixon was elected in 1972, the Watergate scandal left little scope for significant foreign policy initiatives before his resignation in 1974. Still, the evidence that does exist is fairly compelling.

There is little doubt that President Eisenhower's attitude toward Moscow was more conciliatory in his second term than in his first. The level of anti-Soviet rhetoric was more muted; by 1958, even Secretary Dulles offered the opinion that the USSR had become more of a status quo power than one with revolutionary ambitions.[40] The president took significant steps on the path toward arms control by announcing, on August 23, 1958, that the United States would suspend nuclear detonations for a year, provided the Soviets did as much. In July 1959, Eisenhower invited Nikita Khrushchev to visit the United States to discuss all outstanding issues between the two states. The Soviet leader's visit was conducted in a generally cordial atmosphere, and reduction of tensions over Berlin was one of the benefits it yielded. That same year, President Eisenhower proposed a ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere, while negotiations were pursued to find a way of monitoring tests conducted underground and in outer space.

The shift to a more conciliatory attitude was even more pronounced during Ronald Reagan's second term. Talk of an "evil empire" and speculation on the winnability of nuclear war yielded to statesmanlike efforts to find a modus vivendi between the superpowers. It is difficult to disentangle the effects of the second term from the impetus to cooperation provided by Mikhail Gorbachev's new policies, but the Ronald Reagan of earlier years was hard to recognize. Though not a single meeting between the two countries' leaders occurred during the first term, five summits (more than during the incumbency of any other president) were held between 1985 and 1988. In Reagan's first term, virtually no progress toward arms control had been registered; but in 1987 the INF treaty (removing a whole category of nuclear weapons from European soil) was signed, and steps were taken toward a treaty reducing strategic arsenals by as much as 50 percent.

Our hypothesis regarding the difference between the two presidential terms is supported by an examination of the three quantitative indicators whose movement along the four-year electoral cycle we have already traced. In Figure 5, we compare the average annual number of summits

[40] See Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1984*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985), 200.

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

FIGURE 5
THE TWO PRESIDENTIAL TERMS COMPARED

and arms control agreements between the two terms, expecting—for both indicators of cooperation—the mean to be higher in the first term than in the second. For average rate of increase in strategic spending, our indicator of confrontational posture, the expectation is simply reversed.[41] In each case the hypothesis is confirmed.

First terms averaged only 0.2 summit meetings per year; the second-term average was five times as high (1.00). For first terms, a mean of 0.46 arms-control agreements per year is recorded; for second terms, the figure is 0.83. The annual rate of growth in strategic spending averaged 4.7 percent during first terms, as compared to a negative mean growth (−5.6 percent) during second terms. Thus, there is a solid foundation for the assumption that, relieved of some of the pressure of impending elections, U.S. presidents are less inclined to conduct a confrontational Soviet policy. In turn, this reinforces the conviction that an adequate grasp of the forces guiding foreign affairs must include an appreciation

[41] For summits, the first terms are counted as of Eisenhower's presidency because he was the first postwar president to attend such a meeting (Geneva, 1955). For arms control agreements, we begin counting in 1961, since the Kennedy administration was the first to achieve such an accord (the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963). For strategic spending, see footnote to Figure 2.

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of the structure of domestic political incentives in which it is rooted. Nevertheless, the relation must be placed in proper perspective.

The Issue in Perspective

The connection between domestic political competition and policy toward the Soviet Union has not been uniformly apparent throughout the postwar period; it represents a tendency, not a law. Consequently, we must ask why the link is less likely to be activated during certain elections than during others. The basic idea was that, in a presidential campaign, challengers tend to launch their assault on an incumbent's Soviet policies from a hawkish position, causing the incumbent (or his party's designated successor) to attempt to neutralize the challenge through a hardline stance of his own. But there are at least two sorts of conditions under which the mechanism should not be expected to operate; both stem from the voters' distaste for policy extremes.

We have said that a bout of election-induced sabre rattling could make the public less willing to support hardline policies toward the middle of the electoral cycle; but this resistance can also grow out of conditions that directly coincide with the election itself. If the presidential race follows on the heels of a period of sustained international tension, public weariness with confrontation may alter the terms of the political reward structure at the actual time of the election. Thus, popular fatigue with the confrontation associated with the Vietnam War—a war officially justified by the need to curtail Soviet expansionism—made it unprofitable for both Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon to harp on cold-war themes in 1968. Similarly, public nervousness with extreme U.S.-Soviet tension in the early fifties and in the early eighties probably made it bad campaign strategy to stoke the fires of hostility further in 1956 and 1984.

The second circumstance under which an election might not increase hostility is grounded in the character of the candidates rather than that of the times. Because the expectations and values of the electorate are bounded on both their hawkish and dovish ends, a challenger whose positions spill out of these boundaries does not represent a sufficiently credible electoral challenge. Consequently, such positions may be ignored by a candidate whose own stance remains within the broad limits of political acceptability. Accordingly, the expectation that the political system will encourage confrontation at election time assumes that both candidates are located somewhere within the mainstream of American political culture. If they are not, the expectation may not be borne out.

Barry Goldwater's 1964 challenge to President Johnson ended in

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an electoral fiasco caused by his ultraconservative views in virtually every area. Although New Deal issues, as well as the question of general competence, dominated public concern, the fear that peace would suffer as a consequence of his election mattered as well. Goldwater's distance from the center was so great that Johnson never felt it necessary to preempt his support—at least not on U.S.-Soviet issues.[42] George McGovern's problem was the mirror-image of Goldwater's. Since his positions on both domestic and international affairs were too far left to draw major sources of popular support, they could safely be ignored by Nixon—especially in view of the combination of the latter's proven anticommunism coupled with his progress toward relaxing East-West tension. Thus, although the political mainstream runs in a generally hawkish direction, the anti-Soviet scenario need not play itself out if a candidate strays outside its limits, or if the election follows a period of intense cold-war tension.

The Implications for Soviet Behavior

One consequence of democratic electoral competition has been a domestically driven, but—from the viewpoint of U.S. foreign-policy needs—arbitrary alternation of periods of assertiveness and restraint vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Of course, American attitudes toward the USSR are determined by the latter's behavior and capabilities as well by internal U.S. politics; moreover, external and domestic pressures may not always push U.S. foreign policy in the same direction. At times, their separate influences may conflict—as they did in 1964, when the obvious military superiority of the United States and the Soviet leadership's desire to defuse superpower tension complicated the presidential candidates' search for electorally salient foreign policy issues. At other times, internal and external influences may point in the same direction. In 1980, for example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan combined with a critical phase in the U.S. electoral cycle to push cold-war emotions to their highest pitch in decades.

I cannot assign specific causal weights to the two categories of pressures, although elsewhere I have compared, in greater detail, the relative impact of domestic and international conditions in accounting for shifts in each superpower's policies toward the other.[43] The point is that the domestic context of the nation's Soviet policy should be a significant part

[42] See Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Interpreting Elections* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), chap. 5.

[43] See Nincic (fn. 1), chaps. 4 and 5.

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of any successful explanation of its character and shifts, and that the interpretation placed on Moscow's behavior is often determined by domestic political incentives to view it as more or less predatory.

Domestic forces have more frequently led to a hardening of the U.S. stance toward the Soviet Union than to improved prospects for superpower accommodation, and the impact of politically determined bursts of pugnacity on *Soviet* policies should not be ignored. It is conceivable that, by the second half of 1979, doubts that the U.S. political climate would allow the ratification of SALT II, no matter what Moscow did, removed—from the Kremlin's point of view—a major disincentive to the invasion of Afghanistan. The heightening of U.S.-Soviet tension in 1960 and 1961 probably encouraged Khrushchev to abandon his plans for a significant troop reduction, which he had intended to undertake in order to divert resources toward his domestic programs: it almost certainly strengthened the hand of Soviet hardliners, such as Mikhail Suslov and Frol Kozlov, who had opposed his reforms all along.[44] Talk of "rollback" during the 1952 campaign probably increased Moscow's already substantial fears that the United States was intent on depriving it of a secure buffer zone to the West—the region through which, twice during the previous half-century, Germany had assaulted the Russian homeland. Thus, we must assume that there is some connection between Soviet perceptions of the United States and the pressures produced by democratic political competition within this country.

The fact that U.S. Soviet policy may be partially delinked from the USSR's behavior has more general implications for the relations between the superpowers. Relations marred by long and bitter hostility may improve for several reasons. Rivals may discover a common adversary that is a greater threat to both than they are to each other—a state of affairs that describes Washington's relations with the People's Republic of China since the early seventies. Or either side may undergo so dramatic a transformation that much of what had rendered it threatening in the eyes of others simply disappears (the case of Germany and Japan after World War II). In the absence of such dramatic occurrences, a decline in hostility is most likely to stem from incremental behavioral adjustments by both sides. By adapting their actions so as to provoke the least hostile

[44] On the link between the cold war and the configuration of power within the Soviet Union at that time, see Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966). On the anecdotal side, it is reported that, upon returning from his 1959 visit to the United States, Khrushchev astonished his aides by announcing: "I really believe that the US . . . has no militaristic, aggressive intentions and is interested in working for lasting peace." Mikhail Suslov, chief ideologue and unrepentant Stalinist, was overheard to remark: "The Americans have really got him." Quoted in "K's Four-Front 'War,'" *Newsweek*, August 1, 1980, p. 36.

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(or most amicable) response, the zone of confrontational behavior narrows progressively, while the arena of cooperation expands. Although the changes in the nature of the Soviet system introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev are considerable, the incremental model is most likely to be characteristic of any sustained and truly meaningful improvement that superpower relations may come to experience.

It is here that our main argument is most relevant, for the key to a successful process of incremental behavioral adjustment is an effective operation of mutual feedback. In other words, if either side is to adjust its behavior accordingly, the other's responses must be the major basis for its policy. This principle is suggested in the "Tit-for-Tat" strategy of Robert Axelrod as the firmest basis for the evolution of cooperation.[45] If, however, either side marches to the beat of a domestic drummer, the feedback mechanism is undermined. To the extent that American policy is significantly tethered to domestic electoral calculations rather than to the Soviet Union's behavior, the problem is apparent.

It would be interesting to find out whether Moscow has acquired an improved understanding of the domestic dynamics that shape U.S. foreign policy; if it has, it may be able to discount that portion which is driven by domestic politics. It must be left to Sovietologists to provide a definitive answer, but there are indications that the USSR is increasingly aware of the link between electoral politics and foreign policy in the United States. The recognition that U.S. behavior cannot be explained merely by traditional ideological shibboleths dates approximately from the sixties, but Soviet perspectives initially seemed twisted by wishful thinking; for example, Moscow assumed that, because détente was popular with the American public, candidates for office had to demonstrate a commitment to it.[46] The election of 1976 gave a jolt to that notion, leading Soviet analysts to conclude that firmness was more likely to pay electoral dividends in the United States. *Pravda* lamented the "demagogic competition over who will adopt a 'tougher' position in relations with the Soviet Union."[47] Around the same time, Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Soviet Union's Institute of the United States and Canada, observed that "elections pass, but the consequences of campaign demagogy and of the concessions made during the campaign continue to exert an influence on US policy, sometimes creating serious difficulties."[48]

[45] Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), esp. chap. 1.

[46] On the initial shift in Soviet views of the domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy, see Morton Schwartz, *Soviet Perceptions of the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), chap. 5.

[47] "Moscow Looks at US Election Campaign," *Soviet World Outlook*, May 15, 1976, p. 6.

[48] "On Soviet-American Relations," *Pravda*, April 2, 1976, pp. 4-5.

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Similarly, Andrei Gromyko complained in February 1980 that "the presidential candidates, the aspiring candidates, and even those aspiring to be aspiring candidates, are competing with one another in inflaming chauvinist fever." As *Pravda* explained to its readers, "Americans have been kept in a state of almost permanent artificially fueled political crisis since last September. . . . So far this has improved the President's chances in the upcoming elections."[49] Even in 1984, when cold-war rhetoric was relatively muted, *Pravda* estimated that President Reagan "was helped by the fact that he conducted his election campaign on a wave of jingoistic patriotism. . . . Posing as a President who is firm and decisive on international questions, Reagan managed to enlist the support of those people usually regarded as average Americans."[50]

Though foreign policy posturing for electoral ends is never desirable, its consequences may be mitigated if the roots of such behavior are understood by those at whom it is directed, allowing it to be placed in proper context and to be viewed in a less threatening light than if its sources remained a mystery.

[49] "Moscow Unhappy with US Presidential Campaign," *Soviet World Outlook*, March 15, 1980, p. 6.
[50] "After the US Election," *Pravda*, November 8, 1984, p. 6.

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WORLD ECONOMIC CYCLES AND CENTRAL AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY

By MARC LINDENBERG*

Introduction

SINCE the 1950s there has been considerable debate about the impact of international economic forces on political and economic autonomy in the developing world.[1] On the one hand, theorists of neo-imperialism argued that international capital imposed externally rooted class structures on developing countries to maintain social control of the population and to extract surplus.[2] They maintained that this dependent relationship not only inhibited local capital formation, but also heightened political instability as an increasingly impoverished population challenged the dominance of local elites subservient to foreign interests. In contrast, modernization theorists argued that political instability in developing countries was not the result of economic dependence, but rather the consequence of the modernization process itself.[3] They asserted that devel-

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[1] Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises and Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1983) provides an extensive review of the literature on causes of political instability. Four perspectives of particular interest are modernization theory, psychological theories of relative deprivation, perspectives derived from Marxist political economy, and those from more conventional economics. For an explanation of modernization theory see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Examples of the psychological approach are Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," in Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Anger, Violence and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 136-83, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Representative presentations of the Marxist perspective can be found in Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), Vols. I and II, and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974). For a more conventional approach see Gunnar Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), and Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

[2] See for example, Amin (fn. 1) and Wallerstein (fn. 1).

[3] For an explanation of modernization theory see Huntington (fn. 1).

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opment triggered instability as the population's demands grew more rapidly than the capacity of political and economic institutions to meet them.

Latin American scholars provided substantial contributions to this debate.[4] For example, the early works of Baran and Frank established the foundations of Latin American "dependency theory" with their discussion of "metropolis-satellite" relationships.[5] Cardoso and Faletto, as well as Warren, reformulated the dependency argument in the 1970s to make it more consistent with a Latin America where domestic investment, industrial output, and national income actually increased.[6] They argued that in spite of growth and capital accumulation, the Latin American nations were still dependent because they had to import technology and capital goods and that local political instability was still triggered by contradictions in the international economy which pitted local elites aligned with foreigners against other elements of the local class structure.

Even though many prominent students of Latin America did not subscribe to dependency theory, they still assigned an important role to international economic forces in triggering political instability.[7] For example, O'Donnell argued that the end of the stage of easy import substitution helped produce economic stagnation, a breakdown of alliances between governments and populist groups, increased social discon-

[4] An example of a contribution from a Marxist perspective is Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957). Baran's work was further developed by Andre Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). See also Celso Furtado, *Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970). One of the most interesting reformulations of dependency theory is Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). For non-Marxist perspectives see Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, Politics of Modernization Series No. 9 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973), 291-93; David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and David G. Becker, Jeffry A. Frieden, Sayre P. Schatz, and Richard L. Sklar, *Postimperialism* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).

[5] The word dependency is derived from the Spanish word *dependencia*. Advocates of this viewpoint see dependencia not as a theory but rather as a world view which asserts that the economic growth of peripheral economies is conditioned by the fluctuations and growth of the dominant industrial economies. The historic development of dependencia is discussed in Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, *Latin America: Capitalist and Socialist Perspectives of Development and Underdevelopment* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), chaps. 3 and 4, and Juan Eugenio Corradi, "Cultural Dependence and the Sociology of Knowledge: The Latin American Case," in June Nash, Juan Corradi, and Hobart Spalding, Jr., eds., *Ideology and Social Change in Latin America* (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1977), 7-30. For specific works see Baran (fn. 4) and Frank (fn. 4).

[6] Cardoso and Faletto (fn. 4). See also Bill Warren, *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1980).

[7] See, for example, Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), or Alfred C. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). See also Myrdal (fn. 1) and Hirschman (fn. 1).

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tent, and political instability.[8] New alliances among the military, technocrats, and a transnationalized bourgeoisie, created to maintain social control, resulted in the emergence of the "bureaucratic authoritarian state." The work of Becker and Sklar on "postimperialism" rejected dependency theory but focused on the vital role of multinational capital in the formation of Latin American class structure.[9]

While grand theories about the role of international economic forces in the developing world and in Latin America have been intellectually engaging, attempts to subject them to empirical testing have produced conflicting results.[10] For example, Sanders analyzed the relationship between modernization, dependence, and political instability in 107 countries between 1948 and 1967. He found no statistically significant results to support dependency theory and weak support for modernization theory.[11] Hibbs's classic study of political violence produced similar findings.[12] Furthermore, the Latin American contributions to the theoretical debate have been primarily based on noncomparative historical studies of the larger Latin American countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. Notable exceptions are Midlarsky and Tanter, Needler, Putnam, and Sanders.[13]

Paradoxically, the small Central American nations and Panama, relegated to the footnotes of most theoretical discussions, provide the most fertile testing ground for such theories.[14] By normal measures these small

[8] The concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism was first presented in O'Donnell (fn. 4). See also two articles by O'Donnell, "Reflections on Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review* 13, No. 1 (1984), 3-38, and "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 285-318. For a critique see Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merkx, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited," *Latin American Research Review* 17, No. 2 (1982), 3-40.

[9] See Becker et al. (fn. 4).

[10] For the most comprehensive review of the empirical studies of political instability see David Sanders, *Patterns of Political Instability* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1981), chaps. 6-9; Douglas A. Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-national Causal Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1973); and Zimmermann (fn. 1).

[11] Sanders (fn. 10), chaps. 7-9. While Sanders finds no statistically significant relationships between dependency, modernization, and political instability on a global level, he does find some evidence for the dependency argument in Latin America at the level of bivariate correlations (pp. 159-61).

[12] Hibbs (fn. 10).

[13] O'Donnell (fn. 4) and Cardoso and Faletto (fn. 4). For exceptions see Manus I. Midlarsky and Raymond Tanter, "Toward a Theory of Political Instability in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (1967), 12-26; Martin C. Needler, *Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change* (New York: Random House, 1968); Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics* 20 (October 1967), 83-110; and Sanders (fn. 10).

[14] O'Donnell (fn. 4), 11. He specifically excludes Central America from his analysis and then focuses on the larger economies. The closest he comes to discussing regime types in the smaller Latin American states is to classify them as traditional authoritarian (p. 114). Cardoso

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countries are among the most dependent in Latin America and the developing world. They have traditionally relied on a few important export products and markets. Foreign trade has had a predominant influence on the national economy. They have been subject to repeated invasions and interventions by Spain, Britain, and the United States. Furthermore, they are among the more than seventy-five small, developing countries with no internal market to fall back on during worldwide recessions. Finally, they form a relatively cogent unit of analysis since their tiny, highly opened export economies share common products, markets, resource endowments, population sizes, and colonial heritage.

Yet there is little empirical work to fill the gap between the excellent historical studies of individual Central American countries[15] and the sweeping theoretical treatments of dependency or modernization.[16] This article provides a detailed analysis of the relationships between world economic cycles and the political and economic instability that has plagued the five Central American nations and Panama since the 1930s. If one cannot find strong relationships between these forces within this small region, it would be hard to expect to encounter them elsewhere in Latin America or in developing countries in general.

A Basic Thesis about Central American Instability

By juxtaposing elements from the existing (Marxist and non-Marxist) literature with empirical analysis, it is possible to develop and test the

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and Faletto (fn. 4), 122-24, also provide no more than a brief analysis of how international economic forces determine class relations in Central America. They argue that the system continues to be based on dominance by traditional agricultural exporters, enclave foreign interests, and the military. They make no attempt to trace the dynamics of change in those relationships. They treat the region as a unit.

[15] There are many interesting studies of the problems of social discontent, violence, and repression in Central American countries. For Costa Rica, see, for example, John Patrick Bell, *Guerra Civil en Costa Rica* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1985); for El Salvador, Rafael Guidos Véjar, *El Ascenso del Militarismo en El Salvador* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1982), Rafael Menjivar, *Formación y Lucha del Proletariado Industrial Salvadoreno* (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1979), and Thomas R. Anderson, *El Salvador: Los Sucesos Politicos de 1932* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1976); for Guatemala, Gabriel Edgardo Aguilera Peralta and Jorge Romero Imery, *Dialéctica del Terror en Guatemala* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1981), and Rene Poitevin, *El Proceso de Industrialización en Guatemala* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1977); for Honduras, Mark B. Rosenberg and Phillip L. Shepherd, *Honduras Confronts Its Future: Contending Perspectives on Critical Issues* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), and Victor Meza, *Historia del Movimiento Obrero Hondureño* (Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras, 1980); for Nicaragua, see Julio López C., Orlando Núnez S., Carlos Fernando Chamorro Barrios, and Pascual Serres, *La Caida del Somocismo y la Lucha Sandinista en Nicaragua* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1979), or Richard Millet, *Guardians of the Dynasty* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977).

[16] See for example, Frank (fn. 4) and Furtado (fn. 4). A limited number of recent works on Central America provide some basis for further empirical treatment of the role of international forces in Central American political instability. See Daniel Camacho and Rafael

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thesis that because the Central American economies are so small and highly opened, a world economic downturn helps to trigger a cycle of internal destabilizing forces.[17] These internal forces, latent but ever present due to continued population growth, high unemployment, and social inequities, would accelerate during periods of economic crisis. During such periods the region's levels of living would deteriorate further. Discontent would grow.[18] Governments would lose the political resources to maintain control, and political instability would increase.[19] Military governments would appear and disappear through coups and countercoups until a stable military coalition would intervene, usually imposing repressive measures to gain control.[20]

In the period since the 1930s one might expect to find this stable military coalition emerging during the last phases of the economic crisis and the beginnings of world and Central American economic recovery. It would preside over a reordering of the Central American economic strategy and reestablishment of the same dominant social coalitions, although different individuals would govern.[21] These periods of relatively stable military rule would continue until the next world economic crisis set off a new spiral of political collapse.

A final factor, not discussed in the existing literature because it is so recent, merits special mention. The democratic opening of 1986 to 1988 may be the first exception to the cycle of alternating crisis and instability followed by stable military rule. It is far too soon to tell if it will be a

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Menjivar, *Movimientos Populares en Centro America* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1985); Tom Barry, *Roots of Rebellion: Land and Hunger in Central America* (Boston: South End Press, 1987); and Robert G. Williams, *Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).

[17] This part of the thesis most closely parallels the global discussions of economic forces in Frank (fn. 4) and Cardoso and Faletto (fn. 4), the regional discussions of Camacho and Menjivar (fn. 16) and Williams (fn. 16), and the country analysis, for example, of Menjivar (fn. 15) or Poitevin (fn. 15).

[18] External economic crisis can be thought of here as the element which stimulates the frustration which in turn sets off the dynamics of aggression and social discontent described by Feierabend and Feierabend (fn. 1) and Gurr (fn. 1).

[19] This argument runs counter to Huntington's modernization theory (fn. 1). It fits O'Donnell's general idea (fn. 4) that economic stagnation sets off a cycle of discontent which results in repression. However, in O'Donnell's argument for the large Latin American countries, stagnation occurs when the easy state of industrial import substitution ends. In small, highly open export economies like those found in Central America the source is more clearly international economic instability.

[20] This part of the thesis builds upon Cardoso and Faletto's (fn. 4) contention that in Central America in the twentieth century there has been no regime change but only leadership or government change as the coalition of military, traditional agricultural, and enclave forces reestablish themselves. It supports O'Donnell's (fn. 4) general contention that at least until the 1980s some five of the Central American countries might be classified generally as traditional authoritarian regimes.

[21] Cardoso and Faletto (fn. 4); O'Donnell (fn. 4).

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brief aberration or a truly unique response to the traditional cycle of economic collapse and social readjustment.[22]

Other Determinants of Political Instability

Although we might expect the classic crisis and military rule cycles to take place in the way just described, a number of factors might make political crisis more or less intense. For example, political instability might be less acute in crisis periods when the Central American economy was outperforming the world economy, or when there was more product, market, or sectorial diversification. Second, the influence of external political actors might either moderate or accentuate cycles of political instability. For example, it might be argued that in the post–World War II period the U.S. administration found the support of loyal military governments in Central America against Germany and Japan more important than the authoritarian or democratic inclinations of those governments.[23] If this were true, it would have been easier for military rulers in the region to consolidate their power in spite of the economic downturns of the late 1930s. Third, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala have generally experienced more violence and severe political instability in times of crisis than their neighbors Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama. It is possible that the countries with greater population density or larger ethnic populations might have higher levels of instability in times of crisis than those countries with less density or ethnicity.[24] The logic

[22] One interesting hypothesis which will have to be explored elsewhere is that the period from 1986 to 1989 can be viewed as a unique example of regime change from traditional authoritarian to democratic as opposed to simply the continued unprogrammed rotation of military leaders and governments. This may be due to the demands of the larger urban middle and working class which developed as a result of import substitution stimulated through Central America's common market between 1960 and 1978. Certainly levels of urbanization increased from 1965 (37.5%) to 1983 (45%).

[23] See, for example, Daniel Rapport, "American Foreign Policy in Central America: A Method of Analysis and Results" (Unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 1988).

[24] For discussions of the impact of population density and ethnicity on political discontent and repression see Richard Adams and Michael Stone, "Memorandum on Relations between Native Americans and the State in Central America" (Paper prepared for the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development, April 1988). Specific country examples are Armando Brown, "Los Pueblos Indigenas Ante el Mundo," *Revista de la Escuela Nacional de Antropologia e Historia*, Año 1, 1 (June 1980), 2-5, and CIDCA Development Study Unit, "Ethnic Groups and the Nation State: The Case of the Atlantic Coast in Nicaragua" (Department of Anthropology, University of Stockholm, 1987). For more general sources, see Cepal Fao Oit, *Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo Rural en Centroamerica* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1980), and Barry (fn. 16). For excellent treatment of the development of the class structures in Guatemala and Costa Rica and the different treatment of indigenous groups, see Severo Martínez Peláez, *La Patria del Criollo: Ensayo de Interpretacion de la Realidad Colonial Guatemalteca* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1985), and Samuel Z. Stone, *La Dinastia de los Conquistadores: La Crisis del Poder en la Costa Rica Contemporanea* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1975).

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behind this argument, for example, might be that in countries with higher population density like El Salvador and Guatemala, people have less chance to go back to subsistence agriculture when there is a world economic downturn. They must rely more heavily on their wages from coffee, sugar, and exports. With family survival threatened by world economic cycles, and without the option of subsistence agriculture, their discontent levels might be higher than in countries like Honduras where there is more access to land for subsistence. Another possibility is that ethnic tensions explode more readily in crisis conditions.[25] If this were true, then crisis should be more violent in Guatemala, Panama, and El Salvador than, for example, in Costa Rica or Honduras. Fourth, it is possible that differences in colonial settlement patterns might have led to greater equity in some countries like Costa Rica as opposed to Guatemala and El Salvador as well as to the type of regime (authoritarian versus democratic) which emerged by 1930. Some students of the region believe that differences in initial colonial settlement patterns explain more about differences in levels of political instability than many other factors.[26] Finally, differences in income distribution and landholding patterns might be important as well.[27] One might expect more social discontent in countries with greater inequality of income distribution or landholding patterns.

The analysis which follows covers three areas. First, it develops definitions and describes how data were collected. Second, it reports the findings. Finally, it draws conclusions about the process of economic and political change in Central America and the parameters of choice for small countries within the constraints of the international economic system.

Definitions and Data Collection Methods

In order to understand the dynamics of economic crisis and political instability in Central America, data were collected on (1) world and Central American economic cycles; (2) leadership instability; (3) regime in-

[25] The accentuated effects of economic crisis on countries with dense population and indigenous groups whose traditional relationship to the land has been broken is noted by Menjivar (fn. 15), and Eduardo Colindres, *Fundamentos Economicos de la Burgesia Salvadorena* (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1977). The opposite effect is noted in less dense Costa Rica in Reinaldo Carcanholo, *Desarrollo del Capitalismo en Costa Rica* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1981).

[26] See fn. 16.

[27] While these two factors are extremely important, it was difficult to get accurate region-wide data. The best recent source in this matter is the International Commission for Central American Reconstruction and Development at Duke University. Background papers compiled for the commission are being published by Duke University Press.

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stability; (4) repression; (5) social discontent; (6) political instability; (7) population density; (8) ethnic populations; and (9) urbanization.

Central American economic data were collected through construction of a time series of Central American exports, imports, and total trade between 1900 and 1985, and use of existing GDP data from 1950 to the present.[28] Annual GDP growth statistics by year were then grouped in economic crisis versus growth periods through a two-step process. In step one, annual GDP growth data were divided into three categories: (1) economic contraction (three years of declining growth with two of the three years having growth of less than 3 percent); (2) recovery (the first two years of positive GDP growth after a period of economic contraction); and (3) growth (one or more years of positive GDP growth after a recovery period). In step two, economic contraction periods and the immediate recovery periods after the contraction were added together to form economic crisis periods.[29] Periods of growth could then be contrasted with crisis periods.

Leadership instability was defined as "the President's inability to maintain him- or herself in office for the duration of the preestablished term."[30] It was measured by examining the official records in each country to determine the percentages of nonprogrammed changes of presidents per year (for example, coups d'état, resignations, assassinations) to total changes per year, and average number of changes of presidents per

[28] The trade time series at constant prices was constructed from each country's customs data because no official GDP data for Central America between 1900 and 1950 exist. The portion of the series used in this study extends from 1930 to 1988 and correlates highly with the GDP projections recently completed by Victor Bulmer Thomas, "World Recession and Central American Depression: Lessons from the 1930s for the 1980s," in Esperanza Duran, ed., *Latin America and the World Recession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 130-51. After 1950 GDP growth data come from the time series in the Economist's *World Business Cycles*. World GDP growth rate data from 1930 to 1985 are the unweighted averages of U.S. and U.K. growth between 1930 and 1950 as presented in *World Business Cycles*. These two countries were selected because they were Central America's primary trading partners during that period. From 1950 to the present, *World Business Cycles* computes overall world GDP growth rate data.

[29] Crisis periods included both contraction and recovery because there was a general sense that an economic crisis was not over until there was a long enough recovery period to demonstrate that a trend reversal had taken place.

[30] Leadership instability is distinguished here from government, regime, and political instability. Helpful definitions of terms can be found in Sanders (fn. 10), 49-69; Jean Blondel, *An Introduction to Comparative Government* (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968); and David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (New York: Knopf, 1953). Using Sanders's definitions, leadership instability refers to higher than normal levels of nonprogrammed changes of the chief executive; government instability to high levels of nonprogrammed change of the chief executive and cabinet. Regime instability refers to high levels of nonprogrammed changes in goals, norms, and authority structures, for example, moving from oligarchic rule to democratic participation in elections or decisions. Political instability might be defined as the higher than normal level of peaceful or violent social discontent which challenges or replaces presidents, governments, or regimes.

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year. Leadership instability was distinguished from government and regime instability (see footnote 30 for definitions of these terms).

Political repression was defined as "a process in which a government limits the rights of free expression, association, meetings, and life through the use of legal as well as extralegal procedures." The two measures of repression used in this study were the number of days in which constitutional guarantees were suspended per country per year and an index of the number of repressive measures per year which appeared in the government *Gazettas*.[31]

Social discontent was thought of as "the overt manifestation of disagreement by different population sectors with the actions and policies of the government." Examples of such disagreement might be strikes, demonstrations, protest marches, written manifestos, skirmishes, combat incidents, and assassinations.[32]

[31] Governments engage in official repression through formal decrees of censorship, suspension of the right to strike, suspension of constitutional guarantees, denial of rights of assembly, states of emergency, martial law, and war. In addition to studying formal decrees we could have looked at the number of political prisoners, deaths by torture or arrests, and injuries in confrontations with government security forces. The latter measures are so difficult to document that we confined this study to formal measures of government repression—decrees which appear in the official government records called *Gazettas* which have been published since the early 1900s. The index is grouped into five categories: censorship, interventions and nationalization, militarization, limits on organizational meetings and assembly, and others. The governments' stated reasons for each repressive measure leave a fascinating historical picture of the formal justification for their actions and the individuals, groups, and social classes against which the measures were directed. The data on repression which appear in this paper are based on a 100 percent review of the *Gazettas* for all Central American countries and Panama since 1930.

[32] The intensity of such discontent might be measured by the number of people involved, or the frequency or seriousness of their actions. It is equally useful to try to establish the source of such discontent, which may be rural versus urban, and upper, middle, or lower class in its origins. It may come as well from the mainstream or from ethnic minorities, from men or from women. The data on social discontent are among the hardest to amass for Central America for the study period. There are no accurate records of the number of strikes, confrontations, combats, deaths, etc., and no systematic evidence about the origins of social action. In addition to using traditional historical sources this study developed a 28 percent random sample of Central American newspapers between 1930 and 1986. This sample selected two papers per week per country for every week in the study period and then performed a content analysis to identify numbers of stories, editorials, and opinion articles about strikes, demonstrations, sabotage, armed confrontations, and combats. Each action was classified according to its sector of origin (i.e., urban versus rural) and by the kind of group involved (political party, interest group, paramilitary group, etc.).

The newspaper material on social discontent proved to be the weakest of all the data sources developed. They required the most time and effort to collect and netted the least results because of the problems of censorship and changes in the formats of the newspapers themselves during the more than fifty-year study period. Precisely at the moments when historical sources indicate that there was the most discontent, evidence of the volume of that discontent disappears in countries whose newspapers were censored. While data on discontent are more plentiful in crisis periods than in periods of military rule, they appear to understate the volume and intensity of that discontent. The newspaper data are a better source for establishing who was protesting or fighting and what their social origin was.

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Economic periods accompanied by Central American political instability were defined as those with higher than average levels of social discontent, repression, and leadership instability. High levels of leadership instability might certainly contribute to overall political instability due to the lack of policy continuity in a government whose president might be changed as frequently as once every eleven months.[33]

This study used data already collected by official sources in each country on population density (inhabitants per square kilometer)[34] and percentages of ethnic populations to total populations in Central America,[35] and the percentage of urban to total population.[36]

The Findings: Economic Cycles and Political Instability

World and Central American Economic Cycles Since 1930

Since 1930 there have been nine economic trend periods in the world economy. Five of these were crisis periods (1930-1934, 1944-1949, 1954-1961, 1974-1977, and 1978-1985), and four were periods of growth (1935-1943, 1950-1953, 1962-1973, and 1986-1988) (see Table 1).

Although the number of periods is too small for statistical analysis, the Central American economies move in the same direction as the world economy in seven of those nine periods. In four periods (1935-1943, 1950-1953, 1962-1973, and 1986-1988) both the world and Central American economies grow. In three periods (1930-1934, 1954-1961, and 1978-1985) both the world and the Central American economies contract. In the remaining two periods (1944-1949 and 1974-1977) the Central American economy expands while the world economy contracts.[37]

[33] Nonprogrammed presidential turnover is a building block of Sanders's definitions of government instability and regime instability (fn. 10), chap. 3 and p. 62.

[34] One potential problem in using the population density data over a fifty-year period is that country ranks may change. For example, the population of Honduras could be less dense than Costa Rica in 1940 but more dense in 1980. An analysis of population data since 1950 shows that rankings for Central American countries did not change. El Salvador and Guatemala retain the highest densities, Costa Rica and Honduras medium, and Nicaragua and Panama low.

[35] Central American ethnic populations are of two types: on the one hand, Indians of Mayan and other stocks populating northern Guatemala, parts of El Salvador and Honduras, and Panama including its islands, and on the other, Negro groups which settled the eastern coastal areas of Central America.

[36] See World Bank, *World Development Report 1985* (London: Oxford University Press, 1986), 216.

[37] The two periods of discontinuity require special explanation. From 1935 to 1943 the world economy grew due to the buildup related to World War II, but the Central American economies lost their European coffee markets due to the war and were subjected to stringent price controls in their remaining market, the United States. This is reflected in declining terms of trade, market diversification, and export prices compared with the previous period

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TABLE 1
WORLD AND CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC TREND PERIODS, 1930-1988

		World		*Central America*		
	No. of Yrs.	*Type of Economic Period*[a]	*Average Annual GDP Growth*[b]	*Type of Economic Period*	*Average Annual GDP Growth*[c]	*Type of Economic Performance*
1930-34	5	Crisis	(1.74)	Crisis	(11.65)	Underperformance
1935-43	9	Growth	7.0	Crisis	(0.55)	Underperformance
1944-49	6	Crisis	(1.9)	Growth	8.10	Outperformance
1950-53	4	Growth	4.5	Growth	5.08	Outperformance
1954-61	8	Crisis	4.12[d]	Crisis	4.13[d]	Equal Performance
1962-73	12	Growth	5.06	Growth	5.97	Outperformance
1974-77	4	Crisis	3.29	Growth	4.80	Outperformance
1978-85	8	Crisis	2.5	Crisis	0.90	Underperformance
1986-88	3	Growth	3.5	Growth	2.0	Underperformance

[a] Three types of economic period were identified: (1) contraction (three years of declining growth with two of the three years having growth of less than 3%); (2) recovery (the first two years of positive growth after contraction); (3) growth (one or more years of positive GDP growth after a recovery period). Because we are interested in how Central America responds to contractions and recoveries together, we combined them and called them Crisis Periods. Definitions of economic periods appear in Lindenberg (fn. 37).

[b] Between 1930 and 1949, the world GDP growth rate used is the unweighted average of U.S. and U.K. annual GDP growth based on data from The Economist, *World Business Cycles* (London: The Economist, 1986). After 1950, it is world GDP growth from the same source. The 1986-88 data come from The World Bank, *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[c] Between 1930 and 1949, the surrogate for Central American GDP growth is the average annual rate of growth of total trade at constant prices which appears in Antonio Colindres and Rodrigo Valverde, "Economic Trends in Central America and Panama since 1900," INCAE Technical Note Data Series, 1986. After 1950, Central American annual GDP growth is the unweighted average of country GDP data from The Economist, *World Business Cycles*.

[d] Although the average annual growth for the period is above 4%, this is due to the strength of the two-year recovery period.

as shown in Marc Lindenberg, "Central America: Crisis and Economic Strategy 1930-85. Lessons from History," *Journal of Developing Areas* 22, No. 2 (1988), 155-78. However, Central American data for 1935 to 1943 can really be grouped in two periods: 1935 to 1937, when prices, growth, and terms of trade begin to recover along with the world economy, and 1938 to 1943 when markets close, prices drop, and growth plummets. In the second countercyclic period, 1944 to 1949, the world economy contracts during the post–World War II recession, while the Central American economy grows spectacularly but temporarily, due to a reopening to European markets and the liberation of price controls. However, by 1948 and 1949 its decline mirrors that of the world economy.

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There are four periods in which the region underperforms the world economy (1930-1934, 1935-1943, 1978-1985, and 1986-1988), four periods of outperformance (1944-1949, 1950-1953, 1962-1973, and 1974-1977), and one period of equal performance (1954-1961). When the region has outperformed the world economy, terms of trade and prices have been more favorable, products have been more diversified, and the region has sold a higher percentage of its exports to the Central American market in addition to other markets. For example, although in the period from 1974 to 1977 the world economy had a weak contraction coinciding with the oil price shocks, the Central American economy continued to outperform the world economy. A combination of spectacular export price increases and positive terms of trade continued to favor the region. The full effects of the world crisis did not manifest themselves in a Central American contraction until 1978.

World Economic Cycles and Central American Leadership Instability

The data support the hypothesis that world economic crisis is more likely to help set off cycles of leadership instability in Central America than periods of economic growth (see Table 2). Under normal circumstances, with six countries and a scheduled presidential election in each every four years, one could expect about 1.5 presidential elections per year within Central America. The average number of changes of presidents per year in the region during the five world economic crisis periods is 2.61 and for the four periods of world economic growth it is 1.57. The average percentage of nonprogrammed changes due to coups d'état and resignations during world economic crisis periods is 57.3 percent and for periods of world economic growth it is 36.3 percent. Presidents with a military background ruled regardless of whether there was an economic crisis (39 percent) or economic growth (40.91 percent).

Although in the years 1986 to 1988 the region experienced its first period of democratic opening in the study period, it is useful to separate the three periods of economic growth with military rule from this period of democratic rule (see Table 2). While the average number of changes of presidents per year differs little between periods of democratic rule (1.3) and military rule (1.6), there are substantial differences in the percentage of nonprogrammed changes during democratic rule (25 percent) and military rule (37.5 percent). Finally, although military officers could have run for president in the period from 1986 to 1988, as they have in other periods with elections, they did not do so and as a result the per-

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TABLE 2
WORLD ECONOMIC PERIODS
AND CENTRAL AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY, 1930-1988

	No. of Yrs. in Period	*Status of World Economy*	*Average No. of Changes of Presidents per Year*[a]	*% Non-programmed Changes of Presidents to Total Changes*[b]	*% Military Presidents to Total Presidents*[c]
Economic Crisis Periods[d]					
1930-34	5	Crisis	3.2	31.3	43.7
1944-49	6	Crisis	3.0	72.2	33.3
1954-61	8	Crisis	2.6	66.7	42.9
1974-77	4	Crisis	1.5	33.3	83.3
1978-85	8	Crisis	2.8	63.6	27.3
Subtotal	6.7		2.61	57.3	39.0
Periods of Economic Growth with Military Rule					
1935-43	9	Growth	1.3	41.7	33.3
1950-53	4	Growth	1.5	16.7	66.7
1962-73	12	Growth	1.8	40.9	45.5
Subtotal	8.3		1.6	37.5	45.0
Periods of Economic Growth with Democratic Rule					
1986-88	3	Growth	1.3	25.0	0
Total Periods of World Economic Growth (Military and Democratic Rule)	7	Growth	1.57	36.3	40.9

[a] Derived by analysis of the official country records of the length of term of each Central American president between 1930 and 1988 and the changes of presidents during each economic period.

[b] Nonprogrammed changes were those changes which took place for reasons other than a scheduled election, for example, coups d'état.

[c] Based on the official listing of the professional background of each president.

[d] Economic periods are defined based on Lindenberg (fn. 37).

centage of military presidents during the brief period of democratic rule is zero while it is 45 percent during periods of military rule.

There are even greater differences when we make three divisions in the data: economic crisis, economic growth with military rule, and economic growth with democratic rule. Crisis periods have the most changes in presidents per year (2.61), and the highest percentage of non-programmed changes (57.3 percent), but they have an intermediate number of military presidents (39 percent). Growth periods with military rule have an intermediate percentage of changes of presidents per year (1.6)

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and nonprogrammed changes (37.5 percent) but they have the highest percentage of military presidents (45 percent). The democratic period has the smallest number of changes of president per year (1.5), only 25 percent nonprogrammed changes, and no military presidents.

Central American Economic Cycles and Leadership Instability

The data about Central American economic cycles also support the thesis that once economic crisis periods begin within the region they are accompanied by higher levels of leadership instability than are periods of economic growth (see Table 3). In the four periods of local economic crisis the average number of changes of presidents in the region per year is 2.36, the percentage of nonprogrammed changes is 53.5 percent, and the percentage of military presidents is 36 percent. In contrast, in the five periods of Central American economic growth the average number of changes of presidents in the region per year is 1.89, the percentage of nonprogrammed changes is 45.4 percent, and the percentage of military presidents is 43.6 percent.

The differences between Central American economic growth periods, either with military rule or with democratic rule, and economic crisis periods are substantial. The average number of changes of presidents per year for periods of growth with democratic rule is 1.3, with military rule, 2.0, and with crisis periods, 2.36. The percentage of nonprogrammed changes of presidents in growth periods with democratic rule is 25 percent, military rule, 48.1 percent, and in crisis periods, 53.5 percent. The percentage of military presidents in growth periods with democratic rule is zero; with military rule, it is 48.1 percent; and in crisis periods, it is 36.0 percent.[38]

[38] Rapport (fn. 23) generates some interesting hypotheses about why Central American economic cycles appeared to be more weakly related to political instability (see Table 3) than world economic cycles (Table 2). Rapport's content analysis of Central American cable traffic, which appears in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939-1940*, Vols. 1 and 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1980), indicates that shifts in U.S. policy toward Central American governments might have been sufficient either to override the political instability which normally accompanied economic crisis (1934-1943) or to exacerbate political instability in spite of economic growth (1944-1949). For example, between 1934 and 1943, a period of economic collapse in Central America, U.S. diplomatic recognition of Central American military governments was more ready than in the previous or subsequent periods. In fact it recognized all new governments without hesitation, while from 1930 to 1934 it recognized only 18% without hesitation and from 1944 to 1949, 50%. The United States might have been more concerned with reliable Central American allies against the Axis powers in World War II than with their tendencies toward dictatorship. In late 1944 the United States altered its criteria for recognition of new governments in Latin America. Cable traffic reflected active support for democratic openings and elections, a new sympathy in U.S. policy circles for the end of colonialism, and the enunciation of a new policy of U.S. recognition of newly independent, democratic governments.

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TABLE 3
CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC PERIODS AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY, 1930-1988

	No. of Yrs. in Period	*Status of Economy*	*Average No. of Changes of Presidents per Year*[a]	*% Non-programmed Changes of Presidents to Total Changes*[b]	*% Military Presidents to Total Presidents*[c]
Economic Crisis Periods[d]					
1930-34	5	Crisis	3.2	31.3	43.7
1935-43	9	Crisis	1.3	41.7	33.3
1954-61	8	Crisis	2.6	66.7	42.9
1978-85	8	Crisis	2.8	63.6	27.3
Subtotal	7.5		2.36	53.5	36.0
Periods of Economic Growth with Military Rule					
1944-49	6	Growth	3.0	72.2	33.3
1950-53	4	Growth	1.5	16.7	66.7
1962-73	12	Growth	1.8	40.9	45.5
1974-77	4	Growth	1.5	33.3	83.3
Subtotal	6.5		2.0	48.1	48.1
Periods of Economic Growth with Democratic Rule					
1986-88	3		1.3	25.0	0
Total Periods of Central American Economic Growth (Military and Democratic Rule)	5.8		1.89	45.4	43.6

[a] Derived by analysis of the official country records of the length of term of each Central American president between 1930 and 1988 and the changes of presidents during each economic period.

[b] Nonprogrammed changes were those changes which took place for reasons other than a scheduled election, for example, coup d'état.

[c] Based on the official listing of the professional background of each president.

[d] Definitions of economic periods appear in Lindenberg (fn. 37).

SOCIAL DISCONTENT

Although the number of periods is too small for accurate statistical testing, economic crisis periods appear to be accompanied by more violent expressions of social discontent than noncrisis periods (see Table 4).[39] The average number of violent expressions of discontent to total reported incidents of social discontent was 35.2 percent in crisis periods and 25.7

[39] While it would have been useful to look at accurate data on the volume of overt expressions of social discontent in the 28% sample of Central American newspapers, the data proved to be unreliable because of changes in newspaper format and reporting style (see fn. 32).

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TABLE 4
CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC PERIODS, SOCIAL DISCONTENT, AND REPRESSION, 1930-1986

	Violent Incidents as % of Total Reported Incidents[a]	*Rural Incidents as % of Total Reported Incidents*[b]	*Days of Suspended Guarantees per Year per Country*[c]	*Number of Repressive Measures per Year per Country*[d]
Economic Crisis Periods[e]				
1930-34	29	40.6	114	.9
1935-43	18	39.3	88	.6
1954-61	29	32.7	49	.8
1978-85	65	51.9	124	1.5
Average	35.2	41.2	93.7	.95
Economic Growth Periods with Military Rule				
1944-49	23	34.0	130	1.3
1950-53	15	34.3	3	.6
1962-73	32	35.1	12	.4
1974-77	33	35.9	57	.6
Average	25.7	34.8	50.5	.72

Sources: Data on types and origins of incidents of social discontent come from a 28% sample of Central American newspapers from 1930 to 1986 by the author and Maria Joaquina Larraz de Quant. The newspapers are: *El Cronista*, *La Epoca*, *Diario Comercial*, *El Dia*, *El Pueblo*, and *La Prensa* in Honduras; *El Dia*, *La Prensa Grafica*, and *El Diario de Hoy* in El Salvador; *El Imparcial* and *La Prensa Libre* in Guatemala; *El Diario* and *La Nacion* in Costa Rica; *El Centroamericano*, *La Prensa*, *La Noticia*, and *El Nuevo Diario* in Nicaragua.

[a] Violent reported incidents were acts of terrorism or armed confrontation. Nonviolent incidents were strikes and demonstrations.

[b] The origins of incidents were classified as rural, urban, and national.

[c] Days of suspended civil guarantees were computed through analysis of each country's official government gazette from 1930 to 1985 by finding the date of the initiation of legislation to begin as well as end a period of suspension of guarantees.

[d] Examples of repressive measures were censorship, laws outlawing groups, confiscations, jailings, etc.

[e] Economic periods were defined using Lindenberg (fn. 37).

percent in noncrisis periods. Rural violence tended to rise in crisis periods as well. It averaged 41.2 percent of reported incidents in crisis periods as opposed to 34.8 percent in noncrisis periods. Rural violence usually had its origins in conflicts in the banana plantations, disputes over land, or armed confrontations between the governments and guerrillas.

REPRESSION

Central American governments have resorted to repressive measures more frequently during economic crisis periods than during periods of

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economic growth and expansion. Table 4 also shows that the average number of days in which civil guarantees were suspended per country per year during crisis periods was almost double (93.7 days) that of periods of economic expansion (50.5 days). One possible explanation is that once a new military regime consolidated itself and new economic expansion took place, social discontent was reduced, making repression less necessary for regime maintenance. In contrast, during times of economic collapse, social discontent and political instability might have intensified until some new faction of the military stepped in and began a process of restoration of order which included suspension of guarantees and repression.

Cycles of Economic Crisis, Discontent, and Repression

Table 5 sheds interesting light on the way cycles of economic crisis, social discontent, and repression function. It appears that even though there was generally less violent discontent and repression in periods of economic growth than in crisis periods, both violent social discontent and repressive measures were present in growth periods but were more frequent in the second half of those periods. One explanation is that toward the end of a cycle of stable economic growth, violent expressions of social discontent began to build, forcing the government to resort to repression to maintain itself until in fact it was toppled.

At the beginning of the crisis periods instability became even greater, as manifested by continued high levels of violent social discontent (see Table 5). While repressive measures were used widely in these periods, they were in fact used less vigorously in the first half of crisis periods than in the second half. A possible explanation might be that in the first part of the crisis period high levels of leadership rotation did not leave governments in power long enough to implement their control measures successfully.

Violent expressions of discontent appeared to drop in the second half of crisis periods, while repressive measures appeared to rise (see Table 5). This increase in repression appears to coincide with government consolidation, which helps set the base for the new economic growth cycle by means of a new strategy, a more stable coalition, and consequently less need for repression, at least during the first half of the next growth cycle.

A Detailed Example of How Cycles Worked

In order to get a clearer picture of how the cycles of discontent and repression worked, let us look at three of the nine economic periods iden-

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TABLE 5
CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC CYCLES, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, SOCIAL DISCONTENT, AND REPRESSION, 1930-1986

	Avg. Changes of Presidents per Yr.[a]	*% Non-programmed to Total Changes*[b]	*Discontent*[c]		*Repression*[d]	
			First Half of Period	*Second Half of Period*	*First Half of Period*	*Second Half of Period*
Economic Crisis Periods[e]						
1930-34	3.2	31.3	High	Low	Low	High
1935-43	1.3	41.7	High	Low	Low	High
1954-61	2.6	66.7	High	Low	High	Low
1978-85	2.8	63.6	High	Low	Low	High
Average	2.4	53.5				
Economic Growth Periods with Military Rule						
1944-49	3.0	72.2	Low	High	Equal	Equal
1950-53	1.5	16.7	Low	High	Low	High
1962-73	1.8	40.9	Low	High	Equal	Equal
1974-77	1.5	33.3	Low	High	Low	High
Average	2.0	48.1				

Sources: See Table 4.

[a] Derived from official country records of the length of term of each Central American president between 1930 and 1985 and the changes of presidents during each economic period.

[b] Nonprogrammed changes were those which took place for reasons other than a scheduled election, for example, coup d'état, death in office, or resignation.

[c] Each period was divided into two subperiods of equal length, and the number of reported violent incidents from the 28% content analysis survey of Central American newspapers was regrouped by the subperiods. The subperiod with more incidents was marked high and the other low. In some cases the number was equal.

[d] Each period was divided into two subperiods of equal length, and the number of days of suspended guarantees from the review of official government gazettes between 1930 and 1985 was regrouped by the subperiods. The subperiod with more incidents was marked high and the other low. In some cases the number was equal.

[e] Economic periods were defined using Lindenberg (fn. 37).

tified: 1950-1953 (world and Central American economic growth); 1954-1961 (world and Central American economic crisis); and 1962-1973 (world and Central American economic growth). Their dynamics are quite similar to those of the other six periods studied.[40]

The period from 1950 to 1953 was one of world and Central American economic growth and quiet by Central American political standards. The four military leaders and two civilians who emerged from the pre-

[40] Space limitations prohibit the presentation of the data for the other six periods.

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vious crisis period attempted to consolidate their governments.[41] Violent expressions of social discontent were at an all-time low for the region (15 percent). Only one president, Anulfo Arias of Panama, was removed through a coup d'état. The only country which (briefly) experienced a state of siege was El Salvador. However, toward the end of the period discontent and repressive measures began to rise (see Tables 4 and 6). For example, in Guatemala both landowners and the U.S.-based United Fruit Company became increasingly preoccupied by what they perceived to be the "socialist" policies of President Jacobo Arbenz.

The period which followed, from 1954 to 1961, was one of both world and Central American economic crisis and high levels of Central American political instability. Incidents of violent discontent rose from 15 percent in the previous period to 29 percent. The region averaged 2.6 presidential changes per year and 66 percent were by coup d'état. Central American economic strategy collapsed with the depressed banana and coffee industries, and by 1961 a new strategy based on product and market diversification and a regional common market was under discussion. The Cuban Revolution took place. It had a profound impact on the region and on U.S. foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress was initiated in an effort to get Latin American economies moving and to provide a non-Marxist option. In Central America new military governments were installed. The most prominent reversal took place in Guatemala where a CIA-supported coup forced President Jacobo Arbenz from power. But at the same time leadership changed hands though coups almost every other year in Honduras and El Salvador. Costa Rica repelled an invasion by the supporters of an unsuccessful presidential candidate launched from Nicaragua. Worker discontent in the Costa Rican, Honduran, and Guatemalan banana plantations was high, and urban discontent grew as well. The country with most days during which its civil guarantees were suspended was Honduras. Typical legislation included outlawing the Communist Party,[42] strengthening the military,[43] and controlling strikers in the banana plantations.[44] In Guatemala the new military government

[41] Two new military rulers who emerged through coups in the late 1940s in El Salvador (Osorio) and Honduras (Galvez) joined Nicaragua's General Anastacio Somoza Garcia, who had survived the instability of the previous period. Another military leader, General Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala (elected in the previous period), was joined by civilians Anulfo Arias of Panama (installed after the incumbent president died in office) and Utillio Ulate of Costa Rica (elected after the revolutionary junta sponsored a return to civilian rule after the revolution of 1948).

[42] Honduras, *Gazetta Oficial*, February 3, 1956.

[43] Honduras, *Gazetta Oficial*, January 5, 1960. In El Salvador the military school was founded (*Gazetta Oficial*, June 24, 1955).

[44] Costa Rica, *Gazetta Oficial*, January 6, 1960.

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reversed the slide to the left of the Arbenz period.[45] For example, legislation abolished workers' and farmers' organizations,[46] returned land to those who had lost it during land reform,[47] closed progressive newspapers,[48] and prohibited trade with socialist countries.[49] The period culminated in a nascent world and Central American economic recovery and the consolidation of largely new military leaders.

The years 1962 to 1973 were characterized by the most rapid economic growth and political stability of the sixty-year period of this study. The world economy boomed. The Central American regional common market flourished, and the region's economies reached their peak in product and market diversification. Although military leaders predominated, presidents in each country changed on the average of every three to four years and through electoral process rather than coup d'état.[50] The region averaged very low levels of suspension of civil guarantees and repressive measures (see Tables 4 and 5). Where such measures were used they included censorship of Marxist magazines,[51] deregistration of political parties with "Marxist leanings,"[52] and closing and restructuring universities.[53] Social discontent did not begin to pick up until the end of the period (see Table 5).

The Findings: Other Factors and Political Instability

Global and regional economic instability were far more important determinants of political instability in Central America than any of the other factors considered with the exception of one—a country's regime type (democratic versus authoritarian) at the beginning of the study period.[54] The role of initial regime type leads to an extremely important finding. The impact of international and Central American economic

[45] Guatemala, *Gazetta Oficial*, all of 1954-1955.
[46] Guatemala, *Gazetta Oficial*, July 16, 1954.
[47] Guatemala, *Gazetta Oficial*, August 20, 1954.
[48] Guatemala, *Gazetta Oficial*, September 11 and 30, 1954.
[49] Guatemala, *Gazetta Oficial*, June 6, 1955.
[50] The only notable exception is the coup by Omar Torrijos in Panama in 1968, which established his rule for fifteen years.
[51] Costa Rica, *Gazetta Oficial*, October 29, 1962.
[52] Costa Rica, *Gazetta Oficial*, October 26, 1962.
[53] Guatemala, *Gazetta Oficial*, November 1963.
[54] Rank order correlations between % indigenous population, population density, % urban population and political instability, repression, and social discontent were all statistically insignificant with one exception. There was a positive (.80) rank order correlation between % indigenous population and social discontent during economic crisis. The lack of consistent income and land distribution data prohibited their inclusion in the analysis.

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crisis was a necessary but not a sufficient force to instigate cycles of higher leadership turnover and political instability in all countries.

Initial Regime Type

Although all of the countries in the region had higher levels of social discontent during economic crisis periods than during periods of economic growth, Costa Rica's levels of leadership instability, repression, and political instability were much lower than the other countries' (see Table 6). Indeed, since 1930, Costa Rica has managed its social discontent with less repression and unprogrammed leadership turnover than any of the other countries.

Costa Rica's experience suggests that once peaceful and routine procedures for the transfer of political power were established, they were sufficient to help one of the six countries weather economic chaos in a manner quite different from the five authoritarian regimes.

The origins of these differences and their relationship to class structure and values are clearly the topic of another article. However, some

Table 6
Central American Country Differences in Levels of Political Instability, 1930-1985

	Total Years of Suspended Guarantees[a]		*Average Length of Presidential Term*[b]	*% Non-programmed Change of Presidents*[b]	*% Violent Social Discontent*[c]
	Years	*%*			
Panama	n.a.	n.a.	2.11	64	n.a.
El Salvador	20.1	36	2.57	57	48
Nicaragua	16.8	30	3.11	53	31
Guatemala	7.7	14	2.81	57	39
Honduras	7.6	13	3.11	47	27
Costa Rica	1.5	3	3.69	6	16
Central American Average	10.7	19	2.81	50	33

[a] Days of suspended guarantees were computed through analysis of each country's official government gazettes from 1930 to 1985 by finding the date of the initiation of legislation to begin as well as end the period.

[b] Length of presidential terms and programmed and unprogrammed changes come from official country records.

[c] Percentage of violent social discontent data come from a 28% sample of the region's newspapers, 1930 to 1985. See sources, Table 4.

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preliminary comments are in order. Some students of the region feel that original settlement patterns set the foundation for a more egalitarian and democratic Costa Rica. They argue that since that country had few Indians and resources to exploit, it was a colonial backwater. According to this line of analysis, colonists who went there had to work the land on a more egalitarian basis than in Guatemala and El Salvador, where a highly stratified social structure emerged. The absence of a rigid social structure, together with later settlement by European immigrants, permitted the revolution in coffee production to begin in Costa Rica and allowed democratic institutions to emerge.[55]

This argument is convincing since all of the other countries had more intense settlement by the Spaniards and markedly more stratified social structures. Furthermore, there is no evidence that democratic institutions took root more easily in Central American countries such as Nicaragua where external actors made repeated attempts to impose them. In fact, the democratic process in Costa Rica seems to have emerged internally and was protected by the tenacity of its own citizens and leaders during the revolution of 1948. This process had the support of the international community in general and, at key times, of the United States. The development of frameworks for the routine, peaceful transfer of power in Costa Rica was accompanied by explicit decisions not to invest in military expenditures after 1950 and to abolish its armed forces entirely. Consistently larger investments in social services, particularly in education, were made. These investments influenced Costa Rica's larger gains in the Overseas Development Council's Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) between 1950 and 1980 compared to the other Central American countries and account for its largest absolute score, in 1980.[56] Costa Rica also made more consistent investments in training political party leaders and developed ties to global political organizations such as the International Socialist Movement before its neighbors. While these associated factors are hardly determinants of the democratic process, they might provide some suggestions for experiments in other countries.

Conclusions

Economic Cycles and Political Instability

In the last five decades, the Central American region has been highly sensitive to external economic shocks. General evidence supports the the-

[55] See the sources cited in fns. 15 and 16 for more detail.

[56] Costa Rica's PQLI score gained 21 points between 1950 (67) and 1980 (88). This was the largest gain of any Central American country for the period.

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sis that world economic crises have helped set off cycles of Central American economic crisis and political instability. These shocks have been a more important determinant of political instability than any other factor, such as density of population or ethnic composition, with the exception of initial regime type.

The region's periods of instability triggered by economic shocks have been accompanied by high levels of leadership rotation in five of the six countries, and by social discontent and repression, which together have added up to political instability. Usually these periods have ended after a new set of military rulers has taken control of the government. In the periods of military rule which have followed, new economic strategies have been adopted which have generally helped adapt the region to the new cycle of world economic growth and have resulted in Central American economic growth. This growth, however, in virtually all countries but Costa Rica, has not been accompanied by conscious attempts to improve income distribution or to develop mechanisms for peaceful transfer of power from one group of rulers to another. Thus, the seeds of discontent for the next crisis cycle have been planted during the period of stable military rule without concurrent mechanisms for channeling this discontent into peaceful regime change.

During the periods of economic growth with military rule, external manifestations of social discontent have diminished or been otherwise controlled. Eventually repressive measures have been lifted. These periods have usually lasted until the next world economic collapse helps to set off a new cycle of Central American economic and political instability.

How might such cycles be broken? First, if periods of economic growth in the region have coincided with less political instability, social discontent, and repression than periods of economic crisis, then devising how to make the Central American economies less sensitive to external shocks may be a useful first step. The region was more economically independent, and at times actually outperformed the world economy, when its markets and products were more diversified. It also outperformed the world economy when the prices offered for its products were high and when terms of trade for the region were improving. One implication for a policy is that the region's sensitivity to external shocks can be reduced by diversifying its sources of inputs as well as the mix of its products and markets. It would benefit as well from worldwide agreements to stabilize the prices of key products, the reactivation of its common market, and an outward orientation to a variety of world markets. Concentration on both traditional and nontraditional exports should also be part of this process.

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Economic performance alone, however, has not been enough to guarantee lower levels of social discontent and the absence of political instability. Levels of violence and of repression and the number of coups stayed high even in periods of economic growth. They simply became even higher in crisis periods.

The Special Case of Costa Rica

While this study supports the thesis that world economic crisis helps trigger cycles of discontent and instability, it clearly does not lead to the deterministic conclusion that leadership turnover and military rule are the only possible outcomes in Central America. Although social discontent increased everywhere in the region during economic crisis periods between 1930 and 1986, Costa Rica adjusted to these shocks with substantially less repression, leadership turnover, and political instability than its neighbors. While the other nations seemed caught in continued cycles of repression and military rule, Costa Rica responded to the same pressures by building upon its existing democratic institutions, investing in social services, and improving income distribution. The implication is that while small countries like Costa Rica are subject to constraints due to external economic shocks, they are hardly prisoners of this process.

The essence of the democratic process has been the ability to develop and maintain mechanisms for the peaceful, routine, and periodic transfer of power from one group to another even when there has been disagreement between these groups about the political, economic, and social future of the nation. Costa Rica is an example of a country which has carried out a process of democratic transformation without external pressure. This leads to optimism that other countries in the region can mobilize such a process without external pressure to consolidate the weak democratic openings which have emerged since 1985.

While the success of internally generated democratic change in Costa Rica is grounds for optimism, other approaches to breaking cycles of political instability must be treated with more caution. Data for 1935 to 1944 show that external pressure has at times helped the region to defy the political instability and repression which normally come with world economic shocks. Yet external pressure has also helped fuel regime instability even when economic growth was taking place, as in the years 1944 to 1949. Rather than concluding that external intervention is a key requirement to insure a democratic process, it is equally interesting to speculate that multicountry support of internally generated initiatives for democratic openings or conflict resolution, such as the Central American Peace Plan of 1987, may help to reduce the cycles of economic collapse,

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political repression, instability, and military rule. Thinking about how the Costa Rican democratic process was strengthened over a period of thirty years after 1948, multilateral actors might consider how to support the development of political institutions in other countries by increasing the talent base in political parties, legislatures, and judicial systems, by investing in education and human resource development, and by supporting both regional and national guarantees of basic human rights and consistent, explicit rules of conduct. At the same time, multilateral support to help Central Americans declare their region a neutral zone with limited military expenditures might permit the region to invest new resources in the process of social and economic development.

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Review Article

RETHINKING STATE AND REGIME: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy

By ROBERT M. FISHMAN*

Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 212 pp.

Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, *Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 516 pp.

Walter C. Opello, *Portugal's Political Development: A Comparative Approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, 235 pp.

MORE than ten years have passed since democracy returned to the last of the Western European countries that had been ruled by one form or another of authoritarian political system during much of the twentieth century. The historical clustering of distinct national processes of redemocratization in Portugal, Greece, and Spain—all occurring in the mid-1970s—rapidly transformed the political map of non-Communist Europe and eliminated the last nondemocratic model of political rule (except in Turkey, which experienced a period of authoritarian rule after the transitions discussed in this essay). This historical clustering of three instances of regime change encourages one to search for common causes and trajectories. In comparative discussions of the transitions, much emphasis has been directed to the effort to uncover common patterns of and explanations for the developments in Southern Europe.[1] The literature

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[1] See, for example, the discussion by Geoffrey Pridham, "Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition?" in *West European Politics* 7 (April 1984).

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has not been very helpful, however, in conceptualizing differences among the three countries. I will argue that a comparative understanding of the transitions requires the use of analytical distinctions—such as the difference between state and regime—which will allow us to perceive the widely divergent paths of the Southern European cases along several dimensions.

A number of important scholarly works on the return of democracy to Portugal, Greece, and Spain have been published in addition to those devoted to the many countries in other parts of the world that have recently returned to democratic rule. Most analysts have shied away from broad comparative generalizations, however; with few exceptions, the most important contributions have come from country-specific studies, many of them emphasizing the distinctiveness of their national cases.[2] The great exception to the general absence of significant comparative and theoretical work on the redemocratizations is *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (one volume in hardback and four separate volumes in paper), edited by O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead. In his introductory essay to the volume on Southern Europe, Schmitter notes that the contributors to the project concluded that "transitions from authoritarian rule and immediate prospects for democracy were largely to be explained in terms of national forces and calculations" (p. 3) rather than of international dynamics, although the international context of the Southern European cases rendered successful redemocratization more likely there than in Latin America. The excellent country chapters, which cover Italy[3] and Turkey in addition to the three cases under discussion, tend to emphasize specifically political actions and paths—including significant contributions to regime change by some of the very forces that held, or helped to exercise, authoritarian political power. Earlier narrowly class-based and internationally oriented theories of the

[2] Unfortunately, the insightful work of Juan Linz on transitions to democracy is not yet available in one volume. His essays on the topic include "Il fattore tempo nei mutamenti di regime" [The time factor in regime change], in *Teoría Política* 2, No. 1 (1986); "Lideranca inovadora na transicao para a democracia a uma nova democracia: o caso da Espanha" [Innovative leadership in the transition to democracy and in a new democracy: The case of Spain], in Gilberto Dupas, ed., *A transicao que deu certo: O exemplo da democracia espanhola* [The transition that worked out: The Spanish case] (Sao Paulo: Trajetoria Cultural, 1989), and "The Transitions from Authoritarian Regimes to Democratic Political Systems and the Problems of Consolidation of Political Democracy" (paper presented at the IPSA Roundtable, Tokyo, March 29-April 1, 1982).

[3] Excellent complementary essays on Italy's return to democracy after Fascism include Gianfranco Pasquino's chapter in the *Transitions* volume and an earlier chapter by Giuseppe Di Palma, "Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist?" in John H. Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).

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Southern European transitions,[4] already significantly contradicted by empirical work,[5] find little resonance in the interpretive essays of this volume.

The major attempt in the *Transitions* volume on Southern Europe to account for the rough political parallelism—that is, the historical simultaneity of roughly similar political developments across national boundaries—long noted by many analysts of this region is the broadly posed and subtle analysis of sociologist Salvador Giner. In a contribution that encompasses nineteenth- and twentieth-century political development, Giner emphasizes the "unevenness" of Southern European societies and political forces—their heterogeneity and contradictions—rather than focusing on any specific and immutable configuration of sociopolitical forces. He maintains that

> the inner contradictions of each one of these basic components—limited parliamentarianism, restricted and divided liberalism, stunted reformism, and utopian imperialism—irrevocably led these societies toward a specific form of class despotism, namely Fascist or fascistisant dictatorship . . . (p. 23).

What remains somewhat unclear is how such a complex and subtly described syndrome of unevenness and contradiction can "irrevocably" lead to a "specific form of class despotism." Enormous differences among the four cases (Giner includes Italy in his analysis) in the timing of political changes, the longevity of nondemocratic regimes, and the political forms taken by nondemocratic rule make it difficult to sustain the strong assertion of an irrevocable tendency toward equivalence in the political development of these countries.

Although Giner's essay is enormously suggestive, it fails to resolve adequately the large question of (imperfect) political parallelism and historical clustering. Strong causal claims prove difficult to advance unless the differences as well as the similarities among the cases are systematically incorporated into the analysis; in order to do that, we need conceptual distinctions that allow us to delineate crucial differences. Unless one acknowledges and makes sense out of the variations among the coun-

[4] The most influential example is Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships* (London: New Left Books, 1976). Although few empirical data are supplied by Poulantzas or others in support of his interpretation, some important insights may be found in this work. For more recent essays stressing international political economic arguments and class arguments, see Giovanni Arrighi, ed., *Semiperipheral Development: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985).

[5] See, for example, the important study of Spanish business and political change by Robert Martinez, "Business Elites in Democratic Spain" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1984).

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tries, one is left with too many exceptions to any comparative assertion, whether it concerns the political role of the military, the place of a single party in nondemocratic rule, or the character of the crisis leading to the demise of authoritarian rule.

In accounting for the recent return to democracy, Giner emphasizes the erosion of legitimacy for the authoritarian systems, the consequences of economic development, and the contribution to democratization by some of the political forces inside the structure of authoritarian political power. In his emphasis on the delegitimation of authoritarian regimes as well as in his discussion of the role of forces to be found *within* the circle of power, Giner touches upon themes widely emphasized by analysts of the transitions. It is precisely on these two questions—the sources of the delegitimation of authoritarian rule and the location of the impetus toward democratic change within the circles of political power—that an analysis of the differences among the Southern European cases yields significant insights.

Despite the differences among the cases and the absence of any strong evidence for a parsimonious, largely class-based or internationally focused macro-level explanation,[6] the historical clustering of the experiences of Spain, Portugal, and Greece remains an intriguing fact. There is a sense in which authoritarian rule was 'exhausted' in all three societies at about the same time—unable to resolve the basic political challenges of legitimation and institutionalization at a time when crisis, to one degree or another, prevented the regimes from continuing on effortlessly through the sheer force of inertia. But the fact that the exhaustion of authoritarian rule set in at about the same time in the three societies in no sense guarantees that the causes of this exhaustion were the same, or that the path of redemocratization would be similar.

The contributors to the *Transitions* volume have largely chosen to focus on political forces, choices, and dynamics, following the earlier emphasis of Juan Linz and others in their work on the breakdown of democratic regimes.[7] Indeed, the emphasis on strictly political factors is so strongly drawn in many of the contributions—above all in Schmitter and O'Donnell's concluding theoretical volume, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*—that (with the exception of a few of the country

[6] This is not to argue that class forces or the international context are irrelevant; rather, the point is that these forces are not the *sole* determinants of political developments and actions.

[7] See Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration*, and the other three volumes included in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

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chapters) the importance of social forces in undermining authoritarian rule is almost certainly somewhat understated.[8] Nevertheless, the political focus of the *Transitions* volume, including the attention directed to the issue of legitimation—or delegitimation—and the emphasis on the political orientation of forces located within the circle of political power, appears consistently useful in analyzing the Southern European cases.

The Location within the Circles of Power of the Impetus toward Political Change: State or Regime?

The earliest major theoretical statement, in the context of the recent transitions, on the tendency of the impetus for change to emerge from within the structure of political power is "Liberation by Golpe," Philippe Schmitter's strongly argued analysis of the events in Portugal.[9] In this article, written in the aftermath of the revolutionary coup of April 25, 1974, Schmitter asserts that the principal weak point in authoritarian rule—and thus the best hope for the restoration of democracy—is to be found not so much in the relations between state and civil society as within the structure of authoritarian rule itself. Specifically, he asserts that "the sources of contradiction, necessary if not sufficient for the overthrow of authoritarian rule, lie within the regime itself, within the apparatus of the state, not outside it in its relations with civil society."[10] Thus, Schmitter explicitly focuses on both the authoritarian *regime* and

[8] A significant literature does exist on social forces and the transitions. For insightful essays with abundant data on civil society and political change in Spain, see Víctor Pérez Díaz, *El retorno de la sociedad civil* [The return of civil society] (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1987). An important recent comparative analysis of labor and the transitions is J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis," *Comparative Politics* 21 (July 1989).

Strong arguments for the central role of social forces in undermining authoritarian rule may be found in two recent articles by Joseph Foweraker: "The Role of Labor Organizations in the Transition to Democracy in Spain," in Robert Clark and Michael Haltzel, eds., *Spain in the 1980s* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), and "Corporatist Strategies and the Transition to Democracy in Spain," *Comparative Politics* 20 (October 1987). This view contrasts sharply with the position of Donald Share, *The Making of Spanish Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1986), and Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), both of whom stress the internal evolution of the Franco regime itself. Other analysts, such as José María Maravall, in *La política de la transición* [The politics of the transition] (Madrid: Taurus, 1981), adopt an intermediate position stressing both the pressure "from below" and the reform "from above." In *Working Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1990), I analyze the role of labor in the larger political transformation. However, this is not the place to focus on the role of social forces such as labor, despite their importance, or to attempt to draw a compelling balance between social and political determinants.

[9] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe," *Armed Forces and Society* 2 (November 1975).

[10] *Ibid.*, 20.

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the *state apparatus* without drawing a distinction between the two. This emphasis on forces within the structure of authoritarian power appears to fit the Portuguese case, and it has proved highly stimulating to analysts of the other Southern European transitions. Given the fact that the remnants (or successors) of the Franco regime helped orchestrate the reform-oriented process of change in Spain, and that the Greek military extricated itself from political power, Schmitter's perspective appears to be useful for all three cases; indeed, it has helped to orient the work of many country-specific analysts.

I shall attempt to show, however, that this broad focus on sources of change located within the structure of political power masks important differences relating to where the impetus for change is to be found. The crucial move toward democracy—to the extent that it does emerge from within the authoritarian power system itself—may be located within the *regime* or within the *state*; the results differ decidedly. In the case of Spain, it is clear that the reformist sectors were located within the remnants of the Franco regime; from this position, they helped to launch and channel the return to democracy (under pressure from the opposition). In the case of Portugal, by contrast, the regime proved incapable or unwilling to reform itself fundamentally even after 1968, when Caetano replaced Salazar;[11] the impetus for change emerged instead from within the armed forces. The Greek case is somewhat more difficult to place in this scheme, given the problem of distinguishing between regime and state when the military itself rules; in some respects, it falls analytically between the Spanish and Portuguese cases. These differences suggest the existence of divergent causal processes—processes that have, in fact, led to rather different outcomes.[12]

The distinction I emphasize here between state and regime is not a new one; it rests on broadly shared understandings of these two much-used concepts. On occasion, this distinction has been explicitly drawn,[13]

[11] On the failure of the Portuguese regime to reform itself, and the contrast with Spain, see Juan Linz, "Spain and Portugal: Critical Choices," in David Landes, ed., *Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977). A comparison of the Spanish and Portuguese transitions that features, in part, differences in the relations between regime and opposition in the two cases, is Nancy Bermeo, "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal," *Comparative Politics* 19 (January 1987).

[12] For a recent analysis emphasizing the differences in the current democratic polities of Southern Europe, see Arend Lijphart, Thomas Bruneau, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Richard Gunther, "A Mediterranean Model of Democracy? The Southern European Democracies in Comparative Perspective," in *West European Politics* 11 (January 1988).

[13] See, for example, the useful essay by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Despite Cardoso's insights, the essay is somewhat marred by its unresolved ambivalence between a Marxian and Weberian conception of the state, thereby limiting its ability to clarify the issue.

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but it is not consistently maintained even in many works by the best analysts of these systems. Thus, it has not been adequately developed in recent analyses of the transitions[14] despite the many theoretical works on regimes[15] and on the state.[16]

A regime may be thought of as the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not. The distinction between democracy, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism thus deals with the question of *regime type*. (However, full penetration of the state by the regime might be thought of as one of the defining characteristics of pure totalitarianism; in a different sense, in cases of personal rulership or "sultanism," state and regime may be thoroughly entangled with one another, both closely identified with the ruler.) Regimes are more permanent forms of political organization than specific governments, but they are typically less permanent than the state. The state, by contrast, is a (normally) more permanent structure of domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it.

Although the two concepts are analytically distinct, the empirical realities to which they refer may be more or less tightly interwoven in some political formations. In many instances, however, the empirical realities are distinguishable from one another. A state may remain in place even when regimes come and go, as has happened at many points in the history of Spain and numerous other countries. Somewhat less frequently, and only for rather brief periods of time, a regime may remain relatively

[14] To some extent, the distinction is suggested by Alfred Stepan in "Paths to Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). In that essay and in his recent book, *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), Stepan differentiates three forms of what he calls "redemocratization from within the authoritarian regime": transition initiated by a civilian political leadership, by the military as government, and by the military as an institution. However, Stepan's insightful discussion still fails to emphasize the major analytical distinction between state and regime, and ends up placing in the same category (transition initiated by the military as institution) two quite different cases: Portugal and Greece.

[15] See especially the extremely broad and insightful essay by Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. III, *Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

[16] My own understanding of the state is clearly Weberian, and follows the rich discussion in *Economy and Society* (American ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) and "Politics as a Vocation," in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) as well as the strongly argued thesis on the state in Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and in her other writings.

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cohesive and determined to remain in power even as the state on which it relies crumbles away and loses its ability or resolve to coerce, administer, and extract resources.[17] Where a state does not disintegrate in the context of a political transition, it may (or may not) serve a new democratic regime as well as it served an earlier authoritarian one. The ability of new regimes to restructure or "purge" the state, moreover, varies significantly from case to case. Indeed, the state/regime distinction may prove analytically useful even for cases in which it does not correspond to easily differentiated empirical entities.

More concretely, the individuals and collectivities that fill the central roles in states are not always the same as those who do so in regimes. The military, a central institution in any state, is quite marginal in some authoritarian regimes. Without question, official parties in authoritarian systems are part of the regime, but it is not at all clear that they should be viewed as part of the state. Intellectuals, policy advisers, and journalists, as well as former government officials—including well-known former ministers—all may be part of the political community in an authoritarian regime even if they hold no state office or duty. Such 'regime figures,' or regime actors, may play a significant part in authoritarian systems both in normal times and during moments of systemic transformation. Their role is not limited to the objective of legitimation (or delegitimation), but encompasses matters of political strategy and intrigue that may prove central to the political trajectory followed by a regime. By contrast, many centrally important state actors—for example, the judiciary and the civil service as well as the military—play little or no role in regime politics in nonmilitary authoritarian regimes such as Franco Spain. But their capacity to disrupt the regime, should they choose to ignore their traditional marginalization from politics, is clear to all and could be decisive in crucial moments, especially during a transition or attempted transition.

In the case of Spain, the objective of returning to democracy eventually came to be assumed by significant sectors within the regime. Following the death of Franco, and under pressure from the opposition, these sectors began the difficult but ultimately successful process of transition by negotiated reform. The initiative for reform, however, should not be viewed as the clear policy of a united government; some governmental figures, such as Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro did not cooperate

[17] This seems to have been the case in the waning days or months of the Shah's regime in Iran when first government bureaucrats and ultimately the army itself refused to carry out state functions. Such a configuration, if sustained for any significant period of time, is likely to lead to the type of crisis that, according to Skocpol (fn. 16), underpins social revolution.

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fully and nevertheless remained in office until summer 1976. On the other hand, many 'regime figures'—including some who held no formal governmental responsibilities—did play a fundamentally important role.[18] By contrast, state actors (with the extremely important exception of King Juan Carlos[19] who, in some sense, represented both state and regime) never moved to advance the cause of redemocratization; to the extent that they have been a factor at all, they have appeared to threaten the political opening at various points. The most dramatic incident occurred on February 23, 1981, when an attempted military coup by a minority within the armed forces seriously endangered the new democratic system.[20] Indeed, reformist Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez (named to that post in July 1976) found it necessary to override significant pressure from the military in order to implement democratic reforms such as the legalization of the Communist party in April 1977; frequent rumors of pro-coup conspiracies within the military punctuated the transition.

This specific location of the impetus for change helped produce a new political system in which the authoritarian regime was never totally rejected symbolically even though it was fully superseded and transformed. Moreover, regime actors from the old Franco system have been able to play central roles in the new democratic system to the extent that they accept the political change. Adolfo Suarez, the founding prime minister of the new democracy and a political veteran of the *Movimiento*, the old regime party, is only the most obvious example of this broader pattern. By helping to initiate and guide the transition, the reformist sector of the old regime participated in the shaping of the new one. And the marginality in the transition of the state, as such, left its structures intact. The Spanish transition was the only one in Southern Europe in which no purge of the state was possible; moreover, the fear of a military intervention against democracy helped to restrain the more radical instincts of some political actors.

In Portugal, on the other hand, the regime proved incapable of reforming itself to any significant degree even after Salazar passed from the scene. Thus, political actors from the old regime lost the ability to shape the new democracy or the transition period. Instead, the impetus for change came from within the state in the form of a middle-level

[18] Good sources in English include Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London: Methuen, 1986); Carr and Fusi (fn. 8); and Share (fn. 8).

[19] For an analysis of the role of Juan Carlos in the transition to democracy, see Joel Podolny, *The Role of Juan Carlos, the King of Spain, in the Consolidation of the Spanish Parliamentary Monarchy* (Social Studies Honors Thesis, Harvard College, Spring 1986).

[20] For an especially good discussion in English of the coup attempt and its political antecedents, see Preston (fn. 18).

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officers' revolt in the military. The regime was overthrown—something that never happened in Spain—because it had failed to initiate or channel the process of political change. Moreover, the location of the revolt within the military—specifically at the captains' level—seriously undermined the structure of hierarchy in that institution. With the ensuing politicization and division of the military, the stage was set for revolutionary mobilizations that have left an enduring mark on Portugal.[21] Unlike in Spain, where the military remained a cohesive force and a potential threat to a moderate and reformist process of democratization, the military in Portugal helped initiate leftist popular mobilizations and quickly lost the cohesion and discipline necessary to serve as an effective and predictable instrument of state coercion. The ensuing revolutionary mobilizations—in part a result of the shifting balance of power and strategies within the state[22]—transformed the ownership of land in large areas of the country and led to numerous expropriations in urban centers as well, including the entire banking sector. Significant numbers of those involved in the old authoritarian structure of power, including the secret police, were purged.[23]

At a certain level of abstraction, it may be valid to argue that the transitions in both Spain and Portugal were initiated or led by forces within the circle of political power or domination; but the causes and the consequences of the two transitions, as well as the actors and the processes, differ enormously. It is in no sense sufficient to summarize the entire difference with the common dichotomy *reforma/ruptura*.

In Greece, as in Portugal, the military helped to initiate the political change. In the Greek case, however, it is difficult to locate this initiative squarely in the regime or the state, given the military character of the regime and the consequent overlapping of these two analytically distinct entities. In a sense, one can argue that, when removing itself from power, the military acted more as an institution of the state than of the regime. In the summer of 1974, in the wake of the military crisis with Turkey over Cyprus, the armed forces' highest leadership reinstituted military-institutional control over the political hierarchy of the junta and then quickly handed over power to civilian democratic politicians. Nikiforos

[21] For excellent discussions of the Portuguese transition, with the expected emphasis on the role of the military, see the chapters by Kenneth Maxwell in the *Transitions* volume, and in Herz (fn. 3). An outstanding analysis of the revolution in agrarian social relations is found in Nancy G. Bermeo, *The Revolution within the Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

[22] Bermeo, *ibid.*, emphasizes this point.

[23] See Antonio Costa Pinto, "Revolution and Political Purge in Portugal's Transition to Democracy" in Stein U. Larsen, ed., *Modern Europe after Fascism: 1945-1980's* (Bergen: Norwegian University Press, forthcoming).

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Diamandouros, in his compelling analysis in the *Transitions* volume, states that "the Joint Chiefs, invoking the threat of war, reasserted the hierarchical lines of command within the armed forces and effectively neutralized ... the hard-liners" (p. 157). The change occurred rapidly and provided no opportunity for the military to shape the new democracy (as is possible in a regime-initiated transition). In view of the broad support for political intervention within the military, it would, however, be a mistake to completely counterpose the armed forces as a state institution against the junta as a military regime.[24]

In any event, the Greek military acted as an institution and preserved its discipline and hierarchy. By contrast, in the Portuguese case, the location of the coup at the captains' level and the actual exercise of power by the military initiated a period of politicization and internal division within the armed forces. Although the cases of both Greece and Portugal can be seen as state-initiated transitions, the institutional integrity and quick withdrawal from political power of the Greek military explain why no revolutionary mobilization took place in Greece. In Greece, as in Portugal, however, a symbolic break occurred between regimes, and a purge of leaders from the authoritarian period was feasible, even if limited. In Spain, such a purge never took place; the loyalty of the military remained a troublesome question for democratic political leaders for several years. In some respects, the Greek case may thus be seen as lying between the other two.

The distinction between state and regime is important not only for identifying the source of the democratizing initiative, but also for understanding the subsequent trajectory of political change: the location of the impetus for political change within the circles of power has implications for the ability of the transitional political formation to carry out functions associated with state and regime. Thus, regime-initiated transitions like the Spanish one are better able to channel links between society and the center of political power and to determine who will have access to the latter. Regime reformists are able to help steer the transition and define the boundaries of the new democratic system. They may, however, be vulnerable to pressure or threats from within the state itself. By contrast, where state actors initiate the transition, they will probably not be able to participate to the same extent in defining the new political system, but they can at least guarantee the ability of the new civilian political lead-

[24] For data from an empirical study of the Greek military during the junta's time in power, see George Andrew Kourvetaris, "Professional Self-Images and Political Perspectives in the Greek Military," *American Sociological Review* 36 (December 1971).

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ership to administer and coerce effectively—so long as state institutions maintain their unity and internal discipline. Where state cohesion and institutional hierarchy are undermined by the transition, however, as in Portugal, some state functions may no longer be reliably carried out, and the stage is prepared—following Skocpol's formulation—for social revolutionary mobilization, provided that revolutionary actors are available.[25]

Each type of transition suggests specific analytical inquiries. For regime-initiated redemocratizations where the state remains in place, perhaps the most important question concerns the relationship between state and regime in both political settings—under authoritarian rule and in the new democratic context.[26] Was the state, under authoritarian rule, closely associated with the specific form of the regime, or was it seen as more or less politically neutral and bureaucratic (with the possible exception of certain highly specific and isolated state institutions that were strongly linked to repressive authoritarian policies)? Furthermore, are state institutions, under democracy, predictable and effective in carrying out state functions within the structure of democratic legality? Are state entities effectively subject to democratic political control?

Where state actors initiate the transition, the crucial question is whether they retain their internal discipline and unity (as in Greece), or lose those qualities (as in Portugal). If the state initiators of a transition undermine the existing hierarchy and cohesion of state institutions, the state is less able to fulfill its distinctive functions; the result may be more wide-ranging mobilization and transformation.

Where state and regime are closely intertwined, as in Greece, a distinctive question is whether the institutions or actors that initiate the transition behave, during the transition, as regime or as state. The Greek transition tended to take the latter form, initiated by what Stepan calls "the military as institution"; this helps to explain how so much could be changed so quickly by the new democratic political leadership—including the purging of some military elements strongly associated with repressive policies. Other factors are undoubtedly also important in accounting for the ability of Greece's new democratic rulers to impose a decisive political opening quickly and to purge a significant number of military hard-liners within a year after the transition. In other parts of

[25] See Skocpol (fn. 16).

[26] A rich discussion of differing configurations of relations (under authoritarianism) between the coercive apparatus and the governmental institutions is presented by Stepan (fn. 14, 1988).

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the world, some military-led transitions have given way to limited—or even facade—regimes of democracy that coexist with unaccountable centers of repression within the state apparatus.[27]

This line of analysis suggests that democratic transition is more likely to be successful where state and regime can be distinguished from one another. Where the distinction is not easily drawn—because of "fusion" between the two in a military dictatorship, or totalitarian penetration of the state by the regime, or confusion between the two under personal rulership—special problems are likely to emerge in the process of democratization.

The distinction between state and regime is a useful starting point for the comparative analysis of transitions, but it is only a starting point. Major differences between the Portuguese and Greek cases underscore the importance of moving beyond this distinction in order to incorporate other significant factors within any causal analysis. No matter where we choose to locate the actors analytically, their political perspective(s), their internal cohesion or division, and the political mechanisms available to them, all help to determine the role assumed by the initiators of a transition.

If the consequences and the broad outlines of different patterns of political transition are sharply divergent, their causes may be quite dissimilar as well, despite the historical clustering of the processes. It is certainly reasonable to inquire whether the types of factors that help to push a regime toward transition differ from those that induce pressure for political change from sectors of the state largely outside the regime. It is not possible here to provide a complete inventory of relevant factors, but at least one centrally important political component of transitions should be considered: the delegitimation of the old regime and the legitimation of new forms of political rule.

The Delegitimation of Authoritarian Rule: New Crises or Historical Obsolescence?

Despite the emphasis placed on the issue of legitimacy by analysts of the transitions, the problem is rarely posed in terms of the *original* legitimation formula for authoritarian rule and the means available for its

[27] This is most clearly the case in some Central American countries; see Jennifer Schirmer, "Oficiales de la Montaña: Based on an Exclusive Interview with the Guatemalan Golpistas of May 11, 1988," *Human Rights Internet Reporter* 13 (Spring 1989), 13-16. In the case of Brazil, analysts have questioned the fully democratic character of the political formation; see Frances Hagopian, " 'Democracy by Undemocratic Means'?: Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil," *Comparative Political Studies* (forthcoming), and Stepan (fn. 14).

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undoing. Authoritarian rule frequently legitimates itself through reference to a founding crisis, an event, or a series of occurrences that the regime asserts it is uniquely able to overcome. It follows that the delegitimation of such a regime may occur through the appearance of a new crisis that it manifestly fails to handle adequately; alternatively, relevant political sectors may seek to demonstrate that the founding crisis of authoritarian rule has been historically superseded, and that therefore the regime is obsolete. We may think of these two alternatives for delegitimizing authoritarianism as *crises of failure* and *crises of historical obsolescence*.[28] The delegitimation of the Portuguese and Greek regimes took the form of crises of failure—in both instances of a military nature. In the Spanish context, the forces of democracy were not blessed with any equivalent glaring failure of the regime. In this setting, the delegitimation of authoritarian rule required that the relevant political sectors (in the opposition and within the reformist wing of the regime) demonstrate repeatedly that the founding crisis of authoritarian rule had been historically overcome, and that the country was no longer divided into two opposed camps. Authoritarian rule—and most specifically its claim to legitimacy—was thus faced with a crisis of historical obsolescence. The effort of regime reformists and the opposition to delegitimize authoritarianism pushed both political sectors toward accommodation and moderation, thus further tending to preclude any purge of the state.

The character and depth of the foundational crisis of authoritarian regimes—and the coherence of the associated legitimation claims—help to account for the form taken by subsequent transitions. The Greek regime of 1967-1974 emerged from a much less overwhelming crisis than did those of the other two countries.[29] Indeed, Diamandouros maintains

[28] This distinction is to some extent suggested by the formulation of Adam Przeworski in his essay, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (fn. 14). Synthesizing the arguments of others, Przeworski proposes that, to the extent that legitimation is a significant factor, a regime may lose its legitimacy when "it has realized the functional needs that led to its establishment" or for other reasons (p. 50). This suggests that we might counterpose crises of failure and of success. However, I prefer to think in terms of historical obsolescence rather than success since regimes may be overtaken by historical developments that are in no sense their own successes. Moreover, the notion of historical obsolescence suggests more forcefully the need of central political actors to argue that the regime is obsolete, and to support this assertion with their actions and rhetoric. Political arguments (albeit with material referents) rather than objective conditions such as 'the realization of functional needs' are, after all, the essence of legitimation or delegitimation.

[29] On the virtual disintegration from within of the Portuguese First Republic and the foundations for five decades of authoritarian rule, see Douglas Wheeler, *The First Portuguese Republic* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), and Stanley Payne, *A History of Spain and Portugal* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973). The bibliography on the social and political conflict in Spain in the 1930s, culminating in the outbreak of civil war, is too lengthy to be covered adequately here.

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that the junta never enjoyed the same legitimacy with its potential sociopolitical base on the right as did its Iberian counterparts; thus, "the regime's ideological legitimation strategy assigned a preeminent role to the eventual return to democratic institutions and competitive politics" (p. 148). The weakness of the regime's initial claim to legitimacy and its associated inability to institutionalize itself in any serious fashion, as much as the ultimate crisis of failure and the state-led character of the transition, may account for the significant political room for maneuver enjoyed by Greece's new democratic regime.[30] The changes rapidly instituted under the new democracy should not be underestimated: in addition to the purge of some pro-authoritarian sectors within the state apparatus, these changes included the legalization of the Communist party (which had been banned since the civil war) and the end of the monarchy.

As the reader may have noted, there is an affinity between crises of obsolescence and regime-led transition on the one hand, and crises of failure and state-led transitions on the other. It is not likely, however, that the type of crisis alone determines whether state or regime will initiate a transition. Among the factors that shape the way in which states and regimes respond to crises are the political perspectives within them, their internal unity or division, and the mechanisms available to them to influence political life. Thus, neither all states nor all regimes would respond in equivalent ways to similar crises. The Portuguese regime did, in a sense, face a crisis of obsolescence—given the great historical distance of its founding justification—but it was unable to reform itself. One might speculate also that the Spanish state—or, more specifically, the military—even if faced with a severe crisis of failure, would have been slower than the Greek or Portuguese army to call an end to authoritarian rule.

Despite the considerable attention that analysts of transitions have given to the dynamics of legitimation or delegitimation, the explanatory value of legitimacy has been challenged by Przeworski and others.[31] In response to such criticisms, it is worth noting that the concept of legitimacy refers to phenomena that are much more specific than certain types of political behavior—such as obedience, diffuse ill-defined support, or political preference—with which it is sometimes confused. Legitimacy

[30] These features of the Greek case obviously raise the question whether it should be seen as an "authoritarian situation" in the terms of Juan Linz's formulation of the Brazilian case. See Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

[31] See Przeworski (fn. 28).

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in the Weberian sense involves the issuing of a rather specific claim by those in power to justify their position of domination and affirm their right to issue *binding* commands; full legitimacy also entails that staff and subjects accept that claim as valid. It is of course possible to obey, and perhaps even accept as relatively benign, an authoritarian regime without actually supporting its claim to legitimacy. Authoritarian regimes would certainly like to be considered legitimate by all or most citizens; but to survive, they require legitimacy only within the fairly specific circles of their own political supporters and the state. Democracy, on the other hand, probably requires a more broad-based legitimacy if it is to be stable. Thus, a successful transition requires not only the delegitimation of authoritarian rule for some of its former supporters, but also the legitimation of the new democratic regime.

Researchers using both inferential and direct measures have studied the legitimacy of the new democracy more thoroughly in the Spanish case than in the other two.[32] The legitimacy of democracy—and, more importantly, of the state under democracy—has been widely accepted in Spain, which has helped to assure the success of the transition.[33] This legitimacy would probably have been far more tenuous if the state as a whole (rather than only certain limited components of it) had been tightly identified with the Franco regime. Of course, some elements of the state—most dramatically during the attempted coup of February 23, 1981—have identified with the authoritarian past. Their sentiments, and the widespread concern over the potential disloyalty of others, helped to restrain governmental and political action. But ultimately, the pockets of disloyalty within the state were isolated and deactivated. At this time, Spain's democracy rests not just on a regime of competition among more or less mutually secure parties,[34] but also on the existence of state structures of coercion and administration which are legitimate for most Spaniards and loyal to the democratically elected authorities. The behavior of state institutions may at times be a source of frustration to Spaniards; but

[32] For differing approaches to the legitimacy of democracy in Spain, see Peter McDonough, Samuel Barnes, and Antonio Lopez Pina, "The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain," *American Political Science Review* 80 (September 1986), and chaps. XIV and XV of Juan Linz, Manuel Gomez-Reino, Francisco Andres Orizo, and Dario Vila, *Informe Sociológico sobre el cambio político en España: 1975-1981* [Sociological report on the political change in Spain: 1975-1981] (Madrid: Euramerica, 1981).

[33] I attempt an operationalization of the Weberian conception of legitimacy in *Working Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain* (fn. 8). My research findings show the legitimacy of the state under democracy to be a remarkably good 'predictor' of workplace union leaders' support for nationally negotiated wage restraints. See esp. chaps. 5 and 7.

[34] Robert Dahl, in *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), stresses the fundamental importance of mutual security for democracy to survive.

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ultimately, civilian political actors have been free to design a solid new democratic regime on their own.

Distinct Political Trajectories: National Case Studies

The national case studies and monographic investigations of the various transitions represent an important scholarly achievement. These studies are at their best—and are most useful for comparative analysis—when they focus on the most salient, and in many cases distinctive, features of each national case. Indeed, there are important differences among the cases, which must be explored empirically, analyzed, and explained. Distinctive to the Spanish case—in addition to the absence of any purge of state institutions—was the "politics of consensus" encompassing all significant political actors (except for some sectors within the Basque Country).[35] The pervasive moderation (with notable but isolated exceptions on the far right, the far left, and among regional nationalists) and the political forces' joint consultations on major matters have made possible the establishment of a new democratic regime that is accepted by a wide spectrum of adversaries who only four decades earlier were engaged in a bitter civil war.

Spain after Franco, the outstanding book by Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, provides an extraordinarily thorough and compelling analysis of the forging and the practice of this "politics of consensus," and of its impact on the emergence of a new party system. Thanks to an exhaustive program of research, including extensive qualitative interviewing at the elite level and a large sample survey of public opinion at the mass level, the rich work presents many original findings. Moreover, in addition to providing survey data and political science concepts, the work serves as an excellent history of the period; it details little-known facts, especially in the area of elite strategies and of negotiations concerning the constitution and regional policy. At the same time, the authors present a broad and compelling interpretive overview of the foundation of a new democratic system, focusing on the emergence of the party system. They explore the historical foundations—in the memories of the civil war, the transformation of Spanish society, and the dynamics of the transition itself—of the politics of consensus that characterized the early years of democracy. The authors argue convincingly that this consensus rested on a complex interplay between mass-level predispositions and elite-level political initiatives.

[35] On the complexities and internal divisions of Basque politics, see Juan Linz, *Conflicto en Euskadi* [Conflict in the Basque Country] (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986).

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The forging of political parties and of a competitive political arena that permitted veterans of the Franco regime and opposition forces to coexist democratically is shown to have been a difficult process requiring favorable conditions as well as political skill and good will. Clearly, the shape of the new democracy and its chances for survival were powerfully influenced both by the participation in the transition of regime reformers like Adolfo Suarez and the mechanisms used by all democratic forces for 'delegitimating' or undercutting the case for authoritarianism. *In Spain after Franco*, the distinctive contours of Spanish democracy are richly analyzed; far from representing mere idiographic description, the volume provides the basis for comparative analysis and for the explanation of why this case is "so and not otherwise."[36]

The Portuguese case, by contrast, was characterized not only by a purge of state institutions, but also by dramatic political conflicts and revolutionary mobilizations (including the seizing of much property) during the years of regime transition. Most of the recent scholarship on postauthoritarian Portugal has focused on the explanations and consequences of the revolutionary surge. An exception to the general tendency in recent work on Portugal is Walter Opello's *Portugal's Political Development: A Comparative Approach*. Although the book represents much effort and conveys a good deal of interesting information, it avoids or even denies much of what is distinctive about the Portuguese case. The author is so eager to place Portugal within a Western European framework of analysis that he tends to pose only those questions that have been asked before, about rather different cases, by students of political development. Even the survey data deal largely with the most general questions that might be posed in any political system. Opello actually argues strongly against the dominant interpretation of the transition period as a revolutionary (or partially revolutionary) episode. Emphasizing that the end of authoritarianism was precipitated by military initiative rather than popular rebellion, he argues that the dominant interpretation of the period tends "to confuse the rhetoric of revolution with the reality of events that were actually taking place" (p. 65). Opello attributes little importance to the frequently bitter conflicts over control and power in the economy and the state—conflicts that involved mass mobilizations and engendered, at a minimum, highly anxious observation by international powers. The book's argument reflects a limited conception of revolution and a failure to appreciate the particular configuration of state and regime forces that shaped this decisive period of political change in

[36] This is, in Max Weber's phrase, a fundamental objective of the social sciences.

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Portugal. It is, after all, not sufficient to observe that the crucial initiative came "from above"; the distinctive contours of that initiative in Portugal set the case apart from Southern Europe's other two instances of regime- or state-led transition and contribute powerfully to explaining the (ultimately arrested) social revolution of postauthoritarian Portugal. Without some attention to what is distinctive and salient, a case such as that of Portugal cannot be effectively placed in a broader comparative perspective.

To sum up: despite the historical convergence in the mid-1970s of the redemocratization of Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the political processes in these three cases have been remarkably different along several dimensions. The causes of political transition, the identity of the central actors, the paths followed by the political changes, and the broad outlines of the political outcomes are sharply divergent. In Spain, state actors remained uninvolved in the transition process and stood as a potential impediment to change while regime reformists helped to initiate and guide the transition; the result is a polity that is in many respects moderate and restrained. In Portugal, regime actors failed to initiate the move to democracy; a coup of the politicized middle ranks of the military set the stage for a partially successful social revolution, ultimately halted in part by the democratically expressed preferences of the people. In Greece, the military hierarchy, acting as a state institution, took power away from the junta and transferred it to democratic civilian leaders who (after the failure of a coup attempt several months later) were able to carry out a purge of military officers implicated in the abuses of authoritarian rule.

Although international and cross-national historical contexts undoubtedly contributed somewhat to each of the transitions, the three cases do not follow a unified logic. When comparative analysis focuses on differences as well as on similarities, one must be prepared to find that some instances of historical convergence may owe as much to accidents in timing as to any overarching causal configuration.

To emphasize the distinctiveness of specific cases in no sense implies that the comparative enterprise has been abandoned. It simply avoids the false assertion that there is one comprehensive causal constellation accounting for significantly different outcomes and processes. Comparative analysis must delineate and account for differences as well as similarities; it requires the use of concepts that discriminate in useful ways among partially similar and partially different cases. It is to that end that the distinctions drawn in this essay are advanced.

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

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

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